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PREFACE. 
The aim of this thesis is to provide a detailed study of the ideas 
of Oliveira Viana and Roberto Simonsen and an assessment of their 
influence in practice on the social legislation passed by the Vargas 
regime during the period from 1930 to 1945. Oliveira Viana is chiefly 
remembered today as a racist and a corporatist but in the 1920s and 
the early 1930s he was an important innovator in the social sciences 
and an influential political theorist who favoured a strong, author-
itarian, centralised government. Roberto Simonsen, on the other hand, 
is recognised as an early proponent of economic development and a 
leading figure in the foundation of Brazilian industrialists' as soci-
ations. His ideas only came to fruition in the 1950s and 1960s, after 
his death, but in the late 1930s and early 1940s he exercised a con-
siderable influence on the policies of the Vargas government. 
Both of these thinkers are referred to with some frequency in the 
li terature dealing ",i th the period between the two world "Jars, but there 
have been few detailed studies of their work as a whole or of the develop-
ment of their ideas. Such works as there are tend either to vie"J these 
two figures in isolation or else to discuss their position within their 
immediate context. Oliveira Viana ' s ideas have been summarised by his 
1 . 2 biographer, Vasconcelos Torres, and in an article by Jarbas Medekros, 
and his position as a political socio~ogist has been analysed by Paulo 
Edmur de Souza Queiroz.3 He has been compared with Euclides da Cunha 
4 by Marcos Almir Madeira, "'hile a forthcoming thesis by James Lauer "Till 
place him in the context of authoritarian nationalist thought, along-
side Azevedo Amaral and Francisco Campos: Simonsen, on the other hand, 
has been regarded primarily as an economist in a lengthy study by Helena 
iv 
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Fanganiello and he has been compared ",i th the nineteenth century 
7 
entrepreneur Mau~ by Heitor Ferreira Lima; little attention has been 
given to his ideas on society. 8 
This thesis proposes not only to analyse the ideas of these t,,1O 
thinkers but also to relate them to each other and to place them "'ithin 
a wider political and intellectual context. In their lifetime, they 
had little to do with each other, for they had totally divergent back-
grounds and personalities. Viana was a shy, relatively poor son of a 
landowner from the economically depressed state of Rio de Janeiro, who 
lived most of his life in obscurity, only briefly holding a position 
of note as a high official of the Vargas regime . In complete contrast, 
Simonsen was a dynamic industrialist and businessman from the booming 
state of Sao Paulo, with links with the world of high finance and an 
extremely forceful personality. Only late in their lives did their paths 
cross, firstly in a clash over a proposed reform of the legislation 
governing representative associations , and later, incidentally, when 
they were both members of the Academia Brasileira de Letras. 
EQually, on the surface, they appear to belong to Quite different 
intellectual traditions: Viana the conservative political theorist, 
Simonsen the progressive economic developmentalist. Yet if we look 
deeper into their ideas, we can see that they held a number of funda-
mental positions in common. Firstly, they were both anti-liberals: 
Oliveira Viana fought tenaciously against the tenets of political 
liberalism, particularly universal suffrage and local autonomy, while 
Roberto Simonsen attacked economic liberalism in his struggle against 
the free trade ideal and for a protectionist policy. Secondly, both 
Viana and Simonsen were precursors of modern Brazilian nationalismo 
They emphasized that Brazil was different from other countries and 
> 
that it had its own particular problems which needed special remedies 
in order to ensure its national unity, independence and prosperity. Yet 
neither anti-liberalism nor nationalism are terms which adequately de-
fine their basic outlook. Anti-liberalism is a purely negative attitude 
and both men made positive contributions to Brazil ' s development, while 
neither can fully be characterised as a nationalist: Viana because of 
his contempt for Brazil ' s coloured races and his emphasis on the desir-
ability of foreign immigration, Simonsen because of his links with 
international banking and his constant concern with attracting foreign 
capital to Brazil. 
Rather than anti-liberals or nationalists, Oliveira Viana and 
Roberto Simonsen can best be termed "progressive conservatives". Vi ana 
is clearly a conservative in his desire for a hierarchical, authorit-
arian society, but in order to achieve this, he advocated progressive 
measures to strengthen the apparatus of government and open up new 
channels of re~resentation. Simonsen is well-known as a progressive 
proponent of economic development to raise the average standard of 
v 
living, but his objectives were profoundly conservative in that he aimed 
to stave off social revolution and preserve the status quo. Thus both 
Viana and Simonsen were progressive conservatives: they urged progressive 
means but their ends were conservative. 
In practice, their conservatism revealed itself in a distaste for 
egalitarian principles and an open espousal of elitism, while their 
most progressive ideas were related to the role of the State. Viana 
and Simonsen, with differing emphasis, both advocated an expansion of 
the functions of the State: Viana concentrated on its political and 
social functions while Simonsen vIas mainly concerned with its role in 
the economy. Together, in their theoretical writings and in their debates 
over matters of practical policy, they exercised a major influence over 
the development of State intervention in Brazil and helped to define 
the nature and limits of its scope. 
The influence of Oliveira Viana and Roberto Simonsen was felt most 
s t rongly in the area of the social legislation passed by Vargas ' s Min-
istry of Labour, Industry and Commerce. Vi ana , in his capacity as the 
Ministry ' s juridical consultant from 1932 to 1940, and Simonsen, as the 
leader of the principal industrialists ' association from 1938 until 
after Vargas's fall in 1945, were not only responsible for the detailed 
elaboration and implementation of certain laws but also helped to create 
the climate of opinion which moulded the objectives of the government 's 
social policy. The social legislation was generally regarded as the 
Vargas regime ' s most progressive policy; yet, as we shall see, it was 
conservative in its intentions o The ideas of Viana and Simonsen illus-
trate and help to explain the aims of the ruling elite in promulgating 
these la"ls. At the same time, they cast more light on the ambiguous 
nature of Getulio Vargas's government and its shift from cautious 
political reform in the 1930s to bold economic developmental ism in the 
1940s. 
This thesis consists, therefore, of a de tailed analysis of the ideas 
of Oliveira Viana and Roberto Simonsen, plaCing them in the context 
of their period, and of a close examination of three areas of social 
legislation -representative associations, the minimum wage and indus-
trial training, which illustrate the application of their ideas in 
practice. It relies mainly on published works, supplemented by archive 
material and interviews. The archives consulted were the Oliveira 
Viana archive in Viana's former home in Niteroi, Vargas's presidential 
papers and the records of the Conselho Federal do Comercio Exterior in 
vi 
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the Arquivo Nacional in Rio de Janeiro, and the Foreign Office corres-
pondance with the Embassy in Brazil kept at the Public Record Office 
in London.9 I should particularly like to thank Dr. Marcos Almir Madeira 
for allowing me to consult the Oliveira Viana archive \vhile it \>las 
c{osed for reorganisation and D.Edda di Franco for providing me \vi th 
an almost complete collection of Roberto Simonsen ' s published works o 
I owe an especial debt of gratitude to my supervisor, Dr o John 
Street, for his patience and help in preparing this thesis. I should 
also like to thank Dr o Edgard Carone, Luiz Augusto de Rezende Puech, 
Professor Stanley Hilton, Michael Conniff and many others too numerous 
to mention for their assistance and advice. Visits to Brazil \>lere made 
possible by the generosity of the Department of Education and Science 
and the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Finally, I should like 
to express my grati tude to my typist, Mrs. Kathleen Bennett, and last 
but not least, my parents, H. H. and V. D. Howes, for their help and 
encouragement. The responsibility for this thesis however, rests 
entirely with the author. None of it has been prepared in collaboration 
with others and the development and conclusions are entirely mine. 
Cambridge, 10 September 19750 
GLOSSARY. 
associayao profissional: 
bacharel (pI . -eis): 
bacharelismo: 
bancada: 
bandeirante : 
C.F.C.E. (Conselho Fed-
eral do Comercio Exterior): 
C.I.E.S.P. (Centro das 
Industrias do Estado de 
Sao Paulo): 
C.N.I. (Confederay8.o Nac-
ional da Industria) : 
cabo eleitoral: 
carioca : 
caudilho: 
colono : 
coronel (pl. -eis): 
cruzeiro: 
F.I.E.S.F. (Federa y8.o das 
Industrias do Estado de 
Sao .Paulo): 
fazenda: 
fazendeiro: 
fluminense: 
gaucho : 
homenagem: 
interventor: 
latifundio: 
employers' or workers' 
association 
graduate in law 
the predominance of law-
yers in politics 
the delegation of deputies 
from each state in the 
Federal Congress 
pioneer explorer, orig-
inally from Sao Paulo 
Federal Council on Foreign 
Trade 
Centre of Industries of the 
state of Sao Paulo 
Nationa l Confederation of 
Industry 
loca l political lea der 
inhabitant of the city of 
Ri o de Janeiro 
chieftain or leader 
settler 
local politica l leader 
unit of currency adopted 
in 1942 
Federation of Industries 
of the State of Sao Paulo 
rural estate or plantation 
landowner 
inhabitant of the state of 
Rio de Janeiro 
inhabitant of the state of 
Rio Grande do Sul 
formal meeting to express 
support for someone 
state governor appointed 
by the Federal Government 
large rural estate 
M.E.S. ( Minist~rio da 
Educacao e Saude): 
M.T.I.C. ( Minist~rio 
do Trabalho, Industria 
e COIDercio): 
milr~is: 
Rlineiro: 
. , . 
munlclplO: 
parecer: 
paulista: 
profissional: 
9.ueremista: 
rela tor: 
rela t6rio: 
SENAI (Servico Nacional 
de Aprendizagem Industrial ) 
SESI (Servico Social da 
Industria) : 
santista: 
sindica to : 
tenente: 
tenentista : 
trabalhista: 
Ministry of Education 
and Health 
Ministry of IJabour, 
Industry and Tra de 
unit of currency used until 
1942 
inhabitant of the St a te of 
Minas Gerais 
administrative district rough-
ly e9.uivalent to a British 
county 
legal opinion 
inhabitant of the State of 
Sao Paulo 
voca tional or occupational 
l abour supporter of Getulio 
Vargas i n 1945 
the nember of 2, committee 
who presents its report 
report 
National Industria l Appren-
ticeship Service 
Socia l Service of Industry 
inhabitant of the city of 
Santos 
labour union or employers' 
association 
military rebel of the 1920s; 
radical wing of the Revol-
ution of 1930 
supporter of the tenente 
movement 
l abour (a dj.) 
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INTRODUCTION. 
Fe,. countries have changed more in this century than Brazil. Wi th-
in little more than a man's life span, it has been transformed from a 
slave society to a consumer society. Industrialisation has eclipsed 
the predominant position of coffee and given the country the fastest 
rate of economic grovlth in the world. In the cities, the signs of mod-
ernisation are visible on every side: skyscrapers, urban motorways, 
cars, advertising, hire purchase facilities and consumer goods, while 
even the remote interior is awakening under the impact of new roads, 
electricity, television and radio. Brazil has joined the twentieth cen-
tury in spectacular fashion and Brazilians are rightly proud of their 
achievements in opening up their enormous country and developing its 
economic potential . For they are creating, for the first time, a modern 
industrial civilisation in the tropics. 
At the same time, voices of dissent and disillusion are beginning 
to make themselves heard. Economic development has not ushered in the 
millenium: along with the advantages, it has also brought the problems 
of an industrial society. Rio is no longer the "Marvellous City" of 
the 1~30s, as pollution and traffic jams threaten to suffocate it. 
Greater prosperity has not created a stable liberal delnocracy but in-
stead seems to depend on the most rigid and brutal dictatorship in the 
country's history . It is doubtful \-,hether Brazil now has more scope 
for an independent foreign policy than it did in the first half of the 
nineteenth century, when for many years it successfully resisted British 
pressure to end the slave trade. Furthermore, r ecent in~uiries have 
shown that economic development, far from bettering the lot of the 
poor, has increased the ine~uality in the distribution of income and 
"Tealth and led to an absolute as ''1ell as a relative impoverishment of 
the working classes. The divisions between the social classes remain 
as rigid as ever and the ",ords of the old song ironically echo current 
facts: " the rich get richer and the poor get children". 1 
Clearly, economic development has occurred in Brazil and yet it 
has failed to produce the positive benefits "Thich many vlestern liberals 
hoped it would in the 1950s and 1960s. A painful reappraisal is now 
taking place o Yet if we look back at the origins of development and 
the developmental ideology in the case of Brazil, we shall see that the 
resul ts "Thich it is · producing are by no means as inexplicable or unfore-
seen as they now appear. For those who, in the period between the two 
world wars, laid the foundations for Brazil ' s subsequent development were 
not revolutionaries or reformers but conservatives o The policies which 
they advocated are now generally regarded as progressive but their aims, 
at the time, were conservative. Thus they can best be described as 
"progressive conservatives". 
The term is a paradox and requires explanation. Conservatism is 
as much a state of mind as a political ideologyo In its latter guise, 
it has varied according to time and place. The British and American 
conservative tradition has tended to give greater emphasis to individual 
liberty, while the Catholic variant has concentrated on preserving social 
order. But all subscribe to an organic concept of society in that they 
vie,'1 the nation or a community as a ",hole body rather than the sum total 
of its individual members. However, the essence of conservatism is the 
defence of the existing structure of society against those who press 
for change. The specific points of contention have var i ed over the years, 
but since the main thrust of progr es s ive thinking at least since the 
eighteenth century has been tovTards greater equality (religious freedom, 
2 
political and legal rights, universal suffrage, equality of opportunity, 
a more even distribution of wealth and income, etc.), it is fair to 
characterise the conservative response as anti-egalitarianism. Indeed, 
as one conservative vTriter points out: "Conservatives do not make the 
m~stake of thinking that equality before the law and in the sight of 
God somehow implies that all inequalities are unjust. They recognise 
that people, and groups of people, differ in ability and character; and 
2 
they welcome rather than regret such variety". 
It is this belief in the desirability of inequality '''hich marks 
the conservative off from even the most moderate of reformers ",ho, while 
he may accept the inevitability of inequality, will always regret it. 
The most effective form of anti-egalitarianism is elitism or the belief 
that social and political authority should be exercised by a select 
minority, whether it be an aristocracy, a "ruling class" or a "merit-
ocracy"0 Thus, although the preservation of private property and prop-
erty rights is, of course, an important ingredient in practical conser-
vat ism, it is only incidental to the conservative intellectual tradition: 
the heart of this lies in the defence of individual inequality and a 
hierarchical structure of society. 
The progressive conservative is a different category. While he 
shares the anti-egalitarianism of the conservative, thus differentiating 
himself from the reformist, he shovls a ,,,illingness, even an eagerness, 
to accept change and adopt new ideas. His concept of society is not 
static and he is quite ready to take over the methods of progressives 
and turn them to his own advantage. In modern times, the progressive 
conservative has been characterised by his attitude towards the State 
and the question of its intervention in society and the economyo 
Since the late nineteenth century, the most consistent pressure 
3 
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on the status quo has been exerted by socialism which, in this respect, 
represents the main body of progressive thinkingo The socialists have 
explicitly aimed to seize control of the State and use it as an instrument 
of social reform in order to achieve greater equality. Consequently, 
the majority of conservatives, who once regarded the State as an integral 
. 
part of an "organic society", were driven into an uneasy alliance \vi th 
laisser-faire liberals, who emphasized the rights of the individual and 
wished to reduce the functions of the State to a minimum, thus preventing 
any interference in the workings of the economy and social organisation. 
A few conservatives, however, sa\-l that, in the right hands, the 
State could be used for conservative ends. Instead of becoming an in-
strument of socialism, it could be used to bolster the flagging capitalist 
system and thus preserve the existing social structure. These were the 
progressive conservatives. In Britain, an outstanding example of this 
outlook was Harold Macmillan who, in the 1930s, was a strong advocate 
3 
of State intervention and economic planning. In the United States, it 
was Roosevelt and the New Deal. In Brazil, it was Oliveira Viana and 
Roberto Simonsen. 
* * * 
In October 1930, the Liberal Alliance overthrew the government of 
/ President Washington Luis and installed Getulio Vargas in power. For 
the next quarter of a century, that enigmatic little politician from 
the state of Rio Grande do Sul was to dominate the destinies of his 
country. The Revolution of 1930 marks the formal birth of modern Brazil. 
It ushered in a decade of transition in whi ch old str uctures and customs 
were gradually abandoned and there began a process of change which has 
5 
continued to accelerate up to the present day. Yet in reality the changes 
which burst into view in 1930 had been gradually maturing throughout the 
preceding decade: in many ways, the real t urning point came with the 
First World War. 
Prior to the 1914-18 war, the world enjoyed a period of unprecedented 
prosperity created by an international system of free exchange. Brazil 
had been integrated in the world economy from the very begi nning of its 
existence and enjoyed a relatively advantageous position as a colonial 
or semi-colonial supplier of foodstuffs and raw materials to Europe and 
North America. Its economic history was marked by a series of cycles 
of "boom and bust" as brazilwood, sugar, gold, rubber and coffee suc-
ceeded each other as the staple export products and the foundation of 
the economy ' s prosperityo Despite periodic economic crises and the polit-
ical upheavals of the nineteenth and early tvlentieth centuries, Brazil's 
economic structure remained basically unchanged and continued to rely 
on the export market until the 1930s.4 
The country's social structure also changed little. The manner of 
settlement and the requirements of the principal agricultural exports 
(sugar and coffee ) led to the organisation of production on the basis 
of la~ge rural estates, or fazendas. Ownership and wealth were concen-
trated in the hands of a small number of Portuguese-descended fazendeiros 
whilst labour was supplied by native-born freemen and Negro slaves 
imported from Africa. Slavery was finally abolished only in 1688, 
little more than forty years before the Revolution of 19300 Yet, despite 
the harshness of the institution, it left in the countryside a permanent 
residue of personal and social relationships which bound the various 
social classes together with ties of dependency and paternalismo 
This was particularly true of the economically declining areas in 
the Northeast and around Rio de Janeiro. But in the cities and the 
recently-settled areas to the south of Rio, a new style of life was 
rapidly developing. The coastal cities ceased to be mere entrepots for 
the export and import trade as the growth of government and the instal-
. 
lation of public utilities and of factories producing goods for local 
consumption created a small middle class and the beginnings of an urban 
working class. From the middle of the nineteenth century until the First 
World War, industry was situated mainly in Rio de Janeiro but by 1920 
Sao Paulo had taken the lead and thereafter continued to grow at an 
ever-increasing rate, soon emerging as the largest concentration of 
industry in Brazil and in the whole of South America. These changes 
were accompanied and accelerated by a vast influx of European immigrants 
in the years between the abolition of slavery and the outbreak of the 
First World War. Italians, Spaniards and Portuguese came to work on 
the rapidly expanding coffee plantations of Sao Paulo, frequently drif-
ting later to, the towns and cities where they engaged in commerce or 
industry. Further south, in Santa Catarina and Rio Grande do SuI, German 
and Italian colonists opened up the interior and settled in small 
European-style peasant communities. These changes were not sufficient, 
however, to alter the overall character of Brazil, which remained a 
predominantly agricultural, patriarchal society throughout the early 
decades of this century. 5 
Only in politics were there marked changes. The declaration of 
independence from Portugal in 1822 displaced the colonial administrators 
and created a new native-born ruling class, without altering the economic 
and social structures inherited from colonial times o In the absence of 
local traditions of self-government, the new rulers of Brazil turned 
to Europe and particularly Britain for a suitable model, adopting a 
6 
system of constitutional monarchy and parliamentary government ,."hich 
proved admirably suited to the interests of the country's dominant 
aristocracy. The Empire gave Brazil a period of peace, prosperity 
and stability such as it has never enjoyed since. To a large extent, 
however, the success of the parliamentary system was the result of the 
wisdom and moderation of the Emperor, Dom Pedro 11, who effectively 
6 
controlled its workings through his "moderating pO"Ter". 
In 1889, hO"Tever, the Empire ,."as overthrmm in a military coup 
and replaced by a republic. There followed a decade of civil strife, 
revolutions and dictatorship as the military and elements in the urban 
middle classes struggled to hold on to political powero Gradually, 
however, the rural landowners reasserted their authority, aided by the 
boom in coffee exports which was rapidly turning S~o Paulo into the 
dominant region in the country. In effect, the Republic did little 
more than change the institutions of government and help the oligarchy 
of Sao Paulo to replace the aristocracy of the State of Rio de Janeiro 
as the dominant political force. 1 
The new balance of political forces emerged clearly during the 
presidency of Campos Salles (1898-1902)0 The republican constitution 
of 1891 was modelled on that of the United States with its system of 
federal states and the separation of the executive, legislative and 
judicial pO"Ters, and followed the tenets of liberal democracy with its 
emphasis on individual liberties, local autonomy and universal suffrage. 
Brazil ' s social conditions and historical traditions were very different 
from the United States', however, and the system proved workable only 
when it was deformed in practice. Campos Salles wanted to secure a 
foreign loan in order to stabilise Brazil's financial situation and to 
achieve this, he needed political stability at home. He, therefore, 
devised a policy which became known as the "politica dos governadores" 
(governors' politics), "lhereby an alliance was made bet"Teen the President 
7 
of the Republic, or federal executive, and the dominant political 
grouping in each state (known as the "situation") . The federal govern-
ment gave each "situation" a free hand in its own region in return for 
which the "situations" provided a docile,pro-government majority in 
t~e federal Congress. This ensured relative stability and maintained 
the appearances of a democratic regime at the national level, since the 
two dominant states of Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais agreed to rotate the 
Presidency between themselves. 
Thus the clash of interests and the bitterness of political in-
8 
fighting moved to the local level where different groups fought f.erociously 
to become the predominant regional force and so gain federal support. 
Fraud, violence, intimidation and bribery were the currency of politics 
in the munic{pios as "oppositionists" and "situationists" struggled to 
gain or retain power. Sometimes, political struggles led to bloody 
family feuds which lasted for several generations. To be in the 
opposition was a distinctly unrewarding task when state and local govern-
ments applied the traditional Latin American alternative of "pao ou pau" 
(bread or the stick) . Or, in the elegant phrase of one politician from 
Minas Gerais: "To one's friends one does justice, to one's enemies 
one applies the law" . 8 
The early years of the twentieth century marked the apogee of the 
international free trade system founded on the unimpeded movement of 
the factors of production, which was the basic tenet of economic lib-
eralism. Brazil exported coffee in ever increasing quantities and in 
return imported foreign manufactured goods, foreign capital and foreign 
labour. It seemed that almost everything vlOrth having, from French 
cheese to Spanish prostitutes, came from abroad. A campaign was under-
taken to rid the cities of yellow fever and make them safe for the 
foreigners. The Brazilian elite looked to Europe for their cultural 
models and Rio was rebuilt in French style with the aid of a foreign 
loan. In parts of Sao Paul 0 , Italian was the principal language. 
Yet already there were signs of impending dangers. By the turn 
of the century, the supply of coffee was exceeding demand and in 1906 
the governments of Brazil's main coffee-producing states agreed on the 
first of a series of schemes designed to regulate the export of coffee 
and so maintain stable prices at a high level. Such schemes achieved 
their objectives in the short run but in the long term they proved 
disastrous since by maintaining profitability they encouraged continued 
expansion of productiono The size of the coffee crop continued to 
grow and finally overwhelmed the support schemes in the late 1920s.9 
Equally instructive and far more dramatic was the fate of rubber. 
For a few years at the beginning of the motor-car era, Brazil was the 
principal source of the world's supply of natural latex. The resultant 
prosperity created the extravagances for which Manaus became internat-
ionally famous but gave the Brazilians no stimulus to improve methods 
of production. The boom collapsed within a few years when British 
companies flooded the market with rubber from scientifically-controlled 
plant~tions in Halaya. 
The outbreak of the First World War in 1914 doomed the liberal 
system, although the fundamental changes being wrought by the European 
conflict were not at first evident in Brazil. Brazilians watched the 
conflict with intense excitement, identifying with one or other side 
and particularly with France, the mecca of the cultured elite. The 
difficulties in shipping reduced imports and gave a temporary stimulus 
to local industry, which worked flat out and pro~pered during the war. 
9· 
At the same time the war created a wave of inflation which caused severe 
difficulties for the middle and working classes, giving rise to consider-
able social unrest in its later years. 
After the \-Tar, foreign trade returned to normal and continued to 
grow during the 1920s but there were increasing problems caused by the 
over-production of coffee, which \-Tare only temporarily relieved by ne\v 
price-support schemes. Problems were also caused by the level of infla-
tion and fluctuations in the exchange rate, and in the middle of the 
decade, Brazilian industry went through a severe recession when the 
government tried to stabilise the currency. 
At the same time, the political system of the Old Republic came 
under increasing attack. Intellectual dissatisfaction with the status 
quo was manifested in the modernist movements of the 1920s while a more 
direct threat came from attempted military uprisings in Rio in 1922 
and Sao Paulo in 1924, and the revolutionary Prestes Column which 
10 
roamed the interior from 1924 to 1926. The military rebels of the 1920s, 
who came to be known as tenentes since most of them were young junior 
officers of the rank of lieutenant (tenente) or captain, provided a 
permanent source of disaffection and later formed the vanguard of the 
forces which overthre\v the Old RepUblic. 
Events came to a head in late 1929 and 1930. A bumper harvest led 
to the collapse of the coffee support scheme, which coincided with the 
Wall Street crash, causing an acute economic crisis.in Brazil, with the 
drop in export earnings and the withdrawal of foreign capital leading 
to a fall in the exchange rate. Particularly hard-hit \vas the great 
coffee-producing state of S~o Paulo. At the same time the country 
entered a period of political crisis connected with the presidential 
elections due to be held in J anuary 1930. Under the informal arrange-
10 
ment by which the Old Republic was governed , the incumbent paulista 
President, Washington Luis, should have handed on the office to a repre-
sentative of the state of Minas Geraiso However, Washington Lu{s was 
anxious to ensure the continuation, despite the crisis, of the monetary 
a~d exchange stablisation plan which he had inaugurated in 1926 and he 
chose as his successor J~io Prestes, a proteg~ of his, who was then 
governor of Sao Paulo o 
In retaliation, the leading politicians of Minas Gerais, Rio Grande 
do Sul and Paraiba and a number of opposition politicians from the other 
states banded together in the Alian~a Liberal to back the candidature 
of Getulio Vargas, the governor of Rio Grande do Sul. Vargas was 
defeated at the ballot-box by the traditional means of fraud, bribery 
and intimidation. However, after a good deal of hesitation, the Alian~a 
Liberal politicians joined Hith the military rebels of the 1920s and 
launched a revolution against Washington Lu{s in October 1930. With-
11 
in three weeks, the political structure of the Old Republic disintegrated 
and Vargas installed himself as Head of the Provisional Government, 
11 
assuming temporary dictatorial powers. 
The Revolution of 1930 solved none of the problems faCing Brazil. 
Vargas tried to meet the collapse of Brazil ' s foreign trade and the 
demands of its creditors with an orthodox policy of financial retrench-
ment and administrative reform in an attempt to achieve a balanced 
budget and stabilise the currency. The greatest problem, however, was 
that of coffee Hhich not only created economic and financial difficulties 
but also added to the bitterness of political conflicto Vargas tried 
successive measures in an attempt to increase coffee exports and safe-
guard the interests of the politically influential coffee growers, 
introducing measures of exchange control and even flirting briefly Hith 
Nazi Germany on the question of bilateral trade. The attempt to restore 
the pre-1930 pattern of trade was unsuccessful, however: the volume 
of coffee exports grew but prices continued at a low level. 
Nevertheless, the measures to aid a£riculture also helped industry 
b~ keeping up domestic demand for locally-produced goods. As it became 
increasingly apparent in the late 1930s that the future prospects of 
the export trade were not bright, the government turned to the internal 
market and began to consider a policy of industrialisation. Urgency 
was added to its deliberations by the outbreak of the Second World War, 
"Thich made local self-sufficiency and domestic manufacture a matter of 
national survival. By the end of the war, industry had established it-
self in an unassailable position and despite frequent setbacks in 
subsequent years, the foundations had been laid for a comprehensive 
policy of industrialisationo 
Vargas's handling of economic matters was generally orthodox and 
conservative. Shifts in economic policy came gradually and were the 
result of the pressure of events rather than of conscious governmental 
initiatives 0 The major innovations of the early Vargas years were in 
the field of social relations. Immediately after assuming power, the 
new government embarked on a policy of social legislation intended to 
improve the lot of the urban working class. Laws were passed setting 
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up social security funds, regulating working conditions, limiting the 
hours of work and eventually establishing minimum wages. An important 
element in the new policy was the encouragement of sindicatos (employers' 
associations and labour unions). The government's original intention 
was to organise the workforce and discipline industr ial relations, 
thus removing their potential for causing revolutionary conflicts. Some 
of its more radical supporters, however, sa"T the sindicatos as 
instruments for creating a new political system of "class representation" 
which would replace the outmoded methods of liberal democracy. In 
place of individual rights and representatives elected by "the people" 
through universal suffrage, there would be a hierarchical, corporative 
regime with representatives elected by workers and employers through 
their sindicatos. 
The years immediately following the Revolution of 1930 were marked 
12 by recurrent political crises. Until the mid-1930s, Vargas's political 
posi tion '-las by no means secure. Within a year of the Revolution, a 
spli t had developed betvleen the radical military or tenentista wing 
of the October revolutionaries, many of ' .... hom had vague, fascistic 
leanings, and the more conservative politicians vTho wanted a return tOt .. 
constitutional government. The trouble centred on the economically 
vital state of Sao Paulo, which had suffered a great loss of political 
influence as a result of the Revolution. In July 1932, the traditional 
paulista elite led the state into an open rebellion against the Vargas 
government . Although the military situation quickly reached stale-
mate and the paulistas failed to regain their former ascendancy, they 
succeeded in demonstrating Sao Paulo's continuing strength. Vargas 
accept~d a compromise by which Sao Paulo yielded to his authority in 
return for the promise of elections to a constituent assembly which 
would draw up a new constitution for the country. The Constituent 
Assembly met in late 1933 and, after prolonged debates, promulgated 
a new constitution in July of the following year. The Constitution of 
1934 tried to please everybody and in the end pleased nobody. It 
attempted to combine Brazil's traditional federal and liberal demo-
cratic regime with elements of corporativist-style class represent-
ation, social welfare provisions borrowed from the Weimar Constitution, 
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and nationalistic provisions on the ownership of mineral and energy 
resources, banking and insurance. Vargas was elected President by the 
Constituent Assembly and continued in powero 
Dissatisfaction with the new constitutional regime and with the 
liberal democratic system which i t represented grew apace and was 
. 
reflected in the mid-1930s by the rapid growth of tyro extremists parties, 
the fascist A9ao Integralista Brasileira and the popular front Alian9a 
Nacional Libertadora: 3The communists made an unsuccessful bid for 
power in November 1935 with military uprisings in the Northeast and Rio. 
This gave Vargas the chance to declare a state of siege, regaining many 
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of the discretionary powers which he had enjoyed until 1934 and unleashing 
a wave of repression which contrasted markedly with the lenient treat-
ment given to the upper class leaders of the Sao Paulo revolution in 
1932. 
Vargas then had to face the challenge of the preSidential election 
scheduled for 1938 in which, according to the 1934 Constitution, he 
could not succeed himself. Three candidates presented themselves: the 
government-backed candidate was Jose Americo de Almeida, who promptly 
alienated many of his supporters with his radical rhetoric; the other 
two candidates were Armando de Salles Oliveira, the conservative governor 
of Sao Paulo, and Pl!nio Salgado, the leader of the Integralist fascists. 
None of the candidates succeeded in capturing the public imagination. 
Vargas, meanwhile, had engineered the resignation of his principal rival, 
Flores da Cunha, from the governership of Rio Grande do SuI. On 10 
November 1937 with the support of the Army leaders, Goes Monteiro and 
Eurico Gaspar Dutra, Vargas made a pre-emptive coup d'~tat, closing 
Congress and promulgating a new authoritarian constitution. 
The installation of the Estado Novo (New State), as the new regime 
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was called, was received with apathy in Brazil. The Congress had proved 
too factious and too barren in practical measures to generate any regret 
at its passing. Vargas immediately took measures to combat the impending 
crisis in the coffee and import trades, and throughout 1938 a flood of 
legislation poured forth dealing with a wide range of economic and 
administrative matters \.,hich had been held up by delays in the Congress. 
The Constitution of 1937 was culled from a number of sources, being des-
cribed by one cri tic as "a constitutional tutti-frutti in vThich there 
are mixed texts from the Weimar Constitution, the Polish Constitution 
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of 35 and the Eire Constitution of 36"0 It provided for a corporative 
Council of National Economy to replace the Congress but, in fact, it 
was never put into practice and remained little more than a cover for 
Vargas's personal dictatorship.1 5 No attempt was made to create a fascist-
style popular party but the output of propaganda was stepped up and 
later, as liberal opposition mounted, Vargas toyed with the idea of 
using his social legislation to mobilise popular support among the 
working classes. In practice, however, such attempts went no further 
than rhetoric and politics remained confined to the small circle of the 
civilian elite and the top military. 
\{i th the outbreak of the Second World Vlar and the German victories 
in Europe, Vargas assumed an ambiguous position of neutrality; but with 
the increasing involvement of the United States he eventually brought 
Brazil firmly down on the side of the Allies. In January 1942, Brazil 
broke off diplomatic relations with the Axis and in August, declared 
war. Alone among the Latin American nations, Brazil sent an expeditionary 
force to Europe Hhich fought in Italy. The vTar, however, eventually 
proved to be Vargas's undoing. The victory of the democracies, with 
\.,hich Brazil was allied, made it impossible to continue the dictatorship 
at home. Vargas hoped to ride out the storm at the end of the war and 
continue as President but in October 1945, the same military who had 
installed the Estado Novo overthrew him and opened the way for a return 
to democratic governmento 
* * * 
The 1930s marked a unique point in Brazil's history: for once it 
enjoyed a relative freedom to manoeuvre amongst the competing foreign 
or imperialist forces which were trying t o mould its destiny. Brazil 
had come into existance as a colony of Portugal and throughout the 
nineteenth cent ury was linked to Britain in a semi-colonial relation-
ship, depending on British capital and British manufactures. With the 
expansion of coffee production in the late nineteenth century, however, 
Brazilian trade was increasingly directed t owards the United States. 
Large-scale American investment in Brazil began after the First World 
War and was pr~senting a serious threat to British pre-eminence by 
1930, although the value of British capital still far exceeded that of 
the United States. In the 1930s, Britain fought a rearguard action to 
protect its financial links with Brazil ,.,hile the United States had to 
beat off a challenge to its trade from Nazi Germany.16 
The Brazilians were abl~ to a limited extent, to play off these 
conflicting foreign interests against each other and use them in their 
own interests o At the same time, they were made forcefully aware of 
the dangers of relying on foreign markets, capital and goodwill . In-
creasingly Brazilians looked in upon their OYln country, identified new 
problems and sought to find solutions to them within their mm frontiers. 
Their slogan was "national realities" and the main theme of their argu-
16. 
ment was that "Brazil is different" o 
The political turmoi l of the 1930s was foreshadowed by the ferment 
in intellectual and cultural circles in the 1920so The growing disen-
chantment with the system of the Old Republic emerged forcefully in the 
controversial Semana de Arte Moderna (Week of Modern Art), organised 
by a group of modernist writers and artists in Sao Paulo in February 
1922, which exploded the complacency of Brazil's cultural establishment o 
Poems such as Mario de Andrade ' s provocative "Ode ao burgues " (Ode to 
the Bourgeois of Sao Paulo, whom he described as "moral mashed potato" ) 
and his sentimental "Acalanto do Seringueiro" ( a lullaby addressed 
to a rubber-collector in Amazonas) reflected the artists' dissatisfaction 
with Brazil ' s imitative foreign civilisation and their desire to come 
to terms with the country ' s native culture o17 
In a country with such a small elite, cultural movements naturally 
spilled over into the political arena. Intellectuals began to take an 
increasingly critical stand. No longer were they prepared to accept 
without question the ideas and morals which came to them from abr oad 
and to apply them mechanically to Brazil. The belief in "eternal prin-
ciples" embodied in the liberal internationalism and intellectual erud-
ition of Rui Barbosa began to fall from favour and was replaced by a 
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growing interest in Brazil's "national realities". This incipient nation-
alism expressed itself in the foundation of reviews, such as the Revista 
do Bras il (1916-25) and Am~rica Brasileira (1921-24 ) , as well as numerous 
monographs by individual writers . In different ways and with differing 
emphasis, they all sought to throw new light on Brazil's culture and 
society, to analyse its problems and to suggest solutions for them. 
This is not to suggest, however, that Brazilian intellectuals 
suddenly became nationalists overnight nor that they decided to reject 
18· 
all foreign influences. Nationalism views national independence as 
the supreme ideal, overriding the rights and interests of individuals 
and the international conununi ty. Few Brazilians .. Tere prepared t o go 
that far, although Brazil did have a long his tory of anti-Portuguese 
nat ivism, not t o mention simple patriotism, which extended back to col-
onial times . Late nineteent h and early twentieth century writers, such 
as S!lvio Romero and Euclides da Cunha, had raised the problems of 
national identity and drawn attention to the backward conditions pre-
vailing in the interior, of "Thich the cultured eli tes in the cities ",Tere 
only vaguely aware and Vlhich in no way corresponded to their liberal 
ideals. Furthermore, nationalism was rapidly replacing liberalism in 
Europe and the intellectuals were , to a certain extent, indulging in 
the time-honoured Brazilian custom of replacing one set of foreign ideas 
by another, more modern set. 
Nevertheless, nationalism proved to be more than a passing fad o 
This was largely thanks to the solid intellectual foundations given it 
by the pioneering works of Alberto Torres. Torres (1865-1917 ) had had 
a distinguished political career, first as a "historic Republican" ( a 
republican propagandist during the Empir e ) and then as a state and federal 
deputy~ a federal Mi nis t er of Jus t ioe and President of the State of Rio 
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de Janeiro under t he Republ ic . Late i n life , he turned to polit i cal 
journalism and, between late 1910 and mid-1913, he produced a number 
of articles Vlhich he later gathered together in a rather undigested form 
in bw books , Q problema nacional brasileiro and A organizay8.o nacional, 
which were published in 1914, together with a project for the revision 
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of the Constitution of 1891. Writ t en in a rambling and disjointed style, 
which permits differing interpretations, these books raised many of the 
issues which have continued to agitate Brazilian intellectual and 
political circles down to the present day, although to modern eyes, some 
of them seem very strange bedfellows. Torres linked nationalism to 
anti-imperialism, elitism and agrarianism; State intervention was 
invoked to aid the spread of small property, strong government to protect 
individual liberties. 
Alberto Torres ' s main concern was with nation-building. Writing 
in a period of a£gressive imperialism, he reflected the concern of 
contemporary European nationalists with the threat to the sovereignty 
of weak nations. He was less worried by the menace of a direct military 
invasion than by the danger posed by Brazil's own internal disorganis-
ation, which threatened to cause the disintegration of the country and 
provide a pretext for foreign intervention. 
Conse~uently, he thought that Brazil had to organise itself but 
to do this it faced much greater problems than older nations, which had 
developed slowly. "Nations which have appeared by discovery and have 
been formed by colonisation are social improvisations of Chance or of 
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exceptional factors of progress". Colonial governments made invasions 
and con~uests but they did not found nations; they were exploiters, 
not partners. In new nations, "society never manages to constitute it-
self: . assimilation and integration, which evolve slowly and gradually 
21 in old countries, find few sources of encouragement" . 
A conscious effort, therefore, had to be made to compensate for 
the deficiencies of nature: "New countries need to build their nation-
22 
ality artificially". Thus, nationalism was an elementary necessity for 
a young people which had to form the structure of its political societyo 
This re~uired a deliberate policy: 
"Modern nations, built on heterogeneous foundations, 
with different races, are political artefacts, which 
demand decades of conscious work and calm elaboration: 
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this work requires a programme, a plan and continuous 
and persevering action". 23 
Only the government can do this but, unfortunately, "democracies 
are unstable, impressionistic and voluble regimes" , which hamper both 
continui ty and efficiency in government o Torres ,·ras convinced of "the 
incapacity of the masses for government" and believed that "the govern-
ment can only be a function of those who are capable", advocating the 
24 government of the people "for the people", rather than "by the people". 
Torres drew these ideas together in his project for a revision of 
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the constitution, appended to A organiza9ao nacional, which revealed 
an anti-democratic elitism, a reaction against regionalist autonomy and 
an emphasis on technical and administrative efficiency. The project 
provided for increased powers of the Union to intervene in the affairs 
of the states and municipalities, indirect suffrage in the elections 
for the President of the Republic and the Senate, the representation 
of the economic, social and cultural classes in the Senate, longer 
mandates for the President and the Senate, and an Institute for the 
Study of National Problems. The greatest innovation was a "Ooordinating 
Power", composed of life members, with wide-ranging powers to concern 
itself with the elections of the President and the federal Congress, 
conflicts between federal and local powers, legislation, taxation, 
freedom of internal trade, transport tariffs, economic policy, cons er-
vation of the environment, health, education, organisation of labour, 
credit and co-operatives, labour disputes and the rights of the in-
dividual o 
The scope of the coordinating power ' s activities shows that Alberto 
Torres thought of the constitutional revision merely as a means to an 
end, which vras the solution of Brazil's economic and social problems. 
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Indeed, although his concrete proposals were mainly concerned with 
political reform, his deeper preoccupations were with the economy and 
society, for these were the foundations on which the nation had to be 
built. National political sovereignty could only be based on economic 
independence: 
"To keep the nation independent, it is essential to 
preserve the vital elements of nationality: its 
main sources of wealth, its industries of primary 
necessity and immediate utility, its instruments 
and agents of economic vitality and circulation, 
transport and internal trade6and the maximum freedom of industry and commerce". 2 
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There was a two-fold threat to Brazilian sovereignty, presented by foreign 
capital and by foreign labour, in the form of immigration. In relation 
to the former, Torres developed a very advanced criti~ue of Brazil's 
position in the international economy of free exchange and comparative 
advantage: 
"Commercial exports to external markets represent the 
exhaustion of the substance and wealth of the brutally 
exploited soil; imports bring in return goods and 
products of merely secondary interest, "Ihich satisfy 
immediate needs and are nearly alvlaYs short-lived and 
rapidly consumed. The capital which remains accumu-
lated in the cities, in processing industries, in 
commerce, in buildings and in possessions, represents 
a small fraction of the prizes of production and is 
almost all unproductive". 27 
As for foreign labour, Torres pointed out repeatedly the folly and 
injustice of attracting large numbers of immigrants who remained unass-
imilated, whilst nothing was done to help the Brazilian-born workers 
whom they often displaced. 
This line of nationalism verged at times on xenophobia but Torres 
did not merely denounce the abuses of foreigners and the dangers to 
Brazil of its subordinate position; he also pointed out the internal 
distortions which reliance on foreign trade produced. Commercial exports 
of tropical produce had a disastrous effect within the country, attracting 
manpoVler and capital into monoculture to the detriment of consumer 
industries and small-scale crops produced for the home market, Large 
estates also gave rise to a great number of poverty-stricken people, 
without possessions or work and subject to terrible epidemicso 
Torres, however, did not think that the answer lay in a policy of 
industrialisation and he roundly condemned protectionism and the 
indus tries which had grown up under its shado"l-T. Brazil "has to be, 
primarily, an agricultural country. It would be ridiculous to deny it 
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this destiny, in view of its vast territory". Torres wanted to encourage 
the workers to return from the cities to the fields and he advocated 
the expansion of small farming. This "l-Tould have the advantage of 
increasing internal trade and supplying the home market and it would 
also help nation-building by absorbing both immigrants and Brazilians 
into stable communities. 
These, then, are Torres ' s main ideas in outline. From them stem 
a large number of subordinate conclusions and proposals: he condemned 
Brazilians' cultural dependence on European models and the obstacles to 
organisation posed by regionalism and party politics and he courageously 
asserted the value and the ability of Brazil's coloured races. Torres 
was not only one of the earliest Brazilian nationalists but also by far 
the most radical. He attracted a small number of ardent disciples but 
the changes which he demanded were too extreme to gain widespread pop-
ularity. His influence Vias not really felt until the early 1930s, years 
after his death in 1917, and then it was exerted indirectly through 
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his followers and popularisers. These vrere influenced by Torres in 
two distinct ways: on the one hand, they took specific ideas and pr o-
posals from him and inserted them in their programmes and, on the other 
hand, perhaps more importantly, they gained from him an outlook which 
22 
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enabled them to take a critical vieyr of Brazil ' s present situation ,.,.hile 
expressing unlimited confidence in its future o 
At the time of publication, however, Torres ' s writings made little 
impact. The great catalyst proved to be the outbreak of war in Europe 
in 1914. The First World War destroyed the old certainties and created 
a new, unstable world. The system of free international trade and move-
ment of capital and labour was interrupted by the conflict and was 
never fully re-established after the waro Then came the Russian Revo-
lution of 1917 which represented the first serious challenge to the 
capitalist system and the social position of the bourgeoisie. In 
response to the communist threat, fascism exploded on the scene, carry-
ing away liberal democracy as its first casualty. Where communism 
preached class conflict and the class struggle, fascism drew on 
Catholic, syndicalist and conservative sources to create the doctrine 
of corporativism, which sought to achieve co-operation and harmony be-
tween the classes by giving political representation to economic and 
social interests. 
The r epercussions of the First World War gradually awakened a latent 
nationalism in Brazil. In 1917, the poet Olavo Bilac organised a cam-
paign to promote national defence yrhich illustrated the state of Brazilian 
opinion at that time: on the one hand, Bilac shm.,.ed a clear m-rareness 
that a nation ' s defence capability depended far more on the state of 
its population (health, education, etc.) than on purely military factors. 
On the other hand, the solution which he offered was decidedly simplistic 
and relatively painless: all Brazil ' s problems could be solved by the 
, t Ot t ' f ul ' lOt , 30 ~ns ~ u ~on 0 comp sory m~ ~ ary serv~ce. 
In the follm.,.ing years, Brazilian intellectuals ",ere gradually to 
learn that the solutions to the country ' s problems would be neither 
simple nor painless. An outstanding example of this growing awareness 
and greater profundity was the book entitled A margem da historia da 
Republica which a group of intellectuals published, at their own expense, 
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in 1924. In the preface, these writers characterised themselves as the 
generation which was born with the Republic, acknowledged their debt 
to Alberto Torres and appealed to their compatriots to start thinking 
as Brazilians o Antonio Carneiro Leao thought that Brazil ' s basic problem 
was that of education while Gilberto Amado attacked the country ' s in-
efficient and corrupt administration and urged the need for trained 
elites and leaders. Pontes de Miranda launched a root-and-branch 
attack on Brazil ' s existing social and political structure and looked 
for a solution of its problems in a thorough-going application of 
science and technology and a vague form of "national socialism"o 
Vicente Liclnio Cardoso was equally critical and called for the national 
organisation of labour. Other prominent contributors included Ronald 
de Carvalho, Alceu Amoroso Lima and Oliveira Viana, while the topics 
covered ranged' from constitutional reform to economic problems and 
nationalism. The book did not, however, achieve the success its authors 
had hoped for and the planned second edition never appeared o 
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Throughout the 1920s, intellectuals continued to discuss the question 
of Brazil's national identityo Their concept of nationalism was, how-
ever, anything but jingoistic; writers reacted strongly against the 
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boastful vaunting of Brazil ' s riches known as ufanismo; their attitude 
no" was critical, even pessimistic. Symbolic of this outlook was Paulo 
Prado ' s Retrato do Brasil (Portrait of Brazil), published in 1927, which 
33 
opened with the memorable ,yords "In a radiant land lives a sad people" 0 
The book went on to discuss at length the psychological causes of the 
Brazilian sadness and then, with a sudden change of tone, it ended \<Iith 
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a sweeping condemnation of all aspects of contemporary Brazilian life 
and called for a revolution in the belief that the future could not be 
worse than the pasto 
Thus, by 1930, the intellectual confidence which supported the 
Old Republic had been seriously underminedo There was, however, no 
consensus as to what should be done or even as to \.,here the roots of 
the crisis lay. Ideological positions spanned the entire political 
spectrum from the reactionary Catholicism of Jackson de Figueiredo and 
Tristao de Athayde to the Marxism of the fledgling Brazilian Communist 
Party and its future leader, Luts Carlos Prestes. The reigning confusion 
is illustrated by the authors of two books, both published in 1930: 
on the one hand, Jose Maria dos Santos ""rote that Brazil had no deep 
social or economic problems and merely needed to change its political 
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and administrative methods, while, on the other hand, Azevedo Amaral 
thought that the country's main problems were in the economic, not 
the political sphere o 35 
It was against this background of intellectual uncertainty and 
confusion that Oliveira Viana rose to eminence. Viana introduced the 
study of sociology to Brazil and for a while it seemed that he held the 
key to. the country's principal problems, as we shall see in the following 
chapters 0 
Chapt er 10 OLIVEIRA VIANA: THE SOCIAL SCIENTIST . 
Francisco Jos~ de Oliveira Viana "'/as born on 20 June 1883 on the 
Rio Seco sugar plantation at Saquarema in the State of Rio de Janeiro. l 
His father, Coronel Francisco Jose, died ... ,hen Viana ... 'as aged t ... ,o, 
lt~aving his ... ,ido", to take over the running of the fazenda and bring 
up their six children. It seems that at that time the fazenda still 
had slaves and the abolition of slavery in 1888 ",as a severe blml to 
the economy of the whole area.2 Oliveira Viana received his primary 
schooling in Saquarema before moving permanently in 1897 to Ni ter6i, 
where the family had a house on the outskirts of the city, in order 
to continue his studies . He attended the reno",ned Colegio D.Pedro II 
across the bay in Rio de Janeiro and then ... ,ent on to the Faculty of 
La,." from ,·,hich he graduated in 1905. 
Viana began "'ork as a teacher of mathematics and then set up as 
a lawyer, but this ... ,as not a success as he "',as soon not on speaking 
terms \.,i th his partner. At this time, he began writing articles for 
various ne ... ,spapers in Rio de Janeiro and Niter6 i and became acquainted 
",ith Alberto Torres. In 1916 , he began to lecture on the Theory and 
Practice of Penal L8.\o' in the Faculty of Lm., in Ni ter6i and became 
interes ted in the sociological elements in the ",ork of the Italian 
criminologist Enrico Ferri. The following year, he fell ill through 
overHork and \.,ent to Barbacena and Palmira in Minas Gerais to 
convalesce; there me ... ,as impressed by the patriarchal life of the 
mineiros (inhabitants of Minas Gerais). 
Out of these experiences developed Popula9~es meridionais do 
Brasil, Oliveira Viana ' s first book and the one ... ,ith \·,hich he made his 
name.
3 \{ri tten in 1917-18 and published by 11onteiro Lobato in 1920, 
it marked the first systematic application of the concepts of European 
anthropology and sociology to Brazilian history in an attempt to analyse 
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and interpret the social origins of the national character. The ideas 
',hich Oli veira Viana raised and developed in this seminal work "ere, 
with certain modifications and changes in emphasis, to re-appear 
frequently in his subsequent works and to form the basis of his activity 
as a political publicist. The importance of the role of the rural 
aristocracy, the absence of social solidarity and structure in the 
rural areas of Brazil, the rural "clans" and the clan spirit, the 
conflict between centralism and local autonomy, and Viana ' s desire for 
strong central government to combat reg i onalism and separatism can all 
be found in this work o 
Oliveira Viana looked at colonial Brazil and saw a predominantly 
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rural society, centred around a rural aristocracy which drew its strength 
and prestige from the ownership of large estates o This type of society 
had not been inherited from Portugal but was a particular response to 
the new environment found in South America and it had left a permanent 
mark on the national psychology: the Brazilian was essentially a 
country-man. 
The most important element in this rural society was the large 
estate or latifundio, which provided the basis for the social power 
and prestige of the rural aristocracy. Viana idealized this aristocracy, 
identifying the fazendeiro (landowner) and his predecessor, the 
bandeirante (pioneer explorer), with the Aryan elements in the popu-
lation (whites and superior mixed-bloods) whilst the lm,er rural classes 
- the agregados (freemen) and slaves - were drawn from the "inferior" 
races (Indians, Negrces and inferior mixed-bloods). 
As for its social function, the latifundio, because of its 
geographical size and economic self-reliance, tended to simplify the 
rural class structure. It prevented the formation of small farms and 
a rural middle class vlhilst, at the same time, failing to create strong 
links of economic solidarity and dependence between the fazendeiro and 
his workers. The mild climate, the fertility of the land and its easy 
availabili ty meant that the \-lOrker felt no pressing need to work for, 
and so associate 'vi th , the fazendeiro. This led to the disintegration 
of the feudal structure brought from Europe and its replacement by an 
undisciplined, unstable society which lacked any organised social 
structure. This, in turn, caused the formation of clans and the clan 
spirit. 
The concept of the rural clan and its clan spirit is a key element 
in Oliveira Viana ' s thinking. The clan was formed of members of all 
the rural classes, who grouped themselves round the figure of the 
fazendeiro, and was a response to the anarchy prevailing in colonial 
society. The common man looked to the fazendeiro as the only source 
of protection against the abuses of corrupt judges, recruiting ser-
geants and other fazendeiros. In return for protection , the rural 
masses gave the fazendeiro complete loyalty and obedience. Thus, there 
grew up a system of political patronage which created the solidarity 
bet\veen the lower classes and the rural nobility that the physical 
and economic environment had not been able to create. 
Ol iveira Viana then went on to consider the political repercussions 
of this rural social structure . He sa'-l a struggle going on throughout 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in vThich the public pmvers 
sought to assert the authority of the central government over the local 
caudilhos (chieftains), particularly by attempting to eradicate the 
capangas (professional killers), the most obvious sign of the clans. 
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During the Empire , this struggle ,.,ras reflected in the conflicts bet\.,reen 
the liberals and conservatives, and Oliveira Viana praised the conser-
vatives for their courage and wisdom in advocating the centralisation 
of pm.,rer , especially through the monarchy and its "moderating power". 
In this vlaY, they had preserved national unity and prevented separatism 
. 
and factionalism, caused by the excesses of liberal and democratic 
demagogy. 
This belief in the virtues of strong central government and disre-
gard for local autonomy "laS intimately linked to the foregoing analysis 
of the clan system. Because there vlaS no feeling of social solidarity 
or common interest betvTeen groups and individuals in Brazil , local 
political organisation could never represent an autonomous expression 
of local feeling . Therefore, in contrast to Britain and the United 
States, local government in Brazil had no proper functions and became 
the instrument of private interests and the factional clan spirit . On 
the other hand, the governmental structure vTas imposed ready-made by 
the colonial authorities and the independent State was the creation 
of a small elite following European examples. Consequently, Brazil 
had not had a genuine political evolution and its people had not yet 
become conscious of the idea of a national State. 
Oliveira Viana ' s final conclusion vTas considerably more sanguine 
than \.,rere his later Hri tings. He considered that the pm-Ter of the clans 
and the threat of revolution , with its attendant dangers of bloodshed 
and tyranny, had passed , at least in the centre-south around the 
federal capital, if not in the extreme south and in the north. Since 
independence, Brazil ' s leaders had made the same mistake as the Spanish 
American countries by follovTing European theories vThich \.,rere quite 
unsuited to the special conditions of America, and by attaching more 
importance to liberty than to authorityo Yet Brazil had escaped the 
excesses of anarchy and separatism suffered by those countries and 
for this it had to thank the conservative leaders of the Empire, the 
gentle and peaceful nature of its people and the conservative spirit 
of the centre-south population which lived around the capital. 
Popula~oes meridionais revealed the t\vO principal aspects of 
Oliveira Viana ' s \>lritings: on the one hand, he shovred an interest in 
the methods of anthropology and sociology , and attempted to apply them 
to Brazilian studies; and on the other, he aimed to use the results of 
these studies for the purposes of political criticism and reform in 
Brazil . Both of these objectives vlere openingly avovled in the preface 
and it can be seen how one ran naturally into the other: Viana used 
his analysis of the Brazilian "grass-roots" to launch a critiQue of 
Brazil ' s existing political system and insti tutions.5 
Oliveira Viana vTas not the first to study sociology and anthro-
pology in Brazil . At the end of the nineteenth century, S{lvio 
Romero had introduced these subjects into his \>lorks and they exercised 
a formative influence on the young Oliveira Viana~ The publication in 
1902 of Euclides da Cunha ' s classic Os sertoes had forcefully dravffi 
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the attention of Brazilians living in the cities to the baclnlard conditions 
in the rural interior7 Then, in 1914 , Alberto Torres published his 
critiQue of Brazil ' s political and economic system and proposed a 
general reorganisation of the country. Oliveira Viana drew thes e 
various strands together, systematically using sociological methods to 
shmv hovl the historical formation of Brazilian rural society had inter-
reacted \>lith the country's political institutions to g ive Brazil its 
uniQue character. 
To this \>lork of synthesis he brought an extensive reading of 
European sociology and anthropology of the more conservative variety 
and a lucid, readable style of writing \'Thich immediately brought his 
vTorks great populari tyo In the long run, hOvlever, the combination of 
sociological interpretation with political theorising, exemplified in 
the didactic tone of his writings and the frequent moralising about 
the present and future on the basis of the past, has had a double-
edged effect on Oliveira Viana ' s reputation as a sociologist: in the 
1920s and 1930s, when sociology seemed to hold the key to Brazil ' s 
social and political problems , Viana gained a wide audience but as his 
poli tical vievTs fell into disrepute in the 1940s, so his contribution 
8 
to Brazilian sociology \OTas also neglected and forgotten. 
In the 1920s, hm.Tever , Viana '''as a major innovator. In his pre-
face to Popula)l0es meridionais , vrritten in November 1918, he cited the 
group pf ne"T sciences which were contributing t01.,rards the understanding 
of historical phenomena: the anthropo-geography of Friedrich Ratzel, 
the anthropo-sociology of Gobineau, Lapouge and Ammon; the psycho-
physiology of Ribot, Sergi, Lange and James; the collective psychology 
of Le Bon, Sighele and Tarde; the social science founded by Le Play 
and remodelled by Henri de Tourville, aided by Demolins, Poinsard, 
9 Descamps, Rousiers and Preville. Of these, Lapouge and Le Play vTere 
particularly influential on Oliveira Viana' s "Tri tings. 
During the 1920s, Viana contributed a number of articles on 
sociology and anthropology and revie,.,rs of books on these subjects to 
10 
the Correio da Manha and the Correio Paulistano. He read intensively, 
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keeping up to date with recent developments in sociology, as is Hitnessed 
by the lengthy lists of citations in the footnotes to his works , and 
extending his interests in the 1930s to include the progressive 
elements in North American sociological and juridical thinking and the 
wri tings of the Italian corporativists , vlhich he used to good effect 
11 in supporting his Labour Justice law. In his last important work, 
Instituiyoes pol!ticas brasileiras, he made a lengthy analysis and 
cri tique of the cul turalist school associated with Om"ald Spengler, 
12 Leo Frobenius, Franz Boas and others . 
Yet, unlike Gilberto Freyre, who had attended universities in the 
U.S. and Europe , Oliveira Viana vras an autodidact in sociology and 
shm.,red his lack of basic grounding in the relatively limited range of 
his studies. He read intensively but not extensively. He himself 
boasted that, in order to prevent the "de-brazilianisation" of his 
intelligence, he only read foreign material \<Thich suited certain guide-
lines of his ideas and culture, and nothing more, vThilst he read every-
13 
thing published in Brazil o Astrojildo Pereira noted that Viana seemed 
completely una\<Tare of the existence of Marx and Engels, and it is clear 
14 
that he never read left-wing Hri t ers , even to reject them. Economics 
also remained a closed book f or him, despite his insistence on the 
importance of giving political representation to the economically 
productive classes. Thus Viana remained immune to a Hide range of 
experiences and influences and limited his receptivity to a relatively 
small ~egment of conservative sociologists, racialist anthropologists 
and some progressive jurists. 
An example of the results of such a restricted number of influences 
- and one of the main reasons ,.,rhy Oliveira Viana is. so little read to-
day - vTas his attitude tmlards the question of race. Considering the 
consequences to vrhich racialist theories have led in Europe and the 
recent emergence of the Afro-Asian group of nations and Black Pm-Ter in 
the United States , it i s hardly surprising that Oliveira Viana ' s open 
assertion of Negro inferiority should strike modern readers as both 
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anachronistic and dis t as teful. Yet it is important not to exaggerate 
this element in his thinking , since it fOl~s only a subordinate part 
of his more general elitism. Nor for this reason should he be placed 
completely outside the mainstream of Brazilian thought. 
Prior to the Second Horld War, Brazilian intellectuals were 
divided on the subject of race. S!lvio Romero and Azevedo Amaral 
asserted the superiority of the vThite race, and this belief is implicit 
in the attitude of Euclides da Cunha, Hhilst Alberto Torres defended 
15 
the value of Brazil ' s Negro and Indian inhabitants. Finally Gilberto 
Freyre drew these various strands together vlhen he suggested that 
Brazil ' s uniqueness and greatness lay in the harmonious fusion of 
these disparate races, a theory vlhich has subsequently become an 
16 
official dogma. 
Oliveira Viana ' s attitude towards race developed on hlO levels. 
On the one hand, there was clearly an emotional element \'lhen he 
described Indi~ns and Negroes as " tvTO ugly races" and spoke of \'i'hi tes 
17 
seeking out the "less repulsive examples" with vThich to mate . One can 
only speculate on the psychological links betvTeen this attitude and 
the fact that Viana vias himself, to judge by appearances , of mixed 
18 
race . 
On the other hand, he also took an intellectual interest in the 
subject and "Tas familiar Hi th current trends in European and American 
anthropology, as 'Hell as the more overtly racialist literature. The 
greatest influence on him in this respect was the French racial 
theorist Lapouge, whom he cites many times. At one stage , he even 
suggested that the old paulista bandeirantes "lere dolichocephalic 
Aryans, as described by Lapouge, but after a storm of criticism, he 
19 
was forced to retract this suggestion. His ideas on the inequality 
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of races, vThich he did not retract , VTere also taken from Lapouge. 
In 1933 , defending his position against Artur Ramos , Oliveira 
Viana v/rote: "The pure Negro [..0 J has never c. .. J created a 
civilisation", and explained that "as for the pure Negro, my opinion 
t=. ••• ] is that , for certain superior types of intelligence , he 
generally reveals a lesser fertility than the Aryan or Semitic races, 
20 
vTi t h "Thich he has been in contact [ •• 0] ". This did not mean that 
all Negroes were inferior but rather that, proportionately, they 
produced fewer intellectually superior individuals than did the other 
races . Since modern civilisation depended on elites composed of 
these superior individuals , the Negroes in civilised areas naturally 
fell into an inferior position in relation to the uhite groups . 
Viana considered the Negroes uncivilisable because they were 
incapable of fully assimilating Aryan culture, even their highest 
members being unable to do more than merely imitate the habits and 
customs of the white man. The blacks ' ability to rise "laS very 
limited , therefore , not only because the Negro race produced fevT 
superior individuals and because of the pressures of social prejudice , 
but mainly because the black man vTas completely insensitive to the 
higher aspirations ,.,hich governed the outlook of the vThi te man. The 
Indian \vas in an even worse state because he could not even imitate 
certa in aspects of the superior civilisation, as could the Negro , for 
example, the desire to mm land. "Our civilisation is the exclusive 
\'lOrk of the vThi te man. During the long process of our social formation , 
the Negro and the Indian have not g iven [ ••. ] any element of value 
to the upper and ruling classes , \'Thich carry out the \'lork of civil-
isation and construction. Both form a passive and unprogressive mass 
on \vhich the modelling action of the ,.,hi te man vlOrks, not alvays vTi th 
21 
happy results". 
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The negative aspect of this conclusion vTas somm'That mitigated by 
Oliveira Viana ' s attitude tOvTards miscegenation and people of mixed-
blood. Again , he start ed from a position of white superiority: "These 
t\-TO -inferior races only become agents of civil isation , i.e. only 
contribut e eugenic [ = superior ] elements to the formation of the upper 
22 
classes , "Then they lose their purity and cross 'vi th the vrhi t e man" . 
But pmferful individuals Vii th an unbeatable ability to rise had come 
out of the mixed-blood mass, and so Viana came to the conclusion that 
there Here both inferior and superior mixed-bl oods , depending on the 
cultural level of their Negro or Indian forefathers , \-Thich also varied. 
However , the superior mixed-bloods were t hose who were Aryan in character 
or intelligence or , a t least, capable of Aryanisation. 23 
Thus, Oliveira Viana noted an increasing " tendency towards the 
progressive Aryanisation of our regional groups , i.e. the coefficient 
of the vrhite race in our population is increasing all the time". He 
produced stat istics to back up this argument , including some from the 
early nineteenth century ,·,hich shmofed the high mortality rate of Negro 
slaves , adding almos t regretfully tha t "the abolition law of 1888 has 
helped to delay the elimination of H. afer in our country - because, 
,d thout doubt, if kept under slavery , he would have disappeared more 
. 24 qUlckly". 
Observing the different rates of increase of the various races 
in Brazil , Oliveira Viana concluded that the "inferior elements" 'fere 
being rapidly reduced because of the s t a tionary situation of the Negro 
population , the continual increase in the flow of Aryans in recent times, 
and a number of favourable conditions vThich gave the 'vhi te man greater 
vitality and fertility than the other races in the Brazil ian environ-
ment . Not only vTas the numerical volume of the pure vrhi te population 
increasing but ethnic selection \-li thin the mass of mixed-bloods \'laS 
operating to reduce the coefficient of inferior blood and increase 
25 
the amount of vlhi te blood in them. 
Consequently, on the question of the effects of mixed-bloods , 
Oliveira Viana took issue with his masters , the racial theorists 
Lapouge and Le Bon. The latter had claimed that mixed-bloods tended 
to degenerate and revert to the " inferior" race , "lhereas Viana claimed 
that , in Brazil, the opposite \vas happening because of the continual 
inflovl of ne\'l Aryan immigrants . Neither of the Frenchmen had foreseen 
how benign the Brazilian climate \vould prove to be for "lhi te men , and 
so, Viana added , vlhen Lapouge: 
"prophesies that "le Br~sil constituera sans doute 
d ' ici un siecle un immense ~tat n~gre, a moins qu ' il 
ne retuurne, et c I es t probable , a la barbarie" - "le 
have , without doubt and vii thout the slightest irrev-
erence, the right to smile ••• " 26 
The tone and implications of this statement are very important 
in assessing the character of Oliveira Viana ' s racialism. On the one 
hand, in comparison vli th European racialists , ",ho, pessimistically 
and somevlhat illogically , thought that the "superior" race \Vas being 
overwhelmed by the " inferior", Viana took the more optimistic view that 
the " superior" race was more than holding its own in relation to the 
others and that the existing situation vlas quite satisfactory. His 
atti tude tm"ards race "'as , therefore , though callous, a moderate , 
conservative one Hith none of the aggressive virulence or " revolutionary 
reaction" which characterised European racialism. 
On the other hand , Oliveira Viana is not beyond the pale in the 
Brazilian context, either ; in his attitude towards miscegenation, he 
is not so far from the "official" school on race relations , as nO\'1 
represented by Gilberto Freyre. Both, Hi th differing emphasis , \'lelcome 
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the process of miscegenation, and though Freyre himself gives due 
emphasis to the Africans ' cultural contribution to Brazilian civil-
isation, the popular version of his theory, summed up by the ~uotation 
attributed by an approving Donald Pierson to a Hhite Bahian , "We 
should all be kind to [ the Negroes J for it is not their fault that 
they are black", reveals the same latent prejudices I-Thich Oliveira Viana 
21 
formally asserted . Oliveira Viana ' s open manifestations of racialism 
are unacceptable today but, until Brazilian blacks ac~uire greater 
consciousness and assert their pride in themselves as blacks, his 
atti tude tOvTards race relations and the process of "Thi tening will 
28 
continue to illustrate an important element in popular attitudes . 
In reality , though, Oliveira Viana ' s racialism formed only a 
small and relatively unimportant part of his thinking. Only on one 
occasion was he able to give tangible form to it - in his draft for 
a reform of the immigration lavl in 1935, in which he tried to evade 
the restrictions on immigration imposed by the Constitution of 1934 
and encourage the entry of \vhi te immigrants . 29 
Much more important than Oliveira Viana ' s racialism , although 
closely related to it, was his elitism. Elitism can range from 
defence of ine~uality to a call for efficiency , with many intermediate 
variations, and Viana explored most of these arguments in his discussion 
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of Brazil ' s problems. 
His initial position 'vas taken directly from Lapouge and showed 
t h 1 t ' b t ' I ' d I' t' 31 V' t d e c ose connec lon e Iveen raCla lsm an e 1 lsm. lana asser e 
that the value of an ethnic group could be measured by its greater or 
lesser fertility in breeding superior types. These were the men l..rho 
stood out in any society and Ivho directed the masses , moulding the 
consciousness of the great majority of individuals , who had no 
31 
personali ty. Although even the Im.,est human races produced some 
superior types, what distinguished them '-TaS the greater or smaller 
number of such individuals . Therefore, he concluded : 
""Then tvro or more races of unequal fertility in 
superior types are placed in contact in a given 
environment , the less fertile races are condemned C ... ] to be absorbed, or at the very least, domin-
ated by the race ,dth greater fertility . The 
latter breeds the masters , the former the servants; 
the latter the ruling oligarchies , the former the 
passive , resigned majorities". 32 
Thus , looking back at colonial society , Oliveira Viana sm'l the 
rural and social classes corresponding to race : the negro slaves, the 
mixed-blood tenants and the Hhite masters; and he praised the upper 
33 
classes for preserving the purity of their Aryan character. In a 
later book, he attributed the formation during the Empire of an elite 
of great men , imbued with a spirit of patriotism and s ervice to the 
nation, to tvlO factors: the birth within the popular mass , through a 
combination of inherited eugenic factors, of superior individuals , and 
the selective JIlechanism ,.,hich the Empire organised, alloVling these 
34 
superior men to remain permanently in the service of the countryo 
In the meantime , Oliveira Viana shOvred that he Has not merely 
interested in a static, aristocratic society but was also abreast of 
more modern elitist ideas. In a series of articles entitled "0 Problema 
das elites", published in the Correio da l'1anha in 1925-26, he discussed 
the ideas of Pareto and Hosca and tried to apply the theory of the 
35 
circulation of elites to Brazil. He could find only tyro examples: the 
declaration of independence in 1822 and the replacement of the monarchy 
by the republic in 1889. 
Hm-rever, the bulk of the articles VIas devoted to an analysis of 
the political elite of the Old Republic. Viana noted the overHhelming 
38 
predominance of the liberal professions over other classes in the 
composi t ion of Brazil ' s political and governmental elite as compared 
"ri th that of Britain. He thought t he reason for this VIas that the 
liberal professions had a monopoly of higher culture ; agriculture , 
commerce and industry Here considered of 10Vl social status , and so the 
most intelligent and cultured elements of their elites abandoned ' them 
in order to join the intellectual elite or the political elite , changing 
their outlook in the process . The economic classes thus lacked leaders 
endovled \'Ii th trained minds and so "rere politically subordinate to the 
intellectual elite of the liberal professions, despite the fact that 
they possessed the pOHer of numbers and Health. 
Another reason for the political inferiority of Brazil ' s economic 
classes \'Ias their lack of associative spirit , Hhich prevented them 
from electing their mm representatives . Ho"rever , the movement of 
their superior elements into the political class \'Ias not an example 
of the circulation of eli tes because they did not bring ina nm·r out-
look but adapted to the old one prevailing in the political elite . 
Viana ' s analysis failed to take into account the influence of 
family background and social relations in creating an m·rareness of 
class interests but it Has an interesting explanation of bacharelismo 
(the predominance of Im·r graduates in politics) and the obsession VIi th 
legal formulas ,,,hich he descri bed as "ut opi an i dealism". In Viana ' s 
eyes , this was one of the great weaknesses of Brazil ' s ruling class 
and it underpinned his increasing interest in systems of class repre-
sentation , consultative technical councils and, ultimately, corpor-
ativism. 
Later , hO\'lever , he turned what he basically considered a ,,,eakness 
into an advantage "'hen he attempted to refute the !liarxist interpretation 
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of society. He argued that a "bourgeois State" had never really 
existed in Brazil because the bourgeoisie had always held themselves 
apart from politics. Parliament and the government "Tere always in the 
hands, not of the bourgeois, but of bachar~is and politicians, who 
formed a marginal class: by virtue of their way of life, outlook, 
ideas and social status, they belonged to the rich bourgeois class but 
the transitoriness and insufficiency of their earnings and pecuniary 
resources also placed them among the so-called proletarian classes. 
Brazil could be defined as a State whose administration was carried 
out by an intellectual proletariat, qualified by its position in 
government. Viana believed that this situation had enabled Brazil to 
solve its social problem without conflict: the political elite 
constituted a class which was naturally neutral in the latent antagonism 
between the rich and the working classes, since it legitimately belonged 
36 
to both. 
Oliveira Viana ' s elitism was most progressive on education. In 
an essay published after the Second World War, he defended the concept 
of elitism, defining elites as the governing cadres ( quadros dirigentes ) 
40 
of each class or group and urging the importance of giving them secondary 
and hig~er education adequate to the requirements of an increasingly 
complex vlOrld o37 A practical example of this outlook was the idea of the 
sindicatos as mechanisms for training an elite of experienced adminis-
trators, "Thich he put forvTard during the controversy over his Syndical 
38 Law o In stressing the need to allow the most competent elements in 
each group to rise to the top with the aid of education, Viana embraced 
the modern elitism of "meritocracy" or "equality of opportunity". 
Meanwhile, in 1922, two years after its original publication, a 
second edition of Popula9~es meridionais came out , t hus emphasizing 
the enormous popularity which led the historian Capistrano de Abreu to 
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exclaim: "Oliveira Viana spreads like an epidemic" . This popularity 
was the result not only of t he novelty of Viana ' s ideas but also of the 
clari ty and vigour vri th which they v/ere expressed . Unlike Alberto 
Torres (or Roberto Simonsen , for that matter) , Oliveira Viana is an 
immensely readable and enjoyable writer . His style i s seen at its 
best in two articles vThich he vlrote about Minas Gerais , one an affec-
tionate evocation of pattiarchal family life and the other a delightful 
description of a journey through that state in 1927 , "'hich is not vIi th-
out its touch of humour, as '''hen he notes that: "It "'as in this state 
of mind that I alighted in Ponte Nova , at 7 o ' clock at night, from in-
side a goods \·ragon - because the rest of the train ( in accordance 
,·d th the traditions of the Central Raihray) had run noisily off the 
40 
rails in the middle of the journey". 
Oliveira Viana ' s vfOrks are imbued ",ith nostalgia for the past , 
~ 
for the Empire and for the rural aristocracy on "'hich it rested , yet 
he also sings the praises of the modern age ( the cars , the Ford agency, 
the cinema and the glossy magazines vlhich ",ere beginning to penetrate 
into the interior) . He is anything but conservative in his use of 
language , as "'hen he uses a racy foreign expression to describe the 
sudden transition from the aristocratic colonial system to democracy 
and universal suffrage under the Empire , calling it a "sorte de looping-
the-loop pol! tico", vlhile in one unconsciously anachronistic phrase , 
he calls the proponents of a harsh military dictatorship "black 
41 
gorillas" ! 
Sociology ,vas one aspect of Oliveira Viana ' s ,,,ork. Politics ,-ras 
another . His books are full of vigorous comments on politics , yet the 
tone of his vlri tings vras quite at variance Hi th the personality of the 
41 
man. A bachelor, he lived Hith his sister and nieces in the family 
house on the outskirts of Niter6i; all the descriptions of him 
emphasise his shyness and modesty and his preference for a life of 
42 
seclusion and \vi thdraHalo In spite of his interest in politics , he 
never took any active part in political life , raising his hands in 
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horror at the very thought . His attacks ,lere directed against 
political institutions and customs and were usually couched in general 
terms . He rarely stooped to mentioning political personalities and 
by thus holding himself above the common run of Brazilian political 
journalism, he managed to avoid the Horst vicissitudes of that 
hazardous metier. So it is to politics and to Oliveira Viana , the 
poli tical publicist , that ,'le nO,l turn. 
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Chapter 2 . OLIVE IRA VIANA: THE POLITICAL THEORIST ( I ). 
The ferment in the intellectual and social sphere \vhich 
characterised the 1920s was repeated in the political arena. Through-
out the presidency of the highly unpopular Artur Bernardes (1922-26), 
Br zil was governed under a state of siege and in 1926 the Constitu-
tion of 1891 was reformed to strengthen the authority of the executive 
power. Meamlhile , the middle and lower classes sustained a messianic 
faith that Luis Carlos Prestes and the other tenente heroes of the 
Prestes Column would return to drive out the corrupt politicians and 
save the country , a faith that was nurtured and exploited by early 
populis t politicians in the Federal District such as Maurlcio de 
I 
Lacerda and Irineu Machado . 
From the mid-1920s on , dissident members of the upper and middle 
2 
classes joined in the onslaught on the Old Republic . They , too , had 
decided that it vras time for a change but the solutions ,·rhich they 
offered to Brazil ' s problems vlere decidedly s implistic. Their main 
efforts \vere directed towards the foundation of the Democratic Party , 
wh ich vTas to struggle to put the democratic and l iberal principles 
enshrined in the Constitution into force by instituting the secret 
ballot and other elec toral safeguards , as \vell as by finding means to 
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solve the social question. In particular , the secre t ballot came to 
be regarded as a magic formula \'Thich \vould solve all the problems, 
al though the idealism of those \"rho advocated it was often tempered by 
a calculated regard for their mm supposed interests . 4 
It was against these facile solutions of the liberal reformers 
tha t Oliveira Viana took up arms : indeed , his entire intellectual 
posi tion may be summed up \·ri th the vlords tl anti-liberalismtl • Neverthe-
less , there viaS a certain caution in his re j ection of liberal democracy, 
especially in the 1920s . He did not condemn the notion of democracy 
as such - indeed, he lavished praise on its functioning in the tlAnglo-
Saxon" countries (Britain and the United States), 'vhere it originated 
- but rather, he tried to show that it was quite unsuitable for the 
conditions prevailing in Brazil. 
The essence of Oliveira Viana ' s case against liberalism in Brazil 
was that it failed to take account of the realities of Brazilian 
society as it then existed. Consequently, the mechanisms of liberal 
democracy not only failed in prac tice to produce the results which, 
theoretically, they should, but they also produced some quite unexpected 
results. Viana argued that, on the one hand, because of the peculiar-
ities of its historical and soc ial formation, Brazil lacked the 
organised public opinion "fhich was the very foundation of the liberal 
representative system, while, on the other, the emphasis on local 
autonomy and self-government encouraged regionalism and threatened 
national unity. 
Therefore, Viana urged the need to make Brazil ' s political insti-
tutions correspond to its national reality, deriding the simplistic 
notion that the mistakes and confusion \vhich had charac t erised the 
republican regime were the fault of the men ,.,rho operated it. Instead, 
he explained t hat they were the consequence of the deficient and 
rudimentary political abilities of the popular masses, who \-fere basic-
ally responsible for the direction of the country under the system of 
majority rule. In these circumstances, the deformed "Tay in "Thich the 
Consti tution of 1891 had been worked "las the only "Tay in vrhich it could 
have been worked. It \vas not enough simply to Hant to "Tork the 
Consti tution properly nor to find "great men" "Tho could do so , because 
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the real problem Has caused by the attempt to imitate foreign institutions . 5 
Oliveira Viana explained why these foreign models had failed to 
work in Brazil in the essay.Q idealismo na evolucao politica do Imperio 
~ da Republica, "lri tten in 1922 to commemorate the centenary of 
Independence, in which he made a distinction between "utopian idealism" 
6 
and "organic idealism". Utopian idealism was based on general theories 
and principles and did not take the facts gained from experience into 
account, while organic idealism arose from reality, rested on experience 
and was guided by observation of the people and the milieu. 
By imitating European and North American models (constitutionalism, 
parliamentarianism, federalism , etc.) Brazil had practised only utopian 
idealism , never organic idealism, so it had not been able to organise 
its people socially and politically in more than a century of indepen-
dence. 
He was careful to explain that these political ideals vlere not 
at all utopian in their origin , for the United States and England were 
centres of the purest organic idealism. The ideals of each of these 
peoples ahmys represented a vision of their future evolution ; they 
were living, objective and concrete, coming from deep within their 
collective life. These organic ideals, represented in their political 
insti tutions, only became utopian ''''hen transplanted to other peoples 
and applied to other societies vTith a different structure and mentality 
from that of the English-speaking peoples. 
The political and constitutional constructions of Brazilian liberal 
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dreamers failed because they did not give due importance to the phenomenon 
of the patriarchal clan as the basis of Brazil ' s .Thole s ocial and poli t-
ical structure. The clan spirit manifested itself in public and admin-
istrative life as politicalha (politicking); in every Brazilian there 
'vas a latent poli tiqueiro (intriguing politician) because he viaS a 
member of a clan. vlhen the idealism (or Quixotism) of Brazilian dreamers 
came into conflict VIi th the clan spirit , it ,"as inevitably beaten 
because the clan spirit vTas more deeply rooted, more lively and more 
energetic . This VIas the reason for all Brazil ' s constitutional failures. 
Consequently , any political reform had to seek to organise a group of 
specific institutions which would neutralise or reduce the influence 
of the clan spirit . 
To give hTO concrete instances of the naivety of the tlutopian 
idealis t s tl , Oliveira Viana cited the attempts to raise the Territory 
of Acre and the Tri~o Mineiro into states , despite their primitive 
social structure : 
The most striking example · of the conflict betvTeen utopian idealism 
and Brazilian reality vTas , hovTever, the question of an organised public 
opinion. As Oliveira Viana explained in the chapter "'hich he contrib-
8 
uted to A Margem da Historia da Republica , the existence of such a 
public opinion vTas the fundamental premise on "'Thich \vas based the entire 
liberal democratic mechanism of the republican regime - universal 
suffrage , the organisation of parties, the election of representatives 
and the President , and the local autonomy of the states and munic{pios 
( counties ) - yet in Brazil this public opinion did not exist . In the 
Uni ted States and Britain, on the other hand , public opinion ... Tas ,,,ell . 
organised and pressure groups vTere able to force the government to 
attend to their collective interes ts and thus foster the general 
interests of the nation. 
The situation in Brazil VIas quite different from that in the 
English-speaking countries : In Brazil , the economic and social groups 
had no sense of class solidarity , only a rudimentary organisation and 
no avlareness of their collective interests . Brazilians adopted a 
passive attitude towards the government , trusting in its spontaneous 
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action rather than attempting to force it to look after their 
collective interests. This created a vacuum, and so Brazilian govern-
ments ended up being dominated by the factious clans, "Thich were the 
only organised groups to make themselves heard. Thus, the defects of 
the republican regime - the monopoly of power by small political groups, 
the "packed" legislatures and the subordination of the legislative and 
the representative bodies to the executive power - could all be 
attributed to the absence of the discipline exercised by an organised 
public opinion. 
The ansvTer, Viana continued, vTas to organise public opinion, but 
this required more than a few simple constitutional or political 
reforms. The bulk of the national electorate viaS formed by the rural 
population, nine tenths of whom vTere pariahs ,yho vTere entirely 
dependent on the great landowners and had no awareness of their 
political rights. Therefore, the most efficient ways to ensure the 
. independence of public opinion would not be universal suffrage, direct 
elections, the secret vote or local self-government, but economic and 
social reforms such as the establishment of smallholdings , a system 
of long-term or freehold leases, the diffusion of a corporative spirit 
and co-operative institutions, an efficient judiciary organisation and 
10 
an autonomous magistracy capable of standing up to the local despots. 
Thus, 01iveira Viana came to the conclusion that the solution 
of Brazil ' s political problems and the attainment of democracy 
depended upon a series of economic , social and judicial reforms. The 
logic of this conclusion was irrefutable, but to continue in this 
direction must inevitably lead him to propose far-reaching changes, 
particularly in the system of 1andovrnership , vThich formed the basis 
of the entire structure. Viana himself had shmm that the great rural 
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estates vTere responsible for the evils of the clan system, yet he also 
regarded them as the fundamental element in the formation of the 
national character and , as the son of a fazendeiro, he felt an emotional 
attachment to the old patriarchal ,Tay of life epitomised by the great 
11 
latifundio. 
He, therefore, came face to face with the dilemma of reform. In 
the final analysis, hm'Tever, it ''''as the dilemma of the liberal reformers 
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which he highlighted: vrhat price were they willing to pay for democracy? 
For Oliveira Viana himself , the dilemma VIas much less acute: he VIas, 
at best, sceptical about the benefits and desirability of democracy 
and instinctively inclined tOvrards a conservative solution. Hm·rever, 
he never fully explored or resolved the basic problems of reform in 
his works. Instead, he adopted an ambiguous position, praising the 
great landowners ,.,hile condemning the clan system ''Thich they operated, 
and concentrated on technical refornls in the mechanisms for expressing 
public opinion. So his vitriolic attacks on political parties and 
his interest in substitutes for them, such as technical councils, sindi-
catos, class representation, were, in effect, a means of avoiding the 
need to anS\",er basic Cluestions , and thus tacitly bolstered the status Cluo. 
ConseCluently, Oliveira Viana reserved his most vehement critici m 
and spectacular invective for the political parties, an easy target in 
Brazil, vrhose language is extraordinarily rich in derogatory Hords for 
politics and politicians , delightedly Cluoting Nabuco ' s description of 
parties in Brazil as "co-operative employment agencies and insurance 
12 
policies against destitution" o Unlike parties in the English-speaking 
countries, Brazilian parties were "nothing more than simple clans, more 
or less organised and more or less extensive , "Thich struggle to conCluer 
power for the exclusive purpose of exploiting the country bureaucratically 
for the benefit of their members"o They had no genuine ideas or 
programmes , did not represent collective ideals or the public interest, 
and were merely associations of private or regional interests concerned 
only to conquer or stay in pm'Ter. Thus , factionalism and personalism 
pervaded politics at every l evel, resulting in damage to national inter-
13 
ests at the top and in abuses and injustice at the local level . 
Viana's other line of attack on liberalism concerned the question 
of national unity. Given the vast size of their country, Brazilians 
have always regarded the contrast between the preservation of their 
unity and the disintegration of the Spanish American empire with a 
mixture of pride and apprehension. With Oliveira Viana, this theme 
became an obsession. He feared that the liberal republicans, in their 
anxiety to imitate the local autonomy characteristic of the United 
States ' federal regime, would encourage regionalism and separatism, 
to the detriment of the geographical and moral unity of Brazil as a 
nation.
14 
The basic problem \'TaS, once again, the absence of a collective 
consciousness or organisation among the rural population: 
"As long as there are no local common interests , local 
government has no real function of its mm. Once it is 
created, it is transformed naturally into an instru-
ment of private interests, a pmverful weapon imprudently 
placed in the hands of village caudilhos. This is 
. vThat our fierce, and nearly always bloody, local 
struggles to control the councils have proved over and 
over again".15 
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To counteract these pernicious results of the practice of liberalism 
in Brazil, Oliveira Viana raised the rallying cry of "national unity" o 
As he himself said at the end of his life, all his books \vere shot 
through vii th a dominant leitmotiv: "the idea of unity and centralisation 
16 
as a means of organising the Nation". In an early article, he called 
for the "definitive integration of the nation" by emphasising the need 
for political unity, administrative continuity and the supremacy of the 
central authority. These objectives were to be achi eved principally 
by s t rengthening the executive and judiciary pm.,rers ",hile reducing the 
role of the legislative. Oliveira Viana summed up his aims with a 
slogan demanding the "solid and stable organisation of liberty, 
principally civil liberty, by means of a solid and stable organisation 
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of authority , principally federal authority". 
The call for a strong , authorit arian government to protect the 
civil liberties of the individual seems , a t first sight , paradoxical . 
Yet, given Oliveira Viana ' s analysis of the practical results of 
liberalism at the local level in Brazil , it is , in fact , quite logical 
and forms a part of his thinking which should not be underestimated . 
Throughout the 1920s and early 1930s, he pressed for reforms in the 
judicial system, explaini ng that the "main problem of liberty in 
Brazil is not that of political l iberty , a~ we have been thinking for 
the last hundred years - but rather that of civil liberty". Civil 
liberty ,.,ras more important than political liberty and could exist ,.,rith-
out the latter, as in the government of a "good tyrant", but a 
regime of political liberty could not exist \'rithout civil liberty ; 
therefore , the organisation of jus tice \·ras one of the main ways of 
making ~emocracy a reality in Brazil . Consequently, he urged that the 
Supreme Federal Court be granted autonomy and the right to organise 
the country' s judicial system, freeing it from the factionalism of the 
18 politicians in power . 
Thus the tvro lines of Oliveira Viana's assault on liberalism in 
Brazil came to coincide: on the one hand , the theoretical basis for 
a liberal democratic regime \'laS lacking in Brazil because of the 
absence of an organised public opinion; on the other, the practical 
consequences of an excessive local autonomy threatened the very fabric 
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of national unity. Consequently, a strong federal government \'laS needed 
to control the forces of regionalism and to supply the discipline 
normally provided by public opinion. At the same time, nm" channels 
of public opinion, suitable to Brazil ' s conditions, should be developed 
in order to provide a substitute for the mechanism of universal suffrage 
and to ensure that the government both represented the interests of 
the various groups and classes composing society and vIas able to devise 
technically efficient solutions to Brazil ' s problems . 
In urging the need to create nei-l channels of public opinion, 
Oliveira Viana \'TaS clearly influenced by the anti-liberal ideas 
emanating from Europe , vlhich culminated in the fascist ideologies of 
the 1920s and 1930s. In the mid-1920s, he argued that: 
"In a true democracy, the preponderant influence should 
be that of the economic classes, the classes ",hich 
produce and Vlhich , in sum, are also the classes vThich 
pay: vTi thout this , democracy is not possible" 0 19 
The problem of Brazilian democracy \'laS that it \-TaS based on individuals, 
not on organiseQ classes . So Viana fought against both the theory and 
the practice of liberal democracy by urging Brazil ' s economic sectors 
(agriculture , commerce , industry and later , \vhen he vIas in the M. T.I.C ., 
labour) to develop a spirit of association and form povlerful organis-
ations ,·;hich \'/Quld be able to communicate their collective interests 
to the government and , in case of necessity , even to impose their point 
of vievl on the public authorities. 
In the mid-1920s, he was already noting that business and indust-
rial interests in Sao Paulo had gone directly to the President in 
order to secure changes in a recent tax 18\" ; he urged the ne",ly-
founded Democratic Party to concentrate on organising the economic 
20 
classes so that they could exercise the influence ,"hich they deserved . 
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The counterpart to this, on the government ' s side , was the creation 
of a network of technical councils io.fhich would allovr legislators and 
administrators to sound out the opinion of these organisations of 
economic interests and gather information from them. 
21 
Arguing the case for technical councils in the late 1920s, 
Oliveira Viana shoHed himself at his most progressive , 'vell aivare of 
developments in the methods of modern government and of their implica-
tions for traditional ideas about political institutions. He noted 
the importance of technical experts in giving advice and solving the 
problems of government, and concluded that the proliferation of economic 
councils in European countries demonstrated the technical incapacity 
of political eH tes to carry out the "fOrk of administration and 
government . The cycle of omniscient parliaments was over: technical 
abili ty \vas replacing parliamentary procedure . 
Turning to Brazil, Viana obs erved the failure of the country ' s 
social classes to participate in the drafting of laws and in adminis-
tration. He considered this a double mistake because not only ,.,ere 
the laivs technically unsound, but they also failed to obtain the moral 
support of the people , iVhich "laS an error of political psychology. 
Consul ting the social classes both created "rise la"ls and attracted 
the indispensable interest of the masses . Brazil must follow the 
European trend and find a permanent "'ay of making its legislative and 
administrative centres more accessible and more susceptible to the 
influence and interests of the other classes, particularly the 
productive (entrepreneurial ) classes. 
Oliveira Viana described the technical councils which already 
existed in Brazil at that time (mid-1920s), suggesting that the 
government should consult them regularly , and that no legislation or 
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regulation should be drawn up until the technical councils had discussed 
it vii th the interested groups and the class associations of the "Thole 
country. This "Tas the vTay tmvards democracy , rather than struggling , 
"even vd th vTeapons in our hands", to elect deputies to Parliament . 
Despite the progressive aspect of Ol iveira Viana ' s thinking , 
represented by his emphasis on the problem of public opinion - an 
aspect which he later used to defend himself from accusations of being 
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anti-democratic - he rapidly built up for himself a reputation as a 
reactionary during the 1920s . This was partly the result of the 
anti-liberal tone of his writings and partly because , viewing democracy 
in Brazil as , essentially , "a long-term ideal", he urged his compat-
riots to content themselves, in the meantime, Hith the existing 
situation: "with the government of the people by rough oligarchies, 
Hhich all spirits capable of ideali sm should struggle to transform 
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into enlightened oligarchies". 
The culminating point was reached with the collection of articles 
,,rhich Oliveira Viana published during the presidential campaign of 
1930 under the title of Problemas de politica objectiva. Though 
Oliveira Viana later disclaimed any political intention, the book 
reveale,d a deliberate desire to "e'pater le bourgeois" in its assault 
on the sacred tenets of liberal democracy. The clearest example of 
this "!as an article "Thich lauded the results of the United States ' 
intervention in Haiti . Viana contrasted the anarchy and injustice 
prevalent in "free Haiti" with the efficiency of the administration , 
policing , health and education services in the Haiti "enslaved" 
by foreign domination, concluding ironically that this contrast Has 
"the finest lesson which American pragmatism could g ive to the eternal 
idealists of the sovereignty of the people and of the principle of 
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self-determination". 
Given the political situation at the time of publication , such 
anti-liberal sentiments were interpre t ed as a defence of the status 
quo and a token of support f or the JUlio Prestes candidature . The 
Jornal do Commercio complained that vThen "our usurping politicians 
find it more comfortable to be reactionaries , it is a pity that a 
great spirit like that of Sr. Oliveira Viana should decide to give 
25 
them the prestige of his support" . Viana was thus caugh~ off balance 
by the Revolution of October 1930, in "Thich he t ook no part o 
It is something of a surprise , therefore , to find that Oliveira 
Viana ' s prestige and influence Here never higher than in the years 
iwnediately f olloHing the Revolution of 1930 . In June 1931 , Santiago 
Dant as Hrote from S~o Paulo asking Oliveira Viana to cont ribute to 
the newly- founded review A Razao and in October 1932 , a similar 
request came from Aleeu Amoroso Lima of the right-wing Catholic! 
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Ordem. In June of the same year , Pllnio Salgado ,.,rrote to Oliveira 
Viana about the Sociedade de Estudos Pol{ticos and his plans for 
founding the Ac;ao Integralista Brasileira , asking him for a vTord of 
21 
support , while , at the same time , the Rio businessman J oao Daudt 
28 d ' Oliveira ,,'as requesting a programme for his Economist Party. 
Recognition also came from official sources : Oliveira Viana 
accepted an offer in 1931 to join the Consultative Council of the 
29 
St ate of Rio de Janeiro , and in March 1932 he "Tas appointed Juridical 
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Consul tant to the Minis t ry of Labour. The follo"Ting year he took part , 
as a member of the Itamarati Commission , in dra\.,ring up the draft 
31 Consti tution '·Thich vTas presented to the Constituent Assembly of 1933-340 
The most important of the groups to be influenced by 01iveira 
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Viana in the years immediately following the Revolution of 1930 were, 
however, the tenentes. This amorphous group of military radicals and 
their supporters had joined with the opposition politicians of the 
Liberal Alliance to overthrow the Old Republic and sweep Vargas into 
power. Dissension was not long in coming, however, and the years 1931-
32 saw a steady polarisation of the tvro groups, marked by the break of 
the Democratic Party of Sao Paulo with the tenoote interventor, Jo8:o 
Alberto, the wrecking of the Diario Carioca, the resignation from the 
government of Lindolfo Collor, }fuur{cio Cardoso and Batista Luzardo, 
and, finally, the Constitutionalist Revolution which broke out in Sao 
Paulo in July 19320 
As opposition to Vargas's Provisional Government grew among the 
traditional political elites, the tenentes tried to strengthen their 
hold on power, organising themselves into the 3rd of October Club and 
calling for the prolongation of the dictatorial regime. Meanwhile, 
their opponents \vere arguing for a rapid return to constitutional 
government in order to restore the position of the traditional politic-
ians and preserve local autonomy and "states ' rights "o 
To counteract this argument, the tenentes were forced to develop 
an ideology and define their own position. But, in doing this, they 
faced a serious difficulty: while wishing to present a progressive, 
reforming image in contrast to the conservative defenders of constitu-
tionalisation, they were equally anxious not to go to the other extreme 
associated with their former leader, Lufs Carlos Prestes, and be tarred 
with the "communist" brush. They, therefore, turned for intellectual 
support to the two vTriters who seemed to them to contain the required 
mixture of progressive and conservative elements and who offered 
concrete solutions t o Brazil ' s political and social problems: Alberto 
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Torres and Oliveira Viana. Thus it vras that Oliveira Viana, vrho , in 
the 1920s, had seemed to be an unmitigated reactionary, came to be 
associated , in the changed political situation of the early 1930s, 
\·ri th the progressive elements of the October revolutionaries, repre-
sented by t he tenentes. 
This tendency revealed itself on a superficial level vri th the 
constant repetition of the cliche "na t ional reality" .... rhich, as one 
acute contemporary observer, Azevedo Amaral, noted, became a leitmotiv 
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of the period. In their programmes and manifestoes , the tenentes 
consistently identified the political and administrative system 
instituted by the Constitution of 1891 as one of the main causes 
and the greatest obstacle to the solution of Brazil ' s political, 
economic and social problems, demanding that the Constitution be 
reformed in accordance vri th "national realities". They also attacked 
regionalism and called for the strengthening of the central government . 
A distrust of universal suffrage and the political ability of the 
Brazilian masses revealed an elitist mentality. The tenentes were 
bitterly critical of the latifundios and advocated support for small 
farms and businesses. They attacked protectionist tariffs and "artifi-
cial" industries and favoured a policy of social justice and labour 
legislation. Their nationalism made itself felt in their condemnation 
of foreign capital and imperialism and , in some cases , of foreign 
immigration. Finally , they shared \'li th Vargas a rhetorical style 
emphasising vrork, labour , concern with economic matters and an emphasis 
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on efficiency. 
The origin of the ideas contained in the tenentes ' critiQue of 
Brazilian society is clearly seen in the i·rri tings of Virginio Santa Rosao 
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His book! Desordem, vrritten at the end of 1931, contained frequent 
references to both Torres and Viana and shovred the influence of their 
writings, both in the problems \'Thich he identified as the cause of 
Brazil ' s troubles and the solutions he proposed for them. He casti-
gated the clan spirit prevalent in Brazil , condemned democracy for 
stimulating the regionalist spirit and weakening the principle of 
authority and called for the federalisation and autonomy of the judicial 
system, the restriction of states' autonomy , a strong government vIi th 
an organised, conscious public opinion , technical councils and 
. national uni ty}4 
Santa Rosa, like the more radical tenentes, vIas ,hovIever, also 
influenced by the trend tovrards fascism in Europe and ,.,rent considerably 
further than Oliveira Viana , demanding a dictatorship to organise the 
country, class representation in parliament through the sindicatos, 
government intervention in the economy and, above all , a campaign to 
destroy the latifundio system.35 
Consequently , Oliveira Viana , '''ho had , earlier, in a book on the 
fall of the monarchy, sharply condemned the intervention of military 
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men in politics and \"ho, in any case, never took an active part in 
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political life, did not become directly linked vrith the tenentes. Ne ~r­
theless, in 1932, Jua~e~ Tavora, one of the leaders of the tenentes, 
asked Oliveira Viana, through an intermediary, to draH up a programme 
for the revision of the Constitution of 1891. The resulting vrork ",as 
a disappointment to the tenentes, revealing as it did Oliveira Viana's 
fundamentally conservative outlook and his concern to moderate their 
more radical excesses. Yet, both this programme and another which he 
drevl up a t roughly the same time for J08.0 Daudt 0. ' Oliveira ' s Economist 
Party, provide the most systematic exposition of Oliveira Viana ' s 
concrete proposals for change. 
Chapter 3. OLlVElRA VI~~A: THE POLITICAL THEORIST (2)0 
Oliveira Viana ' s suggestions for reform were set out in detail 
in the two programmes ,"hich he drew up in 1932 , one for the group of 
tenentes led by Juarez Tavora and the other for Joao Daudt d ' Oliveira ' s 
pr~posed Economist Party in the Feder al District. In the former 
programme , Viana proposed restrictions on regional autonomy and the 
s trengthening of the federal executive and. judiciary, together Hith 
a reduction in t he popular elective aspects of government and an 
increased emphasis on technical efficiency: In the latter, he urged 
the need to improve the representation of economic interests in the 
poli tical arena and shovled the degree to which he VIas willing to 
countenance economic and social reform. 2 
In his programme for the revision of the Constitution of 1891, 
Oliveira Viana began by emphasizing his conservative outlook. He 
recognised that societies evolved very slowly , that legislators had 
little pOVler consciously to change them and that the new Constitution 
had t o take into account the pressure of historical antecedents , such 
as tradi tions , customs, fee lings , beliefs, etc . 
"Therefore , my political thinking goes agains t 
modifications of a radical character in our social 
. structure and large-scale innovations in our system 
of civil 1 aVIs , and I vTill only accept, as points of 
revision , those modifications \>Thich I feel are 
acceptable to popular sentiment". 3 
Viana thought that they should take the Constitution of 1891 as 
the point of departure and suggested a series of changes intended to 
alter the distribution of power in the existing federative structure . 
He sought to reduce the degree of decentralisation by denying , in 
theory , any exclusive rights to the s tates in the face of the Union 
and by recognis ing only those rights '''hich the Union gr anted them for 
the better management of local interes ts. Thus he transformed the old 
concept of a federation of states into the more rational concept of a 
decentralised organisation of the country. No state \'Tould be able to 
invoke the rights of its autonomy or the defence of a local interest 
in order to prevent an action to protect the general or national inter -
est from being carried out "li thin its territory , for a state, like a 
citizen or a class , could have no rights against the Nation. 
Therefore , only those states which had the financial ability to 
do so should have the right to administer local affairs; in the others, 
the Union should make up the budge tary deficit and this financial aid 
should give it the right to intervene, controlling or taking over the 
services run by the state or even depriving it of its autonomy. 
Having provided for an increased ascendancy of the federal pmver 
over the states, Oliveira Viana then 'vent on to suggest changes in 
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the balance of pmver Hi thin the central government. He proposed the 
creation of a nevT body Hi th life membership to be called the National 
Council, vlhich was to control and coordinate the other povrers of 
government. This council was to be endmved \-Ti th deliberative, consul t-
ative and judicial functions, including the right to decide on federal 
interve~tion in the states, veto certain acts emanating from the othe+ 
political powers, resolve conflicts between the various branches of the 
Union and the states, give an opinion on draft laws, pass judgment on 
members of the Supreme Court and other members of the magistracy, and 
control the number of deputies composing the Federal Chamber and the amount 
of their allowances. The Council \-las to be composed of 15 to 21 members 
chosen from among the most eminent personalities of the country, "rho vTere 
to be elected by a select body of electors composed of members of the 
National Council, the federal Audit Tribunal (Tribunal de Contas), the 
Supreme Court and as many members of the Federal Chamber as there were 
states; former Presidents were automatically to be considered members 
4 
of the National Council. 
He also proposed a reform of the audit tribunals of the Union 
and the states , turning them into autonomous bodies whose members would 
be assured of their independance. They would exercise administrative, 
consultative and jurisdictional functions so that they could become 
a force of effective and efficient control over the gathering of taxes 
and budgetary expenditure at all levels of government.5 
Turning to the legis lative branch, Viana proclaimed his lack of 
respect for Congress but recognised that the popular masses and the 
elites still considered it the symbolic expression of political liberty. 
Therefore, he intended to preserve the Federal Chamber ",ith its 
existing functions, while abolishing the Senate. In order to prevent 
some of the more notorious abuses of the Old Republic , he advocated 
the prohibition of the re-election of federal and state deputies, 
measures to prevent nepotism and the monopolising of elective positions , 
and external controls over the fixing of subsidies for deputies. 
As' for the judicial system , Oliveira Viana came out against the 
continuation of the dual federal and state magistracy and proposed 
the unification of justice and judicial procedure , making both the 
responsibili ty of the Union and granting only regulatory pm.,rers to 
the states. He also thought that the Supreme Court should be empowered 
to declare federal and state laws unconstitutional as 'l1ell as to 
nullify any acts of the federal, state and municipal pmvers , that 
magistrates should be moved regularly and that regional courts should 
be set up. 
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Other proposals concerned the need for a strong executive pmver. 
Viana advocated increasing the mandate of the President of the Republic 
to seven years and that of the presidents of the states to five years. 
Hovrever, he also thought it necessary to reduce the personal povrer of 
the President and ensure his responsibility , proposing a series of 
restraints on the activities of the executive power; these were to 
be exercised by the Supreme Court, the Audit Tribunal and the National 
Council. He also suggested that the President of the Republic should 
be elected by a select body of electors composed of the incumbent 
President of the Republic and his Ministers of State , the members of 
the Federal Chamber, the National Council , the Supreme Court and the 
regional courts , the federal and state audit tribunals , the presidents 
of the states and their secretaries of state and the members of the 
state Legislative Assemblies , claiming that this "small electoral 
minority, because of the position and posts vrhich it occupies, seems 
to me to represent , in truth , the \vill and judgment of the Nation 
better than the unconscious majorities in the interior and in the 
cities" . 6 
Other proposals included the creation of technical councils , a 
reduction of the "spoils system" in the appointment and dismissal 
of functionaries, measures to guarantee the civil liberty of the 
citizen in the interior and changes in the electoral system. \vith 
regard to the latter, he suggested that the magistrates should super-
vise all stages of the elect~ral process, that the federal government 
should lay dO\-Tn a uniform legislation for all elections and that a 
restricted franchise should be introduced in the elections for the 
presidencies of the states, state and federal deputies, reserving a 
generalised suffrage for elections to the municipal councils . A 
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further step in the direction of elitist government vTas his proposal 
to create a distinction between the right to elect (jus suffragii) and 
the right to be elected (jus honorum), establishing more rigorous 
conditions of culture and moral suitability for the latter . 
Finally, he advocated a res t riction of local autonomy by giving 
state governments ample scope to intervene in the affairs of the 
municlpios, urged the importance of reforming the educational system 
in order to produce an elite which 1tlOuld be able to constitute a 
compe tent ruling class, rejected any socialisation of the means of 
production \'Thile supporting the introduction of social legislation, 
and pressed for a remodelling of the system of taxation, giving a 
greater proportion of the revenue to the Uniono 
Such vTere the concrete measures ,·,hich Oliveira Viana proposed 
in order to strengthen the authority of the central government. His 
other main preoccupation , that of constituting new channels of public 
opinion , was d~veloped in the programme which he drevl up for the 
Economist Partyo In Viana ' s view, the main objectives of the Economist 
Party should be to organise the productive classes by means of Associ-
ations, Centres, Leagues, etc; develop in the economic classes an 
awareness of their unity and form an elite by improving the technical 
knovTledge of the landovmers, industrialists and merchants. 
The Economist Party viaS to be a corporative organisation acting 
in the political sphere. It \.,rould not be a confederation of the 
economic classes but, rather , a party organisation, placed above these, 
vThich aimed to serve their interests and aspirations , vThile they , in 
turn, provided its permanent sources of opiniono What should charact-
erise the Economist Party was not the professional or social origins 
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of its members but the exclusively economic aims of its political action. 
Thus it would accept members from outside the economic classes, 
including from the liberal professions, but only in a subordinate 
role: the leadership was to be in the hands of men belonging to the 
economic classes. 
The Economist Party should struggle to develop the social 
organisation of all the produc tive classes of the country, from the 
local to the national level, in order to create permanent centres of 
organised opinion. Consequently, it was in favour of technical 
councils, and especially, economic councils, functioning alongside 
the executive and legislative pOvlers in the municipios, states and 
Union, and constituted according to the principle of class represent-
ationo They must, however, obey hlO vital principles: on the one 
hand, their members should be elected by the classes themselves and 
on the other, the public powers should be compelled to consult them. 
This vlas intended to develop in the economic classes an interest 
in the administrative and political aspects of economic questions as 
well as an avlareness of their ovm importance as centres of political 
influence. At the same time, it would encourage a closer relationship 
betvleen the productive sectors and the ruling classes. It vIas hoped 
that this would g ive the economic classes a consciousness of their 
political and social importance as well as their economic role , a taste 
for public affairs and the habit of dealing with the public pOivers 
and the men of government . 
The rest of the programme "!as devoted to a series of measures 
intended to improve the efficiency of the economy and prevent the 
further loss of export markets for Brazil ' s agricultural products. 
Oliveira Vi ana suggested that the Economist Party shotud encourage the 
spread of co-operatives , especially for credit and sales; the syste-
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matic application of the processes of rational and mechanical 
agricu~ture , including the use of machines and fertilisers , the 
selection of seeds and the standardisation of agricultural products, 
particularly export ones; the foundation of agricultural schools and 
th~ organisation of short- and lone-term credit . Further points were 
a strong defence of the latifundio , permitting expropriation only in 
very limited circumstances , support for foreign capital and foreign 
immigration, and a discussion of the means to develop agricultural 
credi t.7 The programme ended '-Ti th a call to raise the social prestige 
of businessmen vis-a-vis the liberal professions by founding commer-
cial academies, technical schools and economic faculties in order to 
improve their intellectual and technical potential . 
Oliveira Viana raised and developed some of these points in a 
number of amendments which he proposed to the draft Constitution drawn 
8 
up in the Itamarati Commission in 1932-33 . On the question of decen-
tralisation, he suggested that Article 65 of the Constitution of 1891 
should be altered so as to attribute to the Union every and any right 
or power vThich was not expressly or implicitly conferred on the states , 
instead of the existing vrording which attributed to the states any 
power 0r right \vhich \-IaS not denied to them by a clause in the Con-
sti tution. 9 
He again rejected the election of the President of the Republic 
by direct universal suffrage or by the National Assembly (the Itamarati 
draft ' s equivalent of the federal Chamber of Deputies) , stressing that 
"government is an elite function \vhich belongs to the eli tes; it is 
therefore the responsibility of the elites to elect the supreme agents 
of the government". This time , however , the electoral body \vas to 
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include not only the members of the political elite listed in his 
earlier programme for constitutional revision , but also teachers in 
the universities and higher schools , members of national cultural 
institutions and the prefect and members of the Municipal Council 
of the Federal District. He estimated the total number of electors 
at 3050 , of ,.,hich 1000 vlould be political and 2050 non-political electors , 
Hi th the result that the cultural and technical electors vlould predom-
inate over the political ones. Thus , he thought, the President of 
the Republic would have his authority redoubled vis-a-vis the National 
Assembly since , by freeing his election from the intervention of the 
electoral masses of the interior and giving it to the cultured elites 
in the cities , vTho had a national outlook, his choice vTould express 
10 
the will and thought of the ruling elites. 
Oliveira Viana also repeated his suggestion that the re-election 
of federal deputies should be prohibited in order to ensure the 
continuous renovation of the political representatives and create 
a numerous political elite for the nation. ll 
Finally, he turned to the question of class representation and 
technical councils and here he took a noticeably conservative stand , 
in opposition to the more radical ten.entista elements. He thought 
that they should begin by establishing representation of the classes 
in the municlpios , then in the state assemblies and only when these 
were organised, in the National Assembly. The reason for this was 
that the political representation of the classes vIas not possible vIi th-
out their prior syndical organisationo This VTould take time t o 
develop and could not be achieved by a mere disposition of the law, 
especially considering the absence of solidarity and the spirit of 
association in Brazil , which made it difficult to organise the 
population, particularly in t he interior. Therefore, he suggested 
that they begin modestly, trying out class representation in the 
municipal councils, while they vTai ted for the SlovT natural integration 
of the classes; they should encourage the organisation of the classes 
in the sphere of private life and only think of bringing them into 
public life and political representation much later . 
Instead, he advocated the creation of t echnical councils, 1:lhich 
were much easier to form since they represented expertise rather than 
interests. He suggested technical councils for agriculture , industry, 
commerce, labour, land transport , water transport , education and public 
health. Technical councils would resolve the problem of the economic 
and educated classes ' participation in legislation and government much 
better than ,",ould class representation in parliament . However , he 
12 
stressed that the consultation must be obligatory , not optional . 
The limited scope of the reforms suggested by 01iveira Viana and 
the conservative emphasis with vThich he presented them make an inter-
esting comparison with Alberto Torres, with vThose name Viana has ahTays 
been associated in the minds both of his contemporaries and of later 
commentators. Certainly, Viana i-las a friend and disciple of Torres, 
and in many i'lays acted as a populariser for his complicated vlri tings. 
However , he vTas alivays at pains to stress the difference betvTeen his 
own ideas and those of Torres, claiming that the formative influence 
on him "'Tas the i10rk of Silvio Romero .13 
Thus, Oliveira Viana pointed out that vrhereas he concentrated 
on detailed sociological studies , Torres had a panoramic and philo-
14 
sophical outlook; he thought that Torres i-laS a theoretician (homem de 
gabinete) , in the bad sense of the word , though he paid tribute to 
Torres ' s contribution to the a\-Takening of Brazilian nationalism. 15 
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Although he incorporated many of Torres ' s suggestions for constitu-
tional reform into his own proposals , he v,as s ceptical as to the 
pract icabili ty of Torres ' s proposed "Co-ordinating Pov,er", v,hich was 
to operate a t every level do\~ to the l ocal arena , considering it 
impossible to find the required number of Brazilians \1ith the requisite 
' 1 ' t' 16 qua ~ les o 
The most important difference behreen the two men , hOv,ever , lay 
in the fields of economics and i nternational relations . Torres v'as 
particularly concerned v,ith the repercuss i ons of Brazil ' s role in the 
international economy on its development as a nation - indeed , he 
vieVled his plans for constitutional and political reform as merely 
a necessary precondition for subsequent far-reaching economic and 
social reforms . Oliveira Viana \'las perfectly a\-.rare of the fact that 
"for Torres , Brazil ' s basic problem is the economic problem in all 
its complexity: - the problem of the formation, conservation and 
organisation of our v,eal th , [ ••• ] on the solution of \1hich vrill 
depend whether tomorrov' He shall be a European suzerainty or a nation 
of free men" ; but , in his Ovffi vlorks , he almost entirely i gnored these 
17 
aspects of his predecessor ' s thought . 
For l1hereas Torres developed a radical nationalism based on a 
rational analysis of Brazil ' s present situation , Oliveira Viana ' s 
thinking remained trapped in the myth of "national unity", v,hich he 
assiduously fostered but rarely explained . Unwilling to face up to 
the implications of the economic and social reforms demanded by 
Alberto Torres and his more radical tenentista disciples , Oliveira 
Viana abandoned the broad vision of the future which characterised 
Torres ' s thought and concentrated on the details of Brazil ' s past 
67 
social history and suggestions for minor changes in the political systemo 
On the crucial domestic problem of landmmership , he took up a 
conservative stance , defending the role of the latifundio. Further-
more , not only did he ignore the question of foreign imperialism but 
he also contradicted the most overtly nationalistic aspects of tenen-
tista and Torres ' s thought , defending foreign capital and enthusi-
astically advocating large-scale foreign iwnigration. 
After 1932, there came a parting of the "lays. The tenentista 
movement sUL'vived dovm to the Constituent Assembly of 1933-34 and 
tried vTi th some success to have the institution of class representation 
and the nationalisation of subsoil minerals , sources of energy, banks 
and insurance companies "lri tten into the ne"l Constitution. The 
group led by Abelardo Marinho fought hard in the cause of class repre-
sentation , Hhich they saw as a means of breaking the hold of the re-
gional oligarchies at the local level and of strengthening the repre-
18 
sentation of the Nation as a Vlhole o In the end, a compromise was 
reached and provision vlaS made for a sixth of the Chamber of Deputies 
, 19 
to be elected by the sindicatos . 
\'/i th the promulgation of the nevT Constitution, the tenentes 
disappeared as an organised group and their members were either 
incorporated into the ",eb of government or gravitated tOvlards the 
fascist A~ao Integra1ista Brasileira or the popular front Alianfa 
Nacional Libertadora. 
MeamThile, in Harch 1932 , Oli veira Viana had accepted the position 
of Juridical Consultant in Vargas ' s Ministry of Labour and his time 
and energy "lere occupied Hi th his official duties. Apart from his 
participation in the Itamarati Commission, "Thich drevl up the draft of 
the Constitution of 1934, and \V'here, as he himself \'Irote , he appeared 
20 
as an isolated and reactionary figure , he made little contribution to 
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the political debates of the 1930s. But during this period, he \'laS 
becoming increasingly interested in corporativism and \vrote a series 
of articles in defence of his Labour Justice Iml in which he proposed 
administrative decentralisation through autarchic boards and councils 
as a substitute for the political decentralisation of the federal 
. 21 reg~me. Only after the inauguration of the Constitution of 1937 did 
he return to poli tical writing with his nOVl notorious apologia for 
22 
the Estado NBvo . 
Oliveira Viana distinguished three main aspects of the new Consti-
tution: the increase in the power and responsibilities of the Union, 
through a broader conception of national authority and interests in 
the face of local ones; the primacy of the Federal Executive in the 
face of the other federal and state powers , through an increase in 
the responsibilities and prerogatives of the President of the Republic; 
and the broadening of the democratic base of the government and the 
public administration , through t he recognition of new and more ex-
pressive channels of popular opinion. 23 
He particularly emphasised the greater pm-lers granted to the 
President of the Republic and laid the responsibility for this change 
firmly at the door of the Chamber of Deputies o With its factious 
spirit , its failure to pass legislation and the disregard df the 
parties \'li thin it to\<rards the collective and national interest , the 
Chamber had become an obstacle to the efficiency of the public admin-
istration and a centre of agitation and popular unrest , \·rhich the 
communists vrere beginning to exploit o Besides, the President repre-
sented the national interest better than the Congress since only he 
vIas elected by the whole nat ion . 
Nevertheless, in spite of the increased pm·rer of the President, 
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Oliveira Viana claimed that the nevT regime was democratic and repre-
sentative, and did not belong to the dictatorial type of government o 
He himself regarded the Constitution of 1937 as something of a 
personal vindication, proudly ticking off the features contained in it 
which he had long been advocating o24 
The only criticisms "Thich he had of the ne\'1 Constitution were 
that it did not go far enough in some areas , for instance , by continuing 
t o attribute to the states any povrer which "Tas not expressly or impli-
citly denied them , by transferring all the magistrates to the states , 
rat her than to the federal government, and by failing to eradicate 
the electoral clans , \'Thich "Tere the primary cells of the political 
parties . Thus , although the Constitution was the most revolutionary 
sys t em vrhich Brazil had ever had , Oliveira Viana preferred to think 
of it as a point of departure rather than a finishing point o 25 
Short ly before, Azevedo Amaral had also published an apologia for 
26 
the Es t ado Ndvo. It is indeed ironic to reflect that both vTri ters 
\'1ho had laid s o much emphasis on the question of "national real ities" 
should have staked , and ultimately lost , their intellectual reput ations 
by defending a cons titution \'1hich , more than any other , remained a 
purely -paper creation. This is especiall y so considering that , in 
comparison with t he reactionary Catholicism of Tris t ao de Ataide or 
the aggressive fascism of Pl{nio Salgado , the authoritarianism defended 
by Azevedo Amaral and Oliveira Viana represented a relatively moderate 
position. Their mistake , however, ",as to link their names to a 
concrete regime , \'1hose increasing unpopularity rubbed off on its 
defenders . 
By 1942, Oliveira Vi ana was being asked if his concept of the 
State \Vas totalitarian , to "'hich he replied that , on the contrary, he 
10 
was, in fact, an authoritarian, since he considered authority, and 
not liberty, as the fundamental principle of political organisationo27 
He "rrote a series of critical articles trying to explain the roots 
28 
of Nazism but, at the end of the war, vlith the collaps e of fascism 
in Europe and the overthrm., of the Estado Novo in Brazil, writers and 
intellectuals associated wi t h those regimes went into eclipse. 
Nevertheless, despite ill-health and YTaning popularity during 
the 1940s , Oliveira Viana continued writing and publishing . Indeed, 
Vlhat is perhaps his greatest and most complete book - though by no 
means his most oriBinal one - Institui90es pol{ticas brasileiras, 
29 
was published in 1949. This ylOrk, YThich runs to over 600 pages, 
summed up the themes ,.,hich he had introduced in his earlier books on 
Brazil ' s social and political development; as he himself said, looking 
back at the conclusions he had dravm earlier in life: " they ,.,ere right -
because they coincide Yli th the conclusions which I reach noYT, using 
30 
a new methodology". Despite this new methodology, Institui<;oes 
polfticas brasileiras contains little that was new in Oliveira Viana ' s 
thinking , yet it is, in many "lays, the mo s t representative of his 
Horks. The lack of attention g iven to it novladays is an indication 
of the extent to ,.,hich Olive ira Viana ' s reputation has been marred by. 
the political bias which gave his vlri tings the great popularity they 
enjoyed in his early days. As Nelson Vlerneck Sodre "/rote after Olive ira 
Viana ' s death in March 1951, "he "las overtaken by events and became 
secondary before he died". 31 
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Chapt er 4. THE EARLY SOC IAL LEGISLATION OF THE VARGAS REGIME . 
The need for political reform vlas not the only problem facing 
the October revolut ionaries when they assumed power in 1930. Another 
\'laS the "social question", or hoVT the existing social and political 
st cture vTas to react to the emergence of an organised VTorking class 
movement . Vargas IS ans\.,er Vias to create a r.1inistry of Labour (Ministerio 
do Trabalho, Industria e Comercio , or M.T. I . C.) and to decree an 
ext ensive body of social legislation. In later years , he liked to 
present this policy as a spontaneous concession by a generous govern-
ment to the passive and grateful \wrkers . Recent research and the 
publication of militants I memoirs have shovm , hOvTever , that Brazil 
possessed a considerable working class movement prior to 1930 and that 
the government ' s ac t ivi t y in the field of labour relations was by no 
means as disinterested as it liked to make out . l 
Indeed , much of t he legislation passed in the early years vTas 
the result of d~rect or indirect pressure from outside the government . 
This pressure \'Tas strong enough to produce laVis which brought some 
genuine benefi ts to the urban Horkers and yet , ultimately , vTas too 
,"eak to resist the forces of bureaucratisation and political manipu-
lation , \-Thich aimed to tie the '<lorking class to the government ' s apronc. 
strings . The result vTaS the compromise of interests Hhich characterised 
the Brazilian labour scene throughout the post-I'Tar democratic period . 
vlorking class organisations began to emerge with the grovTth of 
industry in the years following t he abolition of slavery and the de c-
laration of the Republic . Poor Viorking and living conditions , long 
hours of work and 10VT pay in the primitive factories and Vlorkshops of 
the period exac t ed their toll in human lives and health , and creat ed 
resentments Hhich burst out in strikes and demonstrations . These , in 
73 
turn , stimulated the appearance of ad hoc committees , unions , centres 
and other forms of VTorkers ' organisation. 
The years from the turn of the century to the outbreak of the 
First 'ilorld 'liar sa\oI a vast influx of Southern European immigrants , v/ho 
brought not only more advanced forms of organisation, such as the Workers ' 
. 
Federations , which aimed to organise and coordinate the Horking class 
struggle, but also the political philosophies and antagonisms which 
were convulsing their native lands . Reformi.s t socialism gained a 
number of adherents in the early years but its influence Has soon 
eclipsed by that of anarchism. The anarchists and anarcho-syndicalists -
many of them foreigners but a fe\oI of Brazilian birth , dominated the 
vlorking class movement during the first h/o decades of the century , 
provoking strikes and agitating for the revolutionary overthroVT of 
the existing social systemo 
Numerous strikes occurred in this period , largely in support of 
demands for shorter \<Iorking hours and higher vrages . The most impor-
tant were the Paulista Raihray strike of 1906 and the general strikes 
2 
of 1907 , 1917 and 1919 in Sao Paulo . The strike of 1917 , Hhich was 
sparked off by the rapid war-time inflation, brought the entire city 
to a halt and forced the industri.alists and the state authorities to 
concede many of the strikers ' demands , though backsliding by the 
employers later nullified most of these gains. After the vIaI' , the 
number of strikes declined; workers ' organisations and their activ-
ities Here severely repressed under the state of siege declared by 
President Artur Bernardes (1922-26 ) and only began to recover their 
vi tali ty in the greater freedom of the \vashington LUlS presidency 
(1926-30) . By 1930 , the number of strikes Has rising again. 3 
The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 had little immediate impact on 
Brazil , although a number of anarchists tried to stage a"maximalist" 
uprising in Rio in November 1918: it was easily put dmm by the police.4 
By 1922 , hm'lever , the issues were clearer and the Communist Party of 
5 Brazil was founded in March of that year . In contrast to most European 
countries , \-There the emergence of communist parties vTas the result of 
a split among the socialists, the Brazilian party was established by 
a group of dissident anarchists , led by Astrojildo Pereira . During 
the 1920s , in the course of a bitter struggle , the communists replaced 
the anarchists as the leaders of the working class , but they remained 
6 
few in number and vTUh 11 ttle real influence . Nevertheless , by chance , 
they gained access to the daily ne,vspaper , ~ Narao , and , for s ix months 
in 1927 , ,.,aged a vigorous propaganda campaign , vThich seemed to give 
them disproportionate importance . ? Furthermore , in late 1927, they 
began to court the immensely popular tenente leader, LUls Carlos Prestes , 
whose pronouncements became increasingly inflammatory and marxist-
oriented from 1930 omvards. 8 
Huch of the \'lorking class agitation \vas centred on the poli tically-
sensitive city of Rio de Janeiro , the then federal capital , and it 
soon attracted the attention of dissident members of the political 
elite. Opposition poli t icians , such as Nicanor do Nascimento , Irineu 
r1achado and r1aurtcio de Lacerda , based their political position on the ' 
Rio electorate , which was beyond the influence of the pro-government 
coron~is and political chiefs of the interior, and , in return for this 
support , fought in Congress for legislative measures to benefit the 
9 
city ' s \·lOrkers . The great liberal politician B,nd orator , Rui Barbosa , 
in his last campaign for the Presidency in 1919 , appealed to this same 
10 
clientele \vith promises of social legislation. Other supporters of 
labour laws were more disinterested . THO , in particular , stand out: 
Evaristo de Moraes and Deodato Maia , who later assumed high positions 
?4 
in Vargas ' s Ministry of Labour, \vere putting forltlard comprehensive 
11 
programmes of labour legislation before the First World War. These 
early proponents of social legislation styled themselves social demo-
crats and urged the importance of mutual co-operation bet\veen capital 
and labour. Hmvever, by 1930 , very few labour Im-ls were on the statute 
book and most of those remained a dead letter. 
Consequently, vlhen the Vargas government began to decree its 
social legislation in December 1930 , it was not acting in a vacuum ~ 
Furthermore, it had to "lork in the context of a definite political 
situation , created by the aftermath of the Revolution. The triumphant 
revolutionaries faced a situation in \'Thich social distress caused by 
the world-\o.lide economic crisis coincided with heightened emotions and 
sharpened political a\vareness on the part of those Viho had witnessed 
the overthrow of the constituted authori ties. The primary aim of the 
more cautious and conservative members of the new government, including 
the first Minister of Labour, Lindolfo Collor, viaS, therefore , to 
. 
restore order and cool passions. Thes e motives \-lere clearly evident 
in the decision to endoVi Brazil with a comprehensive social legislation. 
The nevl labour laVTs vlere not intended to "mobilise" the \'lOrking classes, 
or induce them to support the revolutionary Bovernment, but rather to 
"demobilise" them, preventing them from turninB to the Octobrists ' 
enemies on the left, the communists and Lu{s Carlos Prestes. 
These obj ectives emerged gradually as the new Bovernment 'of or ked 
out a justification for its social policy. The immediate aim of the 
labour legislation Vias, hm"ever, more directly political and bore some-
thing of the air of a propaganda exercise. Back in August 1929, 
Lindolfo Collor had written to Vargas , saying that the country Vianted 
more than a s imple struggle for the Presidency and urging the need for 
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"something ne,,,", a "great movement of national renovation" to give the 
Alian~a Liberal more Height and a focal point '''hich would keep its 
12 
disparate elements together. At that time, he had suggested the 
creation of a Progressive Republican Party but as this did not emerge , 
it seems likely that he transferred these opinions to the creation of 
the T-Unistry of Labour. 
The Labour legislation proved that the Revolution really Has 
"revolutionary". Both the Democratic Party of sao Paulo and the ten-
entes had advocated social legislation and it also enabled Vargas to 
payoff political debts to Alian~a Liberal supporters in Rio de Janeiro, 
such as Evaristo de Moraes and Maurlcio de Lacerda, who had long been 
13 
calling for more labour lai'lS . On the other hand, being confined mainly 
to the urban proletariat of Rio and Sao Paulo, it did not affect the 
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14 politically and economically important agrarian interests of the country. 
Furthermore, the revolutionaries also seemed to think that it 
,YOuld be a simple operation to endow Brazil Hi th an adequate social 
legislation: Lindolfo Collor talked of promulgating a Labour Code by 
the end of 1931 (in the event, the Consolidation of Labour Laws -
juridically a lesser institution - '''as not decreed until 1943); the 
creation· of the tvlO neH ministries (Labour and Education) Has not 
expected to place any extra burden on the budget and, indeed, in the 
15 
ear ly days, the M. T • 1. C. Has run very much on an "ad hoc " bas is. Only 
'.Then experience shm"ed the enormous problems to be faced did it 
become more bureaucratised, especially under the second minister, 
Salgado Filho. 
Short-term opportunism vTas not the only motive, hovlever . The 
workers and popular masses had not taken an active part in the 
revolution, beyond street rioting and the traditional sacking of nevlS-
paper offices , and the revolutionaries , now in pO\"er, vranted to keep 
it that ,"ay . They did not call on the vlOrkers to support the govern-
ment actively but \olanted them to become passive dependents on its 
initiatives. This is clearly visible in the pronouncements of Lindolfo 
Colloro At the beginning of January 1931, he told the members of the 
Stokers ' Union that they shou~d only get involved in politics as 
individuals and should never involve their association in political 
struggles; workers ' associations should only have economic and bene-
ficent ends . He also sugges ted the elimination of intermediaries 
and said that \'lhenever the \'lorking classes wanted something , they should 
go directly to the minister \.,ho \'lOuld always be pleased to receive 
16 
them. Three weeks later, on 24 January , he told workers demonstra-
ting in honour of Getulio Vargas, that " the rulers of the Nevl Republic 
do not consider the proletariat as a political or party force but as 
an economic factor and an element of social expression". He said that 
every citizen was free to manifest his political opinions and defend 
his economic interests and social convictions and went on to disclaim 
any governmental intention to seek support from class associations } 7 
The desire to keep party politics out of the workers ' associations 
viaS clos~ly linked to another preoccupation of the revolutionary 
government . The LUlcertain economic situation and the apparent conver-
sion of Luts Carlos Prestes to marxism had made the Octobrists extremely 
sensitive to the danger of communism. Maurfcio de Lacerda later charged 
that the Provisional Government had "used and abused the epithet of 
18 
communist and exaggerated the dangers of them in Brazil". The nevTS-
papers annOlmced that the Chief of Police had contracted tvTO experts 
19 
in combating communism from the United States ,.,hile Collor "told the 
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vTOrkers frankly that he will not permit any attempt ",hatsoever to disturb 
the social organisation" . He Has referring " to the pernicious action 
of a few foreigners ",ho, as delegates from theorists and ideologists 
in other countries, are infiltrating our ~rorkforoe and interfering in 
20 
the leadership of its centres". 
\f:hen reading the programme of the Alian~a Liberal in January 1930, 
Vargas had concluded his remarks on the social question I'Tith a reference 
to Brazil ' s need to "enhance the value of its human capital because 
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the measure of man ' s social utility is given by his capacity to produce ,~21 
and there ,,,,ere Brazilians in 1930 ,·rho fully understood the direct 
economic benefits of labour legislation, in the sense that contented 
22 
\wrkers increase productivity. Nevertheless, considerations of a polit-
ical and social order ,·rere paramount in the early social legislation. 
The labour laws ,.,ere seen as a means of preserving the existing social 
23 
and political structure by winning the vTOrkers avray from communism. 
Only in the late 1930s and the early 1940s did labour legislation 
come to be regarded as a means of increasing the economic productivity 
of the Brazilian vrorkforce . 
To understand this line of thinking , it is necessary to consider 
the conditions of the period and the ",ay in "'hich they vrere viewed. 
The economic crisis in the advanced countries , the collapse of coffee 
and the upheaval caused by the Revolution had created business distress , 
unemployment and an atmosphere of uncertainty in Braz~l, and although , 
as it turned out, the country suffered less than the industrial nations 
24 
from the Depression, the outlook in 1930 was forbidding . The first 
measure taken by the nevrly-created M.T . I.C. was an act of improvisation, 
almost of desperation. Decree 19482 of 12 December 1930 restricted 
the entry of foreign immigrants into Brazil , obliged all businesses 
and undertakings to ensure that a t least tHo-thirds of their employees 
vrere native-born Brazilians and made arrangements for the unemployed 
to be sent to agricultural jObs . 25 
This, the famous T\'lO Thirds Law, \'Ton immediate popularity because 
of its nationalistic overtones but , in spite of its technical defic-
iencies , which led to repeated prorogations and modifications, it also 
had a definite social and political purpose . This 'vTas to give ivork to 
the considerable numbers of unemployed Brazilians in the main cities 
'vTi thout burdening public funds 'vri th the expense of social assistance 
or public \vorks; it 'vas also to prevent the expected flood of unem-
ployed from Europe , many of i·,hom would be "socially undesirable" and 
'vTould " increase the difficulties of life in the urban centres and 
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infect the Brazilian workman 'vIi th subversive ideas". This decree set 
a pragmatic precedent for the subsequent labour legislation by exempting 
agricultural workers from its provisions and by avoiding large-scale 
governmental expenditure , vrhile it also set a legal precedent by 
limiting a traditional liberty - that of the movement of labour, and 
by imposing restrictive obligations on employers . 
The implications contained in this first laiv vrere extended and 
given theoretical backing in the follo'vling months . Collor adopted 
the traditional corporativist critique of economic liberalism to 
explain the origins of the problems knmm as the "social question", 
i·,hich 'viaS caused by , "on the one hand , the rather disorderly expansion 
of our industrial activities , and on the other, the ever-increasing 
27 
demands of the popular masses " o He explained in greater detail: 
"In fact the result of uncontrolled free competition 
means the prosperity of some at the cost of the sacri-
fice of others and this , in economic policy , is nothing 
but disorganisation". 28 
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11 [ ••• J we are inevitably leaving behind disorderly and 
s t erile individualistic empiricism, which began to 
retreat nearly half a century ago , in order to enter the 
",orld of social co-operation in "'hich the classes are 
interdependent upon each other and in ,.,hich the idea of 
progress is subordinated to the fundamental nation of 
order". 29 
Order vTas to be maintained by submitting the vlhole field of labour 
relations to the rule of la"T o Special laws ,.,ould prohibit the worst 
abuses of employers in relation to working conditions , and would or-
ganise the t,.,o sides into associations or sindicatos, ,.,hich \'lould 
negotiate with each other and sign collective contracts fixing specific 
working conditions and wage rates; l abour courts composed of repre-
sentatives dravll1 from both sides were to settle any disputes and it was 
hoped that the "Thole me chanism would be animated by a spirit of "class 
collaboration" instead of the prevailing one of "class struggle". The 
St ate was to play a tutelary role , establishing the legal f rame,vork 
and enforcing its application but , in theory at least , it "Tas not to 
intervene di rectly in labour relations . This way of thinking ... TaS summed 
up by Collar when he said that : 
"The disorder [in labour relations ] lies in the lack 
of special social mechanisms to guarantee the freedom , 
economic remuneration and juridical protection of 
labour in Brazil . 
Until these social mechanisms are created, the rela-
tions bet",een bosses and workers must be , in principle 
and by definition , relations of conflict and not 
relations of co-operation". 30 
He and his successor , Salgado Filho, therefore set out to achieve 
" the juridical regularisation of the relations betHeen capital and 
labour". If one examines the lm'ls vThich \'lere passed by the Provisional 
Government, one can indeed see that they Here intended to improve the 
conditions of the working classes by placing legal restrictions and 
obligations on employers and by providing institutional mechanisms for 
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the "collaboration betv1een classes " . A stream of decrees limited the 
entry of iwnigrants and nationalised labour; re-organised and extended 
the pension funds; gave legal recognition to employers ' and employees ' 
associations; regulated various jobs and professions; controlled 
vlorking hours i n commerce, industry and specific occupations, and 
female and child labour; instituted an identity card for employees; 
established collective labour contracts, labour courts and concili-
ation commissions; re-organised existing provisions on holidays and 
compensation for accidents at vrork; set up an inspection service and 
special delegations to supervise labour in the ports and began to 
establish the pension institutes.31 
A part of the explanation for this sudden explosion of social 
legislation lies in the legalistic outlook of Brazilians of the time: 
the ruling elite \'1aS composed almost entirely of lavryers, and public 
issues were debated in a legalistic manner. All the Ministers of 
Labour under Vargas, except Lindolfo Collor, ,Tere lawyers and many 
unemployed Im'lYers of Im.,rer social origins found positions in the new 
Hinistry.32 The employers often complained that the labour lavrs were 
the work of laHyers "'ho had little conception of the real conditions 
and problems of indus try and trade;3and the monthly bulletin of the 
H.T. I.C . contains a far greater number of articles justifying the new 
social legislation as a branch of Law than, for example, suggesting 
practical Hays of enforcing it. This predominance of la"'Yers and their 
legalistic outlook inevitably had an influence on the character of the 
social legislation. It explains, for instance , the sheer vollme of 
laws passed and the pre-occupation vrith creating a perfect body of 
legislation on paper rather than enforcing it in practice. 
Furthermore , the Brazilian experience differed from that of Europe , 
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vThere much of the social legislation had been elaborated piecemeal , 
in response to public concern about specific problems vThich had been 
revealed by populax agitation or objective investigation. In Brazil , 
the social la,..,s were copied from these foreign models in the belief 
that social problems ,'rere the same every\"here and that so, therefore, 
were their remedies . Although Salgado Filho called in representatives 
of the interested parties to help in dravring up his labour laws , there 
was no objective statistical research on social conditions in Brazil 
until the American social scientists , Horace Davis and Samuel Lowrie, 
undertook their pioneering studies on the standard of living of the 
vTorking classes in Sao Paulo in the mid-thirties and Josu~ de Castro 
began to investigate the nutritional deficiencies of poor families in 
Recife and Rio de Janeir0 24 Apart from some minor projects , the first 
major study carried out under governmental auspices "ras the inquiry 
into real minimum ,,,ages \\Thich preceded the decreeing of the Minimum 
Wage Lm" in 1938-390 Consequently, the early labour lavTs, which ,"ere 
copied or adapted from foreign models , frequently proved impractical 
in Brazilian conditions and either fell into abeyance or suffered 
constant alterations . The ensuing confusion made strict enforcement 
extremely difficult . Evasion was practised on a large-scale by recal-
citrant employers and abetted by workers vrho Here desperate for 
35 
employment at any price. 
Nevertheless , the social legislation "!as , as a Hhole, effective 
and did bring genuine benefits to the urban VTorkers , particularly in 
the large cities, such as Rio and Sao Paulo. This "!as an essential 
prerequisite if it \Vas to succeed in attracting the allegiance of the 
working class to the existing social system. Furthermore , in the early 
1930s, the Brazilian Horkers shovTed considerable militancy, and while 
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the threat of communism provided an indirect stimluus to the promul-
gation of social legislation , far more direct preSSlITe came from 
\vorking class agitation , demonstrations and strikes . Collor quickly 
discovered hOyl complex and intransigent labour relations could be in 
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his attempts to mediate in a Rio textile yTorkers I s trike in 1931. Direct 
confrontation , hm"ever , soon gave way to an uneasy policy of mutual 
compromise and manipulation . Strikes Here increasingly intended to 
pressure the government into sponsoring compromise agreements v!hich 
VTould be favourable to the workers . 
This process was clearly seen in 1934, Hhen Vargas ,.as in a 
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poli tically ,.,eak position. The employees of the British-owned Leopoldina 
RaihTay came out on strike in April of that year , demanding higher 
vlages and better vlOrking conditions , and only returned to work follovling 
the direct intervention of Vargas and vTith the promise that their 
grievances would be remedied : 7 Direct pressure ,vas also exercised on 
the government itself: in April 1934 , the seamen also struck in support 
of their demands for changes in the administration of their pension 
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fund and in July , the bankvlorkers stopped "Tork in order to ensure that 
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their pension fund "lould be quickly brought into being . Later in the 
same year , the postal and telegraph ,vorkers successfully struck for 
. 40 hlgher ,,,ages . 
In all these cases, the government tried to maintain its authority 
by insisting that the strikers return to \.Jork before it granted their 
demands. Equally , the strikers did not press their demands to the 
bitter finish but accepted the agreements offered. This unstable com-
promise "las maintained by the strength of the working class organisations , 
vlhich exercised considerable political influence in the early 1930s ; 
for example , Oliveira Viana referred in 1933 to the "fearful and 
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arrogant power of the [ dockers 'J Resistencias", which both the N.T. I. C. 
and the police had to treat \-rith care.4l In creating its social legis-
lation, Vargas ' s govermnent had to take account of political realities 
and come to terms with the exis tence of an organised working class. The 
latter was not strong enough to resist the blandishments of a govern-
ment determined to neutralise it but , at the same time , it \vas only 
willine to give up its independence in return for real benefits. This, 
as much as the personal inclinations of the individual politicians 
sponsoring it , explains vrhy the early social legislation ,,,as marked 
by a spirit of fairness and generosity. 
The rapid promulgation of an extensive body of labour la,.,s, need-
less to say , provoked a hoyrl of protest from the employers , some of 
,,,hom even accused the eovernment of encouraging extremism and paving 
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the way for the dictatorship of the proletariat. Vargas retorted that 
the employers did not appreciate '''hat Has being done on their behalf 0 
Nonetheless, they) too, were able to benefit directly from the restric-
, 
tive orientation of the M.T.I.C. Full-blmm European corporativism 
blamed social conflict on the over-production, lmemployment and low 
".rages caused by the cut-throat competition of laisser-faire capitalism, 
and sought to resolve these problems by favouring cartels and arrange-
ments "rhich ",ould reduce production until it came into line ,-ri th 
demand. Nobody had ever thought to accuse the Brazilian industrialists 
of excessive competition b~t , all the same , they Here suffering from an 
accummulation of stocks which they attributed to over-production. 
Vlithin three months of the Revolution, they obtained from the govern-
ment a decree limiting the importation of nm-r machinery for the 
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country ' s principal industries . The pI'ess was uneasy about this measure, 
which so obviously favoured existing interests , but it ,-ras maintained 
and extended for successive periods . 44 
In vieVl of the arguments vThich ''lere later to be put forward on 
behalf of industry and industrialisation , it is interesting to note 
the reasons vii th which Salgado Filho (who did not ac t ually promulgate 
the . decree ) later justified this measure : 
"The importance \'Thich these industries have attained , 
the large amounts of capital invested in their operation 
and the considerable number of vTorkers ''lhich they employ 
[ • • • ] justify the measure \·,i th which they were protected, 
preventing the problems stemming from over-production 
from being aggravated by the installation of nev' factories , 
vIi th incalculable damage to the economy of the country 
and to private fortunes" . 45 
Too much should not be made of this justification, since fe\>T Brazilians 
\-Tere ideologically comrni tted to restricting production . Rather, the 
decree should be numbered amongst the various measures taken to salvage 
existing Brazilian interests in the midst of the international economic 
crisis , such as the requirement to mix a certain percentage of 
Brazilian coal or sugar-alcohol with imported coal and petrol . Never-
theless , it demonstrates that the pervading mentality in the early 
1930s \'las one of " retrenchment", of preserving the existing order 
and saving "'hat could be saved from the crisis , even at the expense 
of material progress . 
The deliberately fair-minded attitude of Lindolfo Collor ''las 
maintained by the second minister, Salgado Filho , despite his previous 
occupation as Chief of Police. The spate of s trikes in 1934 provoked 
"'idespread criticism of the government ' s social policyo Salgado Filho 
claimed, in reply , that vThen it creat ed the Ministry of Labour, the 
Provisional Government "'-Tas not foolish enough to fancy that it \wuld 
extinguish disputes , putting a complete end to the conflicts hitherto 
existing betvTeen bosses and \'Torkers ". It merely intended to remove 
the violent and aggressive aspects of these conflicts , for it 
ft vranted the vrorkers to be treated like other human 
beings , I'lith rights and corresponding obligations , 
C .. . :J. Still , tranquil relations do not mean that 
disputes Hill disappear but that they \·,ill be solved 
peacefully . So , the Provisional Government gave em-
ployers and employees the opportunity to resolve ll their 
differences vii th order and according to the laws . 46 
The crucial test of the social legislation , hm1ever, came in 
November 1935 vri th the wlsuccessful communist uprisings in the North-
east and in Rio . Getulio Vargas , vrri ting to his friend Oswaldo Aranha 
a month later , noted that the governnlent had received demonstrations 
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of support ft even from the \1Orking classes". The then Minister of 
Labour observed that ft reactionaries [ ••• ] are alvrays attacking the 
scope of our social ImlS . But the corrununist uprisings of last November 
,·,hich occurred in the barracks of the federal forces [ • • • J , Vli thout 
the participation of the Horking masses , demonstrate the foresight 
and l1isdom of the Provisional Government in decreeing a profoundly 
human and just legislationft. 48 
The failure of these uprisings proved conclusively that the 
communist menace had been over- exaggerated and \'Tide spread police 
repression ensured that it \1Ould not occur again. In the aftermath 
of this· repression, the generosity and fairness of the early years of 
the Provisional Government Vlere largely forgotten and a more self-
confident and cynical manipulation of the labour laHs , particularly 
in their collective aspects , backed up by virulent anti-communist 
rhetoric , set in . Nevertheless , the initial liberality left a legacy 
on the lmlS Hhich affected the individual rights of \lOrkers: these 
laws continued to s tri ve to give the vlorker genuine benefits and to 
resolve individual disputes in accordance Hith a spirit of fairness . 
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Meanwhile, however, a new outlook was developing in the M.T.I.C., 
which diagnosed a different cause for class conflict and suggested a 
different remedy. In October 1935, an anonymous functionary of the 
Ministry wrote: 
"The social question in capitalist countries, like 
the United States, in which there are great combines -
"trusts" and "cartels", is characterised by the need 
to redistribute accummulated wealth. In Brazil, on 
the contrary, the social question appears in a different 
light, requiring an increase of wealth, which we can 
only achieve with the organisation of our productive 
activities". 49 
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This new approach to the social problem reflects the views of a Brazilian 
industrialist, Roberto Simonsen, whose ideas we shall now consider. 
Chapter 5. ROBERTO SIMONSEN: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND 
SOCIAL PROBLEr-iS. 
Roberto Simonsen vTaS the anti thesis of the intellectuals of his 
time. To him, the economic problem was paramount. He ignored the 
political questions which so absorbed his contemporaries, and declared 
that social problems could not be solved in isolation. Yet, as Brazil 's 
foremost proponent of industrialisation and economic development, he 
evolved a comprehensive system of ideas which encompassed all aspects 
of society. Simonsen introduced the concept of underdevelopment to 
Brazil and, at the same time, he urged radical measures to overcome 
the problems \-Thich it caused. 
The basic element in Simonsen's theory of development was a policy 
of industrialisation to serve the home market. This was nothing short 
of revolutionary in a country ",hich had traditionally depended upon 
the export of primary products, involving as it did restrictions on 
free trade and the raising of internal purchasing pOvler and the aver-
age standard of living . Yet Simonsen ,"as a vTealthy, well-established 
businessman vTho proudly numbered himself amongst Brazil's "conservative 
classes". The apparent paradox of an entrenched conservative advoca-
ting a radically progressive policy of economic development is a 
reflection of the breadth and originality of his vision. 
Simonsen was by no means the earliest advocate of a policy of 
industrialisation, but he vTas the first to consider in ,detail its 
long-term implications and its repercussions on Brazilian society in 
general 0 Indeed, he clearly realised that the social aspects of devel-
opment could not be separated from the economic ones and he set out 
resolutely to grapple vii th the problem of reconciling the t,vo. The 
theory vThich he evolved vTas based on the argument that Brazil viaS a 
poor country and that most of its economic, social and political pro-
blems vTere caused by the low standard of living of its people. The 
way to solve these problems and prevent conflict was to increase the 
production of wealth and so raise the average standard of living of 
the "Thole population. This could only be achieved by a general policy 
of economic development based on intensive industrialisation and the 
expansion of the internal market. 
In pursuing this line of thought, Simonsen developed a perplex-
ingly complicated and ambiguous ideology \-Thich was capable of appealing 
to a "Tide spectrum of opinion, ranging from the Left to the Right. 
For by emphasising the need to create new wealth, he was able to argue 
against attempts to redistribute existing wealth. Economic develop-
ment would solve social problems "Tithout conflict, by raising the 
total national income and so increasing the material well-being of the 
lower classes in absolute terms. At the same time, it would ignore 
the relative distribution of this income and leave the existing class 
structure unchanged. Thus, in Simonsen's eyes, development had a 
conservative purpose. The key to this outlook lay in his concept of 
raising the average standard of living, a concept he gradually \'lorked 
out in the first t\'lenty five years of his public career. 
Simonsen ''las born in the city of Rio de Janeiro on 18 February 
1889 and died in the same city on 25 May 1948 at the age of 59. How-
ever, "the birth of Roberto Cochrane Simonsen in the Federal District 
"Tas fortuitous, since all his family resided in Santos, and he ahTays 
considered himself a paulista and a santista, avoiding mention of his 
place of birth" 0 1 
Simonsen's father, Sydney }iartin Simonsen, was born in London in 
1850 into a family of Danish Je\oflsh descent, and went to Br azil at the 
age of 25; he worked as a bank manager, remaining in Brazil until 
his death at the age of 80. In 1883, he married Robertina da Gama 
Cochrane and the couple had five children, Wallace, Roberto, Sydney, 
2 Lucy and l'1a.ry. Ro bertina was a descendant of Lord Cochrane, the 
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founder of the Brazilian navy, and the daughter of Inaeio Wallaee da 
Gama Coehrane, an engineer whose family owned coffee fazendas in the 
Para{ba Valley and who worked as the superintendent or government 
inspector of various railway and urban improvement companies. He also 
participated in politics under the Empire as deputy to the State Leg-
. 3 
islative Assembly and, later, to the National Assembly. Thus, although, 
like so many of the early paulista industrialists, Roberto Simonsen 
came of immigrant stock, his family had a certain social position, 
,,,i th links vTi th the traditional agricultural society and an interest 
in the country's affairs. 
Simonsen received his primary schooling in Santos and then went 
to the Colegio Anglo-Brasileiro in Sao Paulo Capital for his secon-
dary education. Afterwards, under the influence of his grandfather, 
he matriculated in the Escola Politecnica of Sao Paulo at the age of 
15, graduating with distinction in civil engineering when he was still 
under 21, one of the youngest engineers in Brazil. 
Refusing the government positions to which this diploma entitled 
him, Simonsen began vlork as the engineer of the Southern Brazil Railvr-
ay from 1909 to 1910. In 1911, he married Raquel Cardoso who bore 
him fo~ sons, Roberto, Fernando, Eduardo and Victor.4 In the same 
year, he was appointed director-general of the Prefeitura of Santos 
and engineer-in-charge of the municipal improvements commission, in 
vrhich capacity he took vigorous action to implement a programme to 
improve the drainage, street-building and urbanisation of Santos. 5 
In the fo11O\-ring year, 1912, he resigned his official positions 
and, together vii th a group of friends and colleagues, founded a 
construction company, the Companhia Construtora de Santos, '''hieh ,,,as 
to form the nucleus of his industrial activities. Such an undertaking 
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vias something of a novelty in Brazil, since up to then it had been 
customary to parcel out construction work to contractors . The company 
was successful and in 1916 extended its operations to Sao Paulo Capital 
and Rio, but it was adversely affected by the fluctuations in demand, 
an~ soon began to diversify its activities by entering other fields 
in order to create a market for itself. Such, at least, was one of 
the motives for the foundation of the Companhia Santista de Habitaroes 
Economicas, a firm which aimed to build cheap working class housing, 
and for Simonsen ' s involvement in a scheme to build luxury property 
and in a meat-packing company in Santos. Later, he became interested 
in other companies, ,·[hich produced copper goods and pottery or dealt 
6 
in real estate. The Construtora ' s success and, no doubt, Simonsen's 
dynamic personality caused considerable hostility and led to press 
attacks on his business activities '''hich he vias forced to repudiate o 
Indeed, this personal hostility became a permanent undercurrent dog-
ging him and many of his early writings had the character of apologia. 
During the First World War, Simonsen became interested in the 
ideas of scientific business management, which were being developed 
in the United States, and in early 1918 he proposed a reorganisation 
of the Construtora on these lines, endowing it with technical, com-
mercial and production departments : He later claimed that the 
Construtora was the first company to introduce the scientific organ-
isation of labour into Brazil and apply it practically, and he liked 
8 
to attribute his success to this innovation. The process culminated, 
as far as the Construtora was concerned, in a contract to build a 
series of barracks for the Army in the southern states of Brazil, 
Signed in March 1921. By careful revision of the original plans, 
organisation of the workforce and supplies, and standardisation and 
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bulk purchase of materials, Simonsen was able to achieve a consider-
able saving in time and money, both on the original and the revised 
estimates. Most of the \vork \.,ras done betvleen the beginning of 1922 
and the end of 1923, after which revolutionary disturbances in Rio 
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Grande do Sul delayed and finally led to the abandonment of the remaining 
works. Altogether, 49 barracks, military hospitals and other works 
in the Federal District and eight other states were handed over to 
the Ministry of War. This project, too, was not vlithout its critics, 
and although the final accounts were settled by the Minister of War in 
1926, an inquiry vIas opened after the Revolution of 1930 and dragged 
on until 1935. Luckily, Simonsen, perhaps foreseeing trouble, had 
insisted on the utmost rigour in keeping the accounts and no irregu-
larities were found, but he commented sourly on the thoroughness and 
slmmess ,\-li th \vhich the inquiry was conducted. 9 
Meanwhile, Roberto Simonsen had begun his career as a public 
figure. In December 1918, the city of Santos vIas due to offer a ban-
quet to the Mihister of Agriculture, Padua Salles, but the rival 
political factions were unable to agree on who should deliver the speech 
of welcome. Finally, two days before the banquet, they decided upon 
the apolitical Simonsen, who used the opportunity to draw a comparison 
bet\veen the agricultural policies of the United States and those of 
Brazil, and to speak about the need to organise Brazilian agricultural 
production on scientifically-determined bases. The contrast between 
the seriousness of this speech and the usual inanities of a political 
banquet attracted attention to the orator, and led Padu a Salles to 
recommend Simonsen as the representative of Sao Paulo in the Brazilian 
10 Commercial Mission to Britain in 1919. 
----------------------......... . 
This Mission, headed by Pandia Calogeras, visited the United 
Kingdom from June to August 1919 as the guest of the Federation of 
11 British Industry. Simonsen then went on alone to Paris where, in 
September 1919, he read a paper at a meeting of the International 
Cotton Committee, describing the possibilities of Brazil as a cotton-
producing country and inviting the Comnlittee to send a mission to 
12 Brazil to study conditions there. This resulted in the visit during 
1921 of Arno Pearse, general secretary of the international cotton 
manufacturers' federation, who reported favourably on the possibil-
ities;3Simonsen returned to Brazil in November 1919 and resumed his 
business activities. 
It vTas Simonsen' s early experience as a businessman vThich moulded 
the guidelines of his later caxeer as an advocate of industrialisa~ion 
and expansion of the home market. Indeed, one can dravT a rough par-
allel with the growth of nineteenth-century liberalism: if the history 
of the nineteenth century can be very crudely represented as the pro-
gressive application of contemporary business principles of laisser-
faire and free competition to the economy, society and politics, then 
Simonsen's ideas represent the application of twentieth-century busin-
ess methods to the general problems of society. One could well argue 
that the single most fruitful influence on him was that of Henry Ford 
with his notions of high wages, high productivity, high levels of 
consumption and the spirit of public service:4Simonsen's ideas 
represented the application of the principles of scientific management 
and the rational organisation of labour on an ever-widening scale, 
first to his mm firm, then to industry in general, then to Brazil 
and, finally, to the ,.,hole of Latin Americao 
A mixture of enlightened self-interest and a concern vTi th vTider 
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problems can already be discerned in Simonsen's earliest works, the 
annual reports (Relatorios) of his Companhia Construtora de Santos.15 
In 1916, he outlined the principles of scientific management, as 
established by Evans in his Scientific Management, and in early 1918 
he proposed to reorgan1se the Construtora on these bases, in order to 
16 increase the efficiency and the profitability of t he company. Mean-
while, even before the First vlorld War, he had been made directly aware 
of the poverty of the Brazilian working class by the failure of his 
experiments with the building of popular housing f 7 soon he was to see 
the effects of working class militancy. In July 1917, under the pres-
sure of war-time inflation and the example of the Russian Revolution, 
a general strike broke out in Sao Paulo Capital and rapidly spread to 
the rest of the state, including Santos, .. ,hich .. las already known as 
a centre of agitation; according to Azis Simao, the Construtora was 
among the firms struck. 18 
It .. Tas not difficult to link poverty with militancy. So when 
Simonsen addressed his workers in December 1918 and told them of his 
plans to reorganise the company on scientific bases, he ,..rent on: 
"Remember, however, that the improvement of your 
conditions, your future, your well-being and your 
security can only rest on productive and organ-
. ised labour. 
The cheapening of production, in all its aspects, 
needs to be and should be constantly aimed for in 
your interest and ours. 
This cheapening, however, must not be achieved at 
the cost of your .. /ages but rather by obtaining the 
maximum efficiency of labour". 19 
He expanded this concept of the mutual advantageousness of efficiency 
and high productivity in the introduction fuo his Relat6rio of March 
20 1919. Here he noted that the major problem facing engineers and 
administrators was the economic utilisation of labour, Industrialists 
had to reckon with the existence of a new force, the discontent of the 
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worker; they should provide a just remuneration for labour in order 
to prevent the fettering of production by an attempt to solve this 
problem by mistaken political means, when it could be resolved success-
fully by economic means. He continued: 
tiThe policy of the working class has been based on 
the limitation of production and the unlimited 
increase of wages; now, since the bosses take a 
diametrically opposed point of view, there occurs a 
clash of interests, which thus seem mutually hostile, 
and this results in the gigantic struggle which "le 
are witnessing in the industrial world and which is 21 
assuming the very serious aspect of class warfare". 
But, in reality, this violent antagonism was not justified: 
tlIn fact, what the boss seeks is to pay the least 
possible per unit of production and "/hat the worker 
aims for is to be as well-paid as possible per unit 
of time; hence the viability of obtaining a harmon-
ious solution, to the benefit of both classes, by 
scientific investigations of the real conditions of 
labour and by the intelligent application of the 
economic laws which govern productiontl •22 
It was the backward system§ of payment and the mistaken attitude of the 
bosses which caused the workmen to organise as a class. The employers 
in the old industrial countries always treated their workers as if they 
constituted a single mass, without recognising the abilities of individ-
uals. The bad system of payment for jobs was the main cause of strikes, 
since a. skilful workman could only increase his pay by forcing up the 
wages of the whole class. The industrialists, in their O"Tn interest, 
should prevent their principal collaborators from forming a hostile mass 
seeking remedies for their wretchedness in political conquests which 
disturbed production. 
tlWe can prevent this by making a reasonable payment 
for the true value of labour - calculated so as to give 
a fair reward f or personal effort and for the inev-
itable variations in productivity from one man to 
another. In this "ray, we would have individualised 
the worker and given him a direct stake in produc-
tion, turning him into a growing source of wealth and 
incorporating him into society by economic means, 
since he was alienated from it by economic errorstlo 23 
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It was, of course, a rather crude call to divide and conquer, by 
buying off the skilled sections of the working class. But in it, one 
can clearly see the germs of Simonsen's later thinking, namely, that 
by changing and developing the economic system, it was possible both to 
benefit the workers and to preserve the status quo. 
During the 1920s, Roberto Simonsen established himself as a 
wealthy and influential businessman, with interests in banking as well 
as construction and industry:4He and his brother were partners in the 
banking firm of Murray, Simonsen & Co., which acted as Lazard Brothers' 
agent in negotiating a series of sterling loans to support the State 
of Sao Paulo's coffee valorisation scheme during the years 1926-28;5 
His next major public pronouncement was the speech which he delivered 
at the official inauguration of the Centro das lndustrias do Estado 
de Sao Paulo in June 1928. The Centro das lndustrias (C.I.E.S.P., 
later Federa~ao das lndustrias - F.LE.S.P.) ",as founded by industri-
alists "'ho \{ere dissatisfied with the way the Associa?ao Comercial de 
Sao Paulo was handling their interests, and the inaugural meeting was 
attended by the principal authorities of the state, including the 
governor, JUlio Prestes. 26 
After a brief introductory speech by the President of C.l.E.S.P • . 
Francisco Matarazzo, Simonsen, the Vice-President, launched a vigorous 
defence of the existence of industries in Brazil~7 This speech marked 
the beginning of his career as a champion of Brazilian industry as he 
emphasized the advantages which industrialisation could bring the 
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country in the form of greater economic and political power and incr eased 
prosperity. However, the speech was mainly intended to answer certain 
specific arguments ,{hich \{ere frequently made against the development 
of industry in Brazil. These arguments claimed that most of Brazilian 
industry was artificial, importing a large part of its raw materials 
from abroad; that it did not contribute to the prosperity of Brazil; 
that its products were expensive and raised the cost of living, because 
of the protectionist tariffs; that it disrupted agricultural manpm"rer 
bY, attracting workers to the city; and that it constituted a monopoly 
in favour of half-a-dozen Brazilians to the detriment of millions of 
others. 
Simonsen's willingness to answer these criticisms in detail ShOvlS 
that he had thought out some of the long-term implications of indus-
trialisation and is understandable in the circwnstances in vThich the 
speech ,.,ras made but, inevitably, it also tended to look like an apologia 
for an existing state of affairs. He summed up his speech with the 
conclusion that: 
"it is patent that the objectives of the industrial-
ists and the true national interests coincide com-
pletely. The increase in the country's capacity to 
conswne vTill mean the opening of a formidable market 
for Brazilian industrialists; consumption and pro-
ductiort~, growing together, vTill increase ,.,eal th and 
bring greatness to the country, and well-being and 
security to its population, which will then be able to 
resolve all the other national problems calmly and 
peacefully" . 28 
In short, he managed to prove that industries could be of real advan-
tage to Brazil and ,,,ere not just inconveniences, as many people asswned, 
but he failed to present industrialisation as an inescapable necessity, 
deriving from the economic and social structure of the country itself. 
This was to come later. Meanwhile, the present effort was generally 
regarded merely as a sophisticated appeal for more protectionism. 29 
HOvTever, the bases of Simonsen's later arguments may already be 
seen in rudimentary form. One of his chief preoccupations at this time 
was to answer the accusation of the urban middle classes that Brazilian 
industry and the protectionism which it required were responsible for 
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the rise in the cost of living. In this speech, he argued that Brazilian 
industrial products only accounted for a small percentage of average 
consumption and the:r:'efore had not contributed more than 6% to the rise 
in the average cost of living;30 in a later speech, he attributed the 
rise in the cost of living to successive inflations of the currencyo3l 
But the most fruitful suggestion which he made in the speech of 
1928 was when he claimed that the real problem was not the "high cost 
of living but, rather, insufficient earnings, because the level of 
production is low in relation to the population and size of our 
32 
terri tory". He recounted hO\-T he had found that the problem of providing 
cheap, decent housing for workers \.,as economically insoluble, and ''lent 
on: 
"The solution lies in the increase of average earnings 
[ which] is linked to the increase in the efficiency 
of labour and, therefore, to the principal problems of 
the formation of our nationhood, and to the organis-
ation of our economic structure, sound currency, abund-
ant credit, health and education". 33 
However, he was not prepared to admit any government interfe~ence or 
special measures at this stage: 
"The increase in earnings needs, hOvTever, to be achieved 
within the economic laws and not by simple expedients of 
Governments or the employers, under pain of making pro-
ducts more expensive and fettering production. It is by 
-the increase of production in general that we have to 
obtain the increase of average earnings and, therefore, 
the increase of average consumption per inhabitant" 0 34 
The next six years saw a gradual rearrangement of these arguments. 
The low average earnings (or, in more simple terms, the poverty) of 
Brazil's population ceased to be merely an obstacle to the development 
of industryo Instead, it became the primary factor, which demanded the 
industrialisation of the country as a matter of urgent necessityo Only 
in this way could the average standard of living of the Brazilian people 
be raised with the required speedo 
In April 1931, Simonsen took his ideas a stage further in a 
lecture on finances and industry, which he gave at the Mackenzie College 
'" 35 in Sao Faulo. He began \vi th a brief outline of the development of 
industrial society in England and the United States and then went on 
to analyse in some detail the systems of rational organisation of labour 
which had been evolved by American industr y: the Taylor system ( time 
and motion studies); the Gilbreth system (which aimed to achieve the 
minimum fatigue of the labourer) ; and the Ford system. With regard to 
the latter, he explained: 
"The guiding principle of the Ford Motor Company in 
its industrial method consists therefore in ' increa-
sing the purchasing po"rer of the masses by paying high 
wages and selling at lo"r prices in order to create and 
maintain a constant state of prosperity in the country 11,)6 
He described the reasoning behind this: the buying power of the masses 
was based on wages; "rages were therefore creators of vlOrk and as impor-
tant for industry as for the \vorking class. 
"The policy of high wages can, however, be based only on 
industrial practice of the utmost efficiency: ra~s~ng 
the productive capacity of the operative, increasing 
the intensity of production and the maximum economy in 
the use of raw material" . 37 
"This policy, by giving to the operatives opportunities 
to possess their own savings, to complete their educa-
tion and to enjoy modern comfort, contributes to the 
~ntermingling of classes and the suppression of the 
tendency to strife, which is thus substituted by a 
spirit of cooperation: this is the social i~uence 
which high wages have had in North America" . 
Simonsen then went on to describe the rationalisation of German 
industry after World War I. This rationalisation embraced the whole 
cycle of production: the concentration of industries, the standard-
isation of products and of production equipment; the adoption of 
flO\ving or continuous production and of a system of high ",rages and 
efficient labour methods; the selection and training of labour; the 
increase in the purchasing power of the markets and the expansion of 
industrial concentrations outside Germany ' s frontiers, to bring nations 
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and large international interests closer together. The aim of all this 
,{as to increase the productivity of labour by accelerating the speed 
of manufacture and reducing the employment of capital in order to lower 
the cost of production. This compensated for the shortage of liquid 
capital caused by the post-"lar inflation. 
Simonsen ",as interested in the results of rationalisation in Ger-
many because "it is a demonstration to what degree technology and in-
telligence can make good deficiencies of means of production which might 
39 
at first sight appear to be insuperable" . HOt'lever, he "las also aware 
that the first result of rationalisation was an increase in unemployment 
and that its development had been seriously upset by the world crisis 
and the large withdrawals of American capital. Nevertheless, he 
thought that "a veritable social doctrine" would arise from Germany's 
effort to rationalise production, since " the exis tence is today admitted 
of scientific methods capable of coordinating the economic forces and 
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of regulating the relations bet"leen individuals or groups of individuals" ~O 
He then turned to Brazil, noting the poverty and bacbTardness of 
the country: 
"We are a nation of "Teak productivity. \ife ,{ork little 
and with poor efficiency, the average output per head 
-here being extremely low. The last publication of the 
Dresden Bank ShovlS that such output in Brazil, in 1928, 
was 17 times less than in the U.S.A., 9 times less than in 
England and 6 times less than in Germany. The average 
per capita consumption in Brazil is one third of what 
it is in the Argentine. We have, practically speaking, 
no capital of our own and no savings. The poverty of our 
people is striking".4l 
Yet, "\{e possess an enormous country \{ith 40 million inhabitants. We 
own many raw materials and various sources of energy and motive power" .42 
The explanation for this anomaly was that Brazil's purchasing power and 
level of consumption were lOt{ because its production of goods and social 
benefits was very small in relation to its population. 
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Coffee, Brazil's most important produot, was being over-produced 
and the production of other agricultural and pastoral products could 
only develop slowly. In any case, many of them were in competition with 
those produced in other tropical zones by peoples whose living conditions 
,.,ere inferior to those of the \'lhi te race. Consequently: 
"It is to an industrial policy, founded on rat i onal 
bases and adapted to the conditions of our milieu, that 
we must look, in the main, for the produotion of the 
values in social assets that we require for the rapid 
inorease in our purchasing power, with the consequent 
benefi ts of an improvement in metha~s of work vThich 
industrialisation brings \vi th it". 
He then went on to discuss the implications of an industrial policy 
in detail: it would lead to a mutually beneficial development of agri-
culture; the accusation of "artifiuial industry" vTas unfounded and un-
justified; Brazil needed a tariff revision on protectionist lines. 
Monetary disorder and the shortage of credit threw produotion into chaos 
and destroyed the foundations of organised work because of the lack of 
stable returns; therefore, Brazil had to enoourage the creation of 
industrial banks o He again attempted to prove that Brazilian industry 
was not responsible for the high cost of living, blaming it on successive 
inflations of the currency, and olaimed that industrialisation ",ould 
help to .stabilise the cost of living. 
Finally, tying the ",hole thesis together under the heading of 
"The Rationalisation of Brazilian Production", Simonsen concluded: 
"Eminent SOCiologists state that the social conditions 
of a country are a reflection of its economio conditions. 
[ Thus J it is by tackling the latter that we shall be able 
to obtain the relative ",ell-being of which vTe stand in need. 
We must raise the Brazilian standard of living, increase 
our purchasing pOvler and increase man-value in Brazil. Give 
industry what it vrants: financial machinery such as civil-
ised nations possess, harmonious ImV"s to protect produc-
tion, and freedom of action in the Brazilian market by 
suppressing inter-State barriers, - and industry will be in 
a position to make a pmV"erful contribution to the grovrth 
of .. Teal th in Brazil, "Ti th heal thy repercuss ions on our 
social problems and on the political and administrative 
organisation that we require. [ ••• ] 
La .. Ts and decrees do not create productivity and \·Tealth. 
Let us rationalise labour, and let our programme be 
comprehensive: from the systematic examination of our 
financial problems to the improvement of our manpower's 
health and education; from agricultural rationalis-
ation to the rationalisation of our home market". 44 
Other nations, such as Japan and Germany, had done it and the \vorld 
provided ample lessons from "Thich Brazil could learn. 
Thus, in this lecture, we find the basic ingredients of Simonsen's 
thinking about the problems of Brazil. Firstly, the example of the 
industrial and economic systems and innovations in the more advanced 
countries, and an awareness of their "Tider social implications and their 
specific relevance to Brazil; then, the assertion of Brazil's poverty 
and backwardness, especially in comparison with the industrial countries, 
and the need for the industrialisation of the country in order to raise 
purchasing power rapidly; next, the condensed lessons in economic 
theory as well as a concern with the more detailed aspects of an indus-
trial policy; finally, the overall vision of the role of industry in 
Brazilian society and the optimistic belief that if other countries 
could do it, so could Brazil. 
Yet even here, the full social and political implications of 
Simonsen's ideas .. Tere not entirely "TOrked out. This had to .. rai t until 
the speech which he made as an elected representative of the industri-
alists to the Constituent National Assembly, which met in Rio de Janeiro 
to draw up a new constitution. This speech, delivered in January 1934, 
was somewhat chaotic because of the frequent interruptions by the other 
deputies, the fact that it had to be delivered in two parts owing to 
timetable difficulties, and the turgid introduction which he gave to 
it, no doubt in deference to the assembled bachar~is before "Thich it 
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. 45 s' t d t h f t th t d d f ,.,as g~veno ~monsen ,.,an e 0 ave a re erence 0 e s an ar 0 
living written into the new constitution~6 Hm.,ever, he was also co-
operating fully vii th the Sao Paulo delegation and so the main purpose 
of the speech was to justify the paulista amendments to the chapter on 
the economic and social order in the draft constitution. Simonsen said 
that the guiding principle of all the amendments was "the recognition 
of social rights whilst avoiding damage to the federative regime" and 
the economic development of the country~7 In fact, the paulistas ,.,ere 
determined to limit the sphere of intervention by the federal govern-
ment and preserve as much as possible of the states' autonomy vThich 
they had enjoyed under the previous regime. But they and the employers 
were also anxious about the "socialistic" tendencies displayed by some 
members of the Constituent Assembly and, indeed, by the Provisional 
Government of Vargas. 
Simonsen's arguments ran essentially as fo11O\'1s: State inter-
vention in the field of economic activity should be limited, for "laws 
and decrees do not create wealth and we do not possess enough already 
48 
created to force a readjustment in distribution". In contrast to the 
situation in the older industrial nations, Brazilian legislation should 
aim at the creation of "lealth rather than its distribution. Brazil was 
a poor country and needed to improve the standard of living of all its 
inhabitants as well as their education, which represented the moral 
progress on which the improvement of society largely rested. The State 
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could contribute to the general progress by strengthening the individual. 
The standard of living was based mainly on purchasing pOvTer and 
the greatest purchasing power belonged to the peoples who produced the 
greatest value in social assets which were consumed by society. The 
growth of population "Ias exceeding the rate of creation of wealth so, 
as Brazil could not rely on exports, the purchasing power of Brazilians 
had to be increased by the better use of manpower and the development 
of internal trade and industry. Brazilians could be interventionists, 
not to oppose the laws of nature but to create favourable conditions 
for their operation. 
"The problems of education, health and labour are, there-
fore, extremely important for the country's political 
and economic future. \'le must improve our manpower, incre-
ase our productivity and encourage our internal trade, 
favouring the creation of wealth by every means".49 
Thus, we see how Simonsen had arrived at a simple but flexible 
system of ideas vlhich allowed him to approach his central theme from 
a variety of different viewpoints. By turning the notion that Brazil 
was a special case because of its general poverty as a country into 
the basic premise of his argument, he was able to argue against pro-
posals to redistribute exis ting wealth whilst, at the same time, holding 
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out the positive alternative of a general economic and industrial policy 
which ,.,ould enrich the entire nation and raise the average standard 
of living:O Thus we can see hOVl Simonsen was able to refer to the 
industrialists both as the "productive classes" and the "conservative 
classes". It was, in fact, the beginning of the nationalist develop-
mentalist ideology. 
From now on, Simonsen worked increasingly to have his ideas adopted 
by the government, during the course of which they became progressively 
more sophisticated. Industrialisation became part of the demand for 
a general economic policy; planning meant a certain shift in his ideas 
on the role of the State; and his ideas on international aid after the 
Second \vorld War vrere forerunners of the Alliance for Progress. 
In the meantime, Simonsen had to face a much more preSSing problem, 
namely, the "social 'luestion". His basic premise vlas that "in Brazil 
it is not the problem of d~stribution which is at stake, as in the old, 
declining; over-capitalised nat.ions: here the problem is that of the 
creation of wealth".51Nevertheless, he also paid considerable attention 
to specific social problems. Consequently, it is worth while looking 
in some detail at his ideas on society and the "social Cluestion", since 
they illustrate the deeply conservative foundations on vlhich he built 
his progressive policy of economic development. 
Simonsen's attitude tm"ards social problems was based on certain 
fundamental premises. Firstly, a deep-seated fear of class warfare and 
communist subversion; secondly, a genuine awareness of the wretched 
conditions in vlhich most of the Brazilian people lived and a willingness 
to concede "just demands"; thirdly, an interest in sociology and objec-
tive methods of studying social problems; and fourthly, an optimistic 
belief that remedies could be found for these problems and the capacity 
and energy to put such remedies into effect. 
Simonsen spent his childhood and the early years of his working 
life in Santos which, with its militant dockers and large European immi-
grant population, was one of the most explosive cities in Brazil. In 
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July 1917, the State of Sao Paulo experienced its greatest general strike 
and Simonsen's construction company was one of those struck. In the 
aftermath of the First World War and the Russian Revolution, Europe went 
through a period of profound unrest and during his visit to England in 
1919, he noted the agitation there:2 Simonsen, in common with the rest 
of the Brazilian elite, greatly feared the spread of this unrest to 
Brazil and the entry of foreign doctrines or "exotic ideas", as communism 
was euphemistically r efer red to, and his works are liberally sprinkled 
with references to the danger of communism and class struggles.53 
Simonsen attributed class strife and the organisation of the workers 
into classes in the old industrial countries to the rapidity of indus-
trialisation, which caused the employers to consider labour as a mere 
commodi ty or merchandise:4 He 'varned against the transfer of the doc-
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trines bred by such strife to Brazil, which was still at a quite diff-
erent stage of development:5 Like the corporativists, he also attributed 
unr~st to the excess of individualism:6 His preoccupation vd th the threat 
of communism continued throughout his career and, in 1946, he noted that: 
"In Brazil particularly, with its lo,v average standard 
of living and the sharp inequalities in resources be-
tween the various regions, these agitations are en-
couraged by the present high rate of inflation, the 
Im., level of education and the scarcity of the basic 
factors of production".57 
He went on to lament that "the men of greatest responsibility" were 
failing to unite around a definite course of action. Instead they were 
''lasting their energy in personal political contests and the pursuit of 
easy profits, una",are of the attempt which was be ing made by extremist 
elements to infiltrate the vlOrking masses. 
Simonsen saw a link between bad conditions and popular. agitation. 
Though quick to denounce the "exotic doctrines" and subversion from 
abroad, he also recognised that the working classes did have genuine 
grievances. This mvareness had been borne in on him as a builder in 
Santos in 1912-14 ",hen, partly out of a desire to reduce unrest causeq 
by the high cost of living and partly as a means of creating a permanent 
building project, he had undertaken the construction of cheap houses 
for the lower-paid workers. The failure of the experiment (most of the 
houses ",ere, in fact, occupied by white-collar ''lOrkers) convinced him 
that it "'as "impossible, in view of the legal requirements , for private 
companies to build economical \vorking class districts and receive a fair 
return on the capital employed,,;>8 In short, the \vorking classes were 
genuinely too poor to participate in the normal \vorkings of the capi t-
alist systemo He mentioned this early experience in Santos on several 
occasions in later years and an awareness of bad housing conditions 
remained with him:9 In 1941, he said: 
"\1e should not and cannot be unaware of the fact that, 
in Sao Paulo, a city of ,.,hich vTe are so proud, about 6 
50% of the population is not suitably lodged or housed". 0 
He was also conscious of the terrible state of health of the 
Brazilian workers, vThich vTas caused by ignorance of the basic rules of 
hygiene and the harshness of the environment. ~llien his construction 
company was in charge of a project for supplying water to Sao Paulo in 
1926-28, he ordered a medical examination to be carried out on all the 
vTorkers, vThich revealed that, out of a total of 1411 "Torkmen, of vlhom 
641 were Brazilian-born and 770 were foreigners, 45.5% of the Brazilians 
were infected ,vi th venereal disease, compared to only 4. 9% of the 
recently-arrived foreigners and 22.1% of the foreigners vTith more than 
one year's residence in Brazil. He called these figures "simply sad-
dening": they demonstrated the degree of contamination existing in the 
Brazilian environment and largely explained the noticeable degeneracy 
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vlhich marked much of the national labour force. 
He summed up his feelings on the sub ject in 1940, \-Then he said: 
liThe proportion of our population "Thich exists at a level 
below the tolerable minimum is very large. Also large 
is the mass of undernourished people as well as the num-
ber of those who suffer through physical ,.,eakness. 
vie hear constant criticism of the lack of application 
and ambition of our rural workers. I am convinced that 
this phenomenon does not represent ~ ••• ] a deliberate 
state of laziness; the fact is that our rural "Torkers 
are undernourished and often sick , and so they do not 
have sufficient physical resistance to carry out the 
continuous labour to which the properly educated colon
6
-
ist coming from "rell-nourished peoples is accustomed" 0 2 
A part of the problem "Tas the lack of reliable statistics and 
objective studies on the real conditions of the Brazilian people. 
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Administrators and politicians were f orced to make up for this shortage 
of information by means of intuition, diplomatic skill and inspiration.63 
Yet the need to deal with social problems was urgent: 
"Vie can no longer regard social questions as secondary 
but, instead, as fundamental to the problem of revlvlng 
our civilisation. They should be a 6main topic of con-cern for the elites of the nation". 4 
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Consequently, Simonsen took a leading role in the foundation of the 
65 
Escola Livre de Sociologia e politica de Sao Paulo in 1933. The main 
. 
purpose of this school vTas to encourage the creation of genuine admin-
66 istrative elites. Simonsen thought that legislators needed to knovT more 
about social problems and hoped that the Escola Livre ,.,ould encourage 
the study of sociology in Brazil as well as carry out research vThich 
would guide the development of more suitable political, judicial and 
economic institutions. To achieve this, its programme included - besides 
its normal courses - social investigations, the collection of adequate 
statistics, the application of direct methods of observation and research, 
67 
and the training of research vTorkers capable of such undertakings. In-
deed, the Escola Livre made the first statistical investigations into 
living conditions of any consequence in Brazil, in a study of working 
class families in Sao Paulo, supervised by the American professor, Horace 
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Davis, in 1935. Simonsen himself taught the course on economic history 
and later reworked his lectures into a book entitled Hist6ria econ~mica 
69 do BrasH published in 1937. But lest anyone mistake vThat all this was 
aiming at, Simonsen announced that the School "immediately declares its 
disapproval of the proliferation of 'saviours' and false ideologues, who 
70 in reality are completely ignorant of our problems and our needs": 
"It will be, finally, a permanent fetter on the excesses 
of demagogy because in it, under the inspiration of science 
and sincerity, our problems and our needs ,.,ill be studied vTi th 
the most advanced methods that civilisation has yet created". 71 
Simonsen was to return to this theme in 1946 vThen he sponsored the 
creation of the industrialists' social service system, SESI. In the mean-
time, he had a paragraph ,."ri tten into the Constitution of 1934 (Art. 
115), requiring the public pm'Ters to ascertain periodically the stand-
ard of living in the various regions of the country. In, 1940, he 
l 
noted that in the industrial nations: 
"Students of the social sciences indicate the most 
efficient means to combat these causes at their 
point of origin; t hey aim t o reduce poverty, not 
only because of a natural spirit of human fellowship 
but also because of the painful repercu~~ions which 
it creates for the harmony of society". 
Furthermore, the social and political sciences could not only fight the 
causes of the lI exotic doctrines ll but also combat the doctrines them-
selves; in 1947, referring t o the Escola Livre, he said: 
"This School constitutes, perhaps, at the moment, one 
of the most notable proofs that science and research 
give the lie to the political pretensions of Marxism. 
The pupils of the higher courses of t his establishment 
were able to place communism within one of the branches 
of reactionary socialism, understanding its raison d' 
~tre in the age in vThich it was conceived". 73 
HOvTever, he was generous enough to admit lithe vigorous contribution of 
Marxism, as a method, to the elucidation of numerous contemporary 
economic, social and political problems". 74 
But, alas, Stalin and the Third International could not be wished 
away Quite so easily and, in the meantime, it was necessary to do some-
thing about the "social Question". Simonsen ' s basic premise here did, 
in fact, owe much to Marx ' s "vigorous contribution". For he observed, 
"eminent sociologists state that the social conditions of a country are 
a reflection of its economic conditions. (Thus] it is by tackling the 
latter that we shall be able to obtain the relative well-being of which 
\"e stand in need" . 75 
Simonsen ' s original recipe for solving the II soc ial Question" lay 
in a massive application of the principles of scientific management and 
the rational organisation of labouro In December 1930, he summed up 
this solution as follows: 
IIWith regard to the proletarian problem, a comparison 
between European practice and North American experience 
has taught us that it is by individualising the value 
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of the operative, by developing his efficiency and 
increasing his capacity to earn that we shall succeed 
in making him an integral part of our social life". 76 
From this starting-point, he developed his theory of the poverty and 
baclavardness of Brazil and the need to raise, concomitantly, the stand-
ard of living, the purchasing power and the production of social assets 
of the Brazilian people. Indeed, the cry "'vIe need to raise our average 
standard of living!" became his main theme from then on. 
MeanvThile, the ne"Tly-created Ministry of Labour had begun to pro-
mulgate a broad programme of social legislation, to YThich the indus-
trialists had to take up an attitude. Simonsen had rejected mixed 
arbitration tribunals back in 1919, on the grounds that each side would 
be trying incessantly to defeat the other and that questions between 
Labour and Capital could not be resolved permanently in an atmosphere 
of dissension.77 He vTas fond of saying that "la'\>1S and decrees do not 
create productivity and ,.,real th" but he did not reject the labour legis-
1 t ' t ' ht d';d ' d t ' l' t 78 a ~on ou r~g ,as ~ some ~n us r~a ~s s. 
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Instead, he criticised the one-sidedness of the government's social 
legislation. In a lecture to a group of visiting American university 
students in 1939, he noted that "Brazil has made great progress in 
social reform" and proceeded to enumerate the labour laws passed by the 
government; he calculated that these represented a burden of mor e than 
10% to the employer, over and above his annual wage-bill. Simonsen con-
cluded that "there is, in fact, between this excess of measures for 
social reform and the lack of measures to stimulate production a general 
79 inconsistency". In pri vate, hO,\>lever, he was a good deal more outspoken 
and he complained bitterly about the lack of consultation and the con-
straints imposed upon the industrialists by the innumerable social laws 
and regulations, giving the T,\>TO Thirds LayT as an example. 
"Industry is not hostile to good l abour legislationo 
All its interest lies, precisely, in that there should 
be la,.,..s regulating the relations between employer and 
employee, establishing the rights and duties of each 
one o It does not agree, however, that for one side there 
should be only duties and for the o~her, only rights o 
Yet this is the present situation" . 0 
Nevertheless, in April of the follm.,..ing year, 1940 , he publicly 
retracted his earlier criticism when , at a banquet given for Get~io 
Vargas, he declared: 
"One of the great concerns of Your Excellency ' s govern-
ment has been to establish an advanced social legis-
lation "Ihich, t o many unwary minds , has seemed to bring 
excessive burdens for our productive forces, cooling 
creative initiatives and preventing the f ormation and 
entry of capital which is so needed by a country like 
ours [0 .. ]. 
International events have, however, justified that 
orientation and the facts are demonstrating that the 
burdens which it caused us were compensated by the 
level of peace and social progress which "le enjoy" . 81 
It is possible that this speech merely signalled a tacit bargain with 
Vargas, whereby Simonsen agreed to support the government ' s labour 
policy in return for the greater consideration which the industrialists 
'-. 
were then receiving in matters of economic policy. However, Simonsen ' s 
later action in sponsoring the creation of SESI suggests that it was 
at least partly sincere. 
The industrialists were also anxious to improve their image with 
the working class. In January 1945, as Vargas began to lose his grip 
and strikes broke out in the factories, F.I . E.S.Po distributed a pam-
phlet to the industrial workers of Sao Paulo containing a speech by 
Simonsen and introduced with the words: 
"The industrialists of Sao Paulo have long been demon-
strating their concern with social problems . LO"] 
Our manufacturing sector is trying to keep up with the 
progress of technology, apply the rationalisation of 
I I I 
labour and carry out the social legislation in order 
not only to promote and improve production but also to 
meet the just desires of the orderly and hard-vlOrking 
proletarian population. 
The fact is that we understand more and more the need 
for harmony between capital and labour, for the benefit 
of the progress of Brazil" . 8 2 
. The upshot of all this was the creation, at Simonsen's suggestion, 
of the Servi90 Social da Industria (SESI ) by President Dutra in June 
1946, i.e. after the return to democratic government. SESI was (and 
continues to be) an organisation run by the employers' syndical associ-
ations to provide social assistance for industrial workers and their 
families, being modelled on the highly-successful SENAI industrial 
training system and financed by a ~ levy on industrial payrolls o 
SESI reflected Simonsen ' s optimistic belief that: 
"The social problem in Brazil, as in any democratic 
nation, is susceptible to a ful~ practical solution 
\-Ti thout the traditional foundations of public and 
political order being subverted, whether by revolu-
tionary violence, which constructs nothing, or by the 
deceptive action of myths which are alien to the 
nation's pride and its historical character. There 
is no social question - housing, food, education, 
heal th and others - vThose solution demands more than 
just goodwill and diligence on the part of those who 
are responsible for the preservation of our social 
and historical inheritance".83 
He hailed SESI as: 
"A work which \vill honour Brazilian employers and "Thich 
will show, as soon as it is put into effect, that 
amongst us the climate \-Till not be propitious to the 
insidious penetration of the class struggle, since 
\vorkers and bosses vTill strive together through the 
Servico Social da Industria, to achieve a new way of life, 
J 
vIi th a wider and fairer distribution of vTeal th and with 
greater respect for the proletariat ' s dignity".84 
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Simonsen observed that developing societies were more susceptible to 
the impact of unrest abroad and thought that SESI could provide an ideological 
counterbalance to "the forces of evil". Thus, besides its function of 
providing material social assistance for the workers, "SESI will be an 
educational force, not in t he exclusive interest of one class - either 
the employers' or the workers', but in the general interest of society 
as a \vhole and the various groups 1vhich compose i t " ~5 Then, using a 
contorted metaphor, he continued: 
"SESI, alongside the democratic and liberal political 
parties, "Till be an educational force in the struggle against 
a grievous misinterpretation of the sense and reality of 
true democracy. And i f you will permit me this biblical 
image, it will make the Brazilian working masses cross, 
"Ti th dry feet, the Red Sea dlf oppressive and inhuman 
totali tarianism and after the journey [ ••• ] breathe the 
Brazilian atmosphere purified by our patriotism and by 
our democratic vocation".86 
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Simonsen also reiterated a concept which had inspired the foundation 
of the Escola Livre de Sociologia e Polltica in 1933, when he predicted 
that research, to be carried out by SESI experts, would uncmver the 
87 
origins of social conflicts and help to solve them. These aims, toget-
her with SESI ' s primary function of providing material assistance in the 
form of discount stores, dental and medical care and recreational facil-
Hies, \vere to contribute tmvards social justice in Brazil. For, as 
Simonsen said in a speech in the Senate applauding Dutra's decision to 
outlaw the Communist Party of Brazil: 
"We cannot allow the exploitation of man by man. Justice 
and Liberty are concepts which match and complete each 
other. The possibility of economic coercion tends to dis-
appear "There social justice is practised [ ••• J in accor-
dance with the higher principles of Christian moralityo 
The communist mysti~ue appears noticeably reduced where 
social justice is practised".88 
Finally, to return to the fundamental ~uestion of the distribution 
and redistribuHon of Health, 1-Te may ask if Simonsen thought that his 
theories would lead to a more egalitarian society. The answer is 
implici t in all the above but he \vas also explicit on the subject o In 
the speech inaugurating the Escola Livre, he spoke at length of the 
need to form trained elites: 
"Universal history contains examples of great civilis-
ations constructed without a base in popular education. 
But there is no example of any civilisation which did 
not have as a foundation wisely and pO\verfully con-
stituted intellectual elites".59 
"So the f ormation of elites should constitute one of the 
prime concerns of modern societies. Any social institu-
tion or doctrinal school which aspires to be adopted, 
any industrial or commercial association in order to 
reach its objectives, all need and demand, more and more, 
eli te elements at their head" 090 
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In 1940, Simonsen noted philosophically that considerable differences 
in the standard of living and comfort continued to exist in the rich 
countries and that even in the United States, the richest country in 
the world, the poor classes amounted to about 40% of the population 
and those who lived with noticeable comfort, abundance and wealth did 
91 
not reach 8~0 He accepted the need for the working class to maintain 
its self-respect when he decided that SESI ' s services should be paid 
for, which allowed the beneficiaries to have the right to demand effic-
iency and good ,quality, thus "establishing the principle that the worker 
92 is not a pauper" . But his general concept of the nature of society 
is seen clearly in a passage, significantly entitled "The Illusion of 
Equality" , which he wrote in 1940 : 
- "Let us not cultivate the illusion of a possible social 
and material equality amongst men. The social hierarchy, 
whi ch is based on the ability of each individual, can 
never disappear; this is in harmony, furthermo r e, with 
everything , ... hich is observed in nature. 
We can only try to make this hierarchy result more and 
more from the real value of individuals ~nd not from 
the material goods , ... hich they possess " .9 j 
The implications, as far as the social consequences of Simonsen ' s ideas 
are concerned, are clear : economic development would satisfy the material 
demands of the working class and remove t he sources of conflict but it 
would leave the existing structure of society basically unchanged o 
Chapter 6. ROBERTO SIMONSEN: ECONmUC DEVELOPMENT AND 
INDUSTRIALISATION. 
"le have seen hmo[ , by the mid-1930s, Roberto Simonsen had formed 
a coherent system of ideas 2.bollt the present state of Brazil and its 
economic and social future . Instead of being a mere apologist foL' 
exi ting industries , he Has able to shm{ that Brazilian conditions 
demanded industrialisation as a means of solving the country ' s f 1mda-
mental problems . From nO\·, on , vre find t\-TO main tendencies in his 
writings and activities: the refinement of his ideas and the s tru~gle 
to have them put into practice . Neither of these \-las to prove easy . 
Tlle refinement of his ideas meant essentially a continuous effort 
to give them a sOlmder ooting in economic science , both theoretically 
and statistically. This \'las hampered, on the one hand , by Simonsen ' s 
lack of basic grounding in economics; he had experience in business 
administration and banking but he had graduated as an engineer , and 
so his vfOrks Shovl the constant struggle of an autodidact to clarify 
his theoretical ideas. On the other hand , Brazil at that time "las 
v.roeflJlly lacking in accurate statishcs and Simonsen was forced to 
base much of his reasoning on his mm calculations, many of them little 
1 
more than estimates or guesses . 
'rhe struggle to have his ideas accepted and put into pract ' ce was 
even harder. There were tHO main reasons for this: firstly, Simonsen ' s 
personal and political isolation and , secondly , the fact that his 
suggestions ran contrary to the policies bei.ng pursl.1ed by the govern-
ment in the early and mid-1930s . 
Throughovt Simonsen ' s life \'le find an undertoH of personal 
hostili ty and suspicion tm·18.rds him. Clearly, he had made povlerful 
enemi es through his involvement in Sao Paulo coffee ~olitics in the 
2 
1920s and early 19308 . But on a more immediate level, there Has a 
distrus t of him personally '''hich clearly eme::c~ed. in an exchange \'li th 
an employees ' representa t i ve , Waldemar Reikdal , in the Chamber of 
Deputies in September 1934 ; Reikdal fel t t ha t, although he could not 
put his finger on it , there was somet hing about Simonsen vlhich he 
instinctively mistrusted .3 An i llumi nating anecdote has it that 
Simonsen built, next to his holiday home in Campos de Jorda o , quarters 
for his servants which were so comfortabJe and llLxurious that they 
said he had built t hem that "laY because , "Then communism came , he Hould 
116 
4 have to live there whil e they , the servants , moved into the main house ! 
The impression that Simonsen was " too clever by half" did not contri-
but e towards a ready acceptance of his ideas . 
More serious , however , was his political isolation , as an indus-
I 
trialist and a pau ista , from the federal government of Ge t ulio Vargas 
throu8hout t he early 1930s. Simonsen vlaS closely inentified vrith 
the regime overthrO\.Jn by the Revolution of 1930 . He had publicly 
declared his support for the financial policy of Washington Lui s ' s 
government on several occasions and Murray , Simonsen & Co ., the banking 
firm in "Thich he VIas a partner , had acted as Lazard Brothers ' agents 
in arr nging a number of l oans f or Sao Paul0 and other areas in the 
5 
period 1926- 28. JUl io Prestes , the President of Sao Paulo State, \<1ho vIas 
to have ~ucceeded Washington Lur s , had lent his enthusiastic support 
to the foundation of C.LE . S.P., of ,·[hich Simonsen was Vice- President ; 
in return , the industrialists ' association had support ed his candid-
6 
ature f or the presidency. In November 1930, Simonsen and his brother 
"!ere imprisoned for a fortnight, presumably because of their firm ' s 
involvement in coffee policy , and an inquiry VIas opened into the 
Construtora ' s contract to build barracks for the Army, vThich d:ragged 
on until 1935. Renevred violent attacks on r-Iurray , Simonsen & Co . led 
7 
to further inquiries into their dealings \·ri th coffee finance in 1933 . 
Furthermore, in 1932 Sao Paulo rose in rebellion against the 
federal government and Simonsen took a leading r ole in organising 
industrial production in the besieged state, fleeing abroad for a 
. 8 
short time vThen the rebellwn collapsed. Al though his participation 
increased his stature within the State of Sao Paulo and, indirectly, 
launched his career as a public figure in national life, it did not 
make for good relations with the federal government. During the 
Constituent Assembly of 1933-34, which first brought him to the notice 
of a wider public, Simonsen collaborated fully with the anti-Vargas 
"Chapa Unica" (United Front ) of the paulista delegation , despite his 
nominal position as a "class representative" of all Brazilian indus-
trialists. It is possible that he diverged from the paulista line 
and voted for Vargas in the election for President at the end of the 
9 Constituent Assembly. Nevertheless, he was amongst the represent-
atives of Sao Paulo \"ho publicly snubbed Vargas by returning home on 
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the day train, thus missing his inauguration as constitutional president}O 
Consequently, by the mid-1930s, Simonsen was hardly in a position 
to exert any direct personal or political influence on federal 
policy-making. However, the later 1930s witnessed a gradual mending 
of bridg~s with the government in Rio as he moved over to support ~ 
Vargas and, in return, was increasingly consulted on matters of econ-
omic policy. He produced reports for the Conselho Federal do Com~rcio 
Exterior, broke with the paulista delegation in Congress and publicly 
11 
declared his support for Vargas's coup of 10 November 1937 . As 
President of F.I.E.S . P. from 1938 om"ards, he was accorded increasing 
prestige as the Estado Novo turned more and more tOvTards a policy of 
industrialisation. But his real chance to exert influence came in 
1942, when a personal friend of his, Alexandre Marcondes Fi1ho, became 
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Minister of Labour ; this gave him access to the higher levels of 
decision-making in the Estado Novo . 
·An this , hovrever, lay in the future in 1934. At that time , 
Simonsen found him. elf not only isolated from the centres of policy-
ma ing but also at complete variance Vii th the policies "'hich they \<lere 
then pursuing in the face of the Great Depression . The international 
economic crisis of 1929-30 had been a severe bloVl to Brazil ' s tradit-
ional export economy. The inflmr of foreign capital ceased abruptly 
and exports dropped in volume and value , causing a reduction in the 
country ' s earnings abroad , a sharp fall in the exchange rate and a 
diminished ability to import . Foreign trade , and particularly coffee, 
remained in severe difficulties throughout the 1930s but , on the 
other hand , the home market held up vrell and prospered during this 
period . The milreis retained its domestic purchasing power and Brazilian 
industry , recovering quickly froDl the initial crisis in 1930 , boomed 
12 
from 1932-33 o)1Vrards . 
However, the implications of this contrast between the foreign 
and domestic markets vrere only gradually perceived by the ~overnment 
and public opinion . The Vargas regime, far from representing the 
accession to pm-rer of the industrial bourgeoisie , engaged upon an .,.. 
orthodox policy of financial retrenchment ~3 A British banker repre-
senting the Rothschilds , Sir Otto Niemeyer , visited Brazil in 1931 
and sugges t ed measures to achieve the financial reconstruction of the 
country '<lhich , he said , demanded tHO fundamental bases : the mainten-
ance of budgetary equilibrium by all public authorities and the 
stabilisation of the currency. The government publicly accepted the 
14 
report. In keeping vri th this orientation , Vargas ' s policy emphasized 
increasing exports in which Brazil had a cos t and geographical advantage : 
cotton , coffee , foodstuffs and certain raH mat erials . Existing 
industries \'/ere protected from competition by a decree prohibiting 
the importation of nevl machinery but the substitution of domestic 
manufactures for foreign imports did not have high priori ty:5 The 
increasing government intervention in the economy in the early 1930s 
was not designed to accelerate the process of industrialisation hut 
16 
rather to save the existing export economy . 
A concrete demonstration of Vargas ' s priorities can be seen in 
the \my he dealt vri th a request by some Rio Grande do Sul meat-
packers for the repayment of customs duties on imported tinfoil , vrhich 
vTaS used for canning meat for export . The director- general of the 
Department of Industry and Commerce supported the request on the grounds 
that it vrould allovl various sectors of industry to \'Tork intensively , 
"vii th a noticeable increase in the manpower employed and , therefore , 
in the purchasing pOVler of the proletarian class , \'Thich ahvays re suI ts 
in an increase in consumption of all kinds of goods and , consequently , 
a stimulus to :9roduction in general". Vargas ' s pencil marks shoi'! , 
hm-lever , that he vias much more concerned \vi th the effects of this 
request on the government ' s fiscal revenue . Consequently , he ended by 
concu.rri~g with the Finance 1'1inister, Osvraldo Aranha , that the treasu~. 
17 
could not afford such generous exemptions . 
Clearly , industry did not have a high priority. The question 
of industrialisation ,·ras by no means new i n 1930 , hOHever . It had 
been discussed intermittently since the beginning of the nineteenth 
century and a large number of factories and vTorkshops had sprung up 
18 in a haphazard fashion durine the intervening period . By the clOSing 
years of the Old Republic , the industrialists had become a pm-/erful 
vested interest and \'Tere firmly settled in the ranks of the governing 
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"situat ion". When the old regime collapsed in 1930, the industrialists 
19 
were seen, not as a progressive force but as a reacti.onBry one. This 
unpopularity naturally rubbed off on the idea of industrialisation 
too . 
In the early years of the Vargas regime, industry and the indus-
tri .lis t s found themselves under attack from every direction. The 
l'/orking classes demanded hiehe-r \>Tages and better \'lorking condj tions , 
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\vhile the communists and the left attacked the entire capitalist system, 
of which the industrialists were the standard-bearers. Radical inte-
llectuals and tenentes lumped the innustrialists together I'/ith the 
c;reat lando\-mers as "plutocrats", and condemned them as obstacles to 
the creation of a democracy of rural smallholders, of Ivhich Alberto 
20 Torres had dreamt . Of the prominent intelle tuals, o~ly Azevedo Amaral 
21 
Sa\'l industrialisation as the basis for Brazil ' s future development. 
The most direct threat, however , came from the urban middle classes 
and a group of Sao Paulo coffee- grmvers , Ivho attacked the protectionist 
tariff. This, indeed, \'las the Achilles ' heel of Brazilian indu:=;try , 
\-/hich was qui te unable to compete on e<lual terms vIi th the imported 
products of the Ivell-established industrial nations. Much of the pro-
tection'for Bra7.il ' s incipient indust ies came , in fA.ct, from uncon-
trolled fluctuations in the exchange rate , but public attention 
inevi tably focussed on the tariff rates , since these I'/ere susceptible 
to government 1 control. Protectionism and tariff barriers had been a 
subject of debate, often highly acrimonious in tone, throu~hout the 
22 
Old Republic. The most vocal opposition was raised by the middle classes , 
vlho blamed the protectionist tariff for raising the cost of imported 
goods and forcj.ng them to buy inferior- quality Brazilian products. 23 
Jlfany farmers and exporters also had a vested interest in the free trade 
system. In 1930 , the Sao Paulo-based Sociedade Rural Brasileira , led 
by Octaviano Alves de Lima, mounted a campaign urtsing a drastic reduc-
tion in the Brazilian tartff, Vlhich , they hoped , I'lould encolU'age other 
nations to reciprocate by opening their markets to coffee .24 
Simonsen attacked this proposal, claiming that it would mean the 
transformation of the cOlmtry into a vast coffee plantation and the 
10Hering of the s tandard of living , vTi th the consequent threat of 
25 
social revolution. As for the complaints of the middle classes, he 
,,,ent to considerable lengths in the late 1920s and early 1930s to 
persuade people that the rise i n the COAt of livine; vTas caused hy 
monetary and fo:ceign exchange factors rather than by tariff barriers ~6 
Finally, he submerged the argument in the broader question of the 
standard of livine;. 
Simonsen vTas not content merely to defend the tariff, hovTever o 
On the contrary , he ''l8.nted changes too, since the existing t ariff ",as 
fiscal rather than protectionist in character. In 1924, he suge;ested 
a policy of selective imports, facilitating the importation of machines , 
iron, steel , coal and medicinal products and making the importation 
of lUXlU'y products really prohibitive , as part of a broader policy to 
27 
stabilis·e the exchang8 rate and diversify Brazil ' s exports. One of t e 
main reasons for the creation of the Centro das Industrias do Estado 
de Sao Paulo in 1928 \'Tas , apparently , to lobby for a protective 
tariff .28 In his inaugural speech , Simonsen assert ed that though high 
tariffs existed in Brazil , they ,,,ere fiscal rather than protectionist 
in intent. "A protectionist policy in the accept ed sense does not 
really exist in Brazil" since the existing ta iffs fell indiscrimin-
ately on various imported products , ",hether they ,,,ere r8.\. materials , 
manufactured products or foodstuffs. "A protectionist policy organised 
for the development of industries exempts ra\'l materials and lightly 
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burdens semi-manufactured products , making the customs duties fall 
principally on manufactured products". 29 
This concept of the t ariff ran contrary even to the ideas of 
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moderate opinion, vrhich VIas pre;;>ared to accept the existence of Brazilian 
inqustry , hm"ever reluctantly. A scandalised Sao PauIo ne,,,spaper con-
mented: 
"One of the speeches made at the inauguration of the centre 
openly defended fictitious industry , '''hich is· considered 
by many to be a cancer on the national economy ; this is 
because not even the textile industries, Hhich are the 
most important ones, have managed to increase the grm-ring 
of cotton, Hhich is declining more and more" . 30 
Industries '''hich did not use Brazilian raw materials vrere cons id-
ered "fictitious " and "artificial". An editorial of the 0 Estado de 
- -
Sac Palllo in January 1931 emphasized that the economy required the 
establishment of intimate links and mutual dependence betVleen manu-
facturing industries and the natural primary activities , minine; , agri -
cul ture and stock-raising . It ended by susgesting ,-rays of encouraging 
local industry to use Brazilian rm" materials , thus to "correct the 
31 
errors of the past". 
Vargas shared these vim·TS "'hen he came to povrer . In his proe;ramme 
of Janu~ry 1930 , he said that , Vlith regard to the tariffs : 
"\'le should maintain the general , protectionist criter-
ion for the industries \'Th -ch use national rmr materials, 
but \'le should not encourage the grovrth of artificial 
industries Hhich manufacture imported rmr materials , 
raising the cost of living for the benefit of privil-
eged firms ". 32 
In November of the same year, he ,-ras threatening to abandon protec-
t - - ft -+' - - 1 - d t - 33 lonlsm or ar l~lCla In us rles . 
At issue here Here hro fundamentally different concepts of the 
role of indl1stry in the Brazilian economy. Those Hho '.fished to 
restrict industry to processing Brazilian raw materials cast it in an 
ancillary role, which would leave the basic pattern of the export trade 
undisturbed. Simonsen, on the other hand, boldly proclaimed that the 
export trade must be subservient to the needs of the home marketo His 
great originality lay in the way he linked industrialisation to the 
expansion of the internal market; this was the basis of his emphasis 
on the need to raise the standard of living of the Brazilian people. 
To foster a more positive attitude towards industrialisation, 
he had to convince other sectors of the population that it would 
bring definite advantages to Brazil. In his speech at the inauguration 
of C.I.E.S.P. in 1928, Simonsen proclaimed that industries were a 
measure of the development of a people; they were centres of ideas 
and progress, helping to form trained elites and to expand man's under-
standing, by stimulating new research and new discoveries. Industries 
would help to increase the wealth, prestige and power of the Brazilian 
people, raise wages, cheapen production, enrich society, increase 
consumption, intensify trade and communications, and promote the vic-
34 
torious march of civilisation. 
In 1931, he mentioned some of the factors which favoured indust-
rialisation: Brazil was an enormous country with many raw materials 
and various sources of energy and motive power; it already had the 
largest industrial sector in South America, a large home market as 
regards the number of consumers, and physical conditions which were 
favourable to industrial development. However, there were also 
obstacles, such as inter-state taxes, the low purchasing power of the 
people, the shortcomings of the country's economic and financial 
institutions, the systematic hostility of a large part of public 
opinion and the inadequate protection afforded to industry by 
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legislation. On top of this there '-las monetary disorder , a shortage 
of credit and \'lOrkin3 capital , and an inadequate bankine system. 35 
Such complaints allied Hith hopes led inevitably to 8. broader 
consideration of general economic policy and the role of the State 
in .relation to the economy , thoueh it \'Tas no t a consideration Thich 
Sirrtonsen Has eager or quick to undert8.ke . Prior to 1930, vThen the 
liberal system seemed secure both politically and economically , there 
Has no i ncentive for the industrialists in Brazil to theoriee on their 
relations i'lith the State . They relied on their personal connections 
and political i nfluence 'vi th the ruling elite to secure the favours 
they needed: Simonsen "Tas full of praise for Vlashington Lui s ' s govern-
ment . Even after the Revolution of 1930 , Hhi 1st he 1'laS developing 
his ideas on t he need to raise the standard of living of the Bra.zilian 
people , Simonsen made no explicit reference to the role Hhich the 
eovernment should play in such a process . 
However , in 1933 , he Has elected as a class representative of 
the industrialis ts to the N8tional Constituent Assembly , "'hich met 
to Hri te a nev! political constitution for the Republic , and so he ,·ras 
forced to define his thinking on the role of the State in the economy. 
The 'paulista bancada , Hi th '-Thich he Hli.gned himself , \'Tas main y 
concerned vTith protecting the states ' rights from federal encroachment 
and combating the socialist elements in the Cons t ituent Assembly . 
. 36 COnse(lUently , ,,,hen Simonsen del ivered a speech in early 1934 , 
he placed a strong emphasis on the need to preserve an6 encouraee 
individual initi8.tive , althou,gh he Fas prepared to admit some govern-
ment inte:cvention in a supportin.s role: 
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"The State, [ ••• ] in a country like ours, can stimulate 
and support production, protect labour and lay down 
sound, coordinating guidelines, so that these factors 
may progress in an atmosphere of harmony, reducing to 
the minimum the friction \vhich creates social problems; 
hO\,lever, it .should never do this by intervening in 
the field of production, disturbing and diminishing 
ini tiatives \'lorthy of support, causing the stimuli 
which create progress to disappear [ ••• J. The 
powers of the State in the field of economic activity 
are already too numerous, even in governments be-
longing to the liberal school" .37 
Government action could help to increase prosperity by expanding wealth 
and reducing the cost of living, but it should do this mainly by 
strengthening and encouraging t he individual. 
"We can, then, be interventionists in our country, 
not, however, to oppose natural la\'ls but ,dth the 
intention of promoting situations in which the action 
of those laws can proceed in a direction favourable 
to our interests" . 38 
Thus, although the emphasis in this speech was on restricting the role 
of the government, Simonsen did not rule out State intervention alto-
gether and left himself considerable freedom in deciding exactly how 
much he wanted and in what circumstances. The problem was to be to 
persuade the government to intervene in the way he wanted. 
If the ideas outlined above, protectionism, industrialisation 
and State intervention, were to be adopted as a deliberate change in 
overall ·policy rather than ad hoc innovations to counter individual 
problems, they needed to be fitted into a broader vision of Brazil ' s 
place in the world. Simonsen moved tentatively towards a position 
of economic nationalism with his vision of an independent economy 
based on agriculture and industryo In 1928, at the inauguration of 
C.I.E.S.P., he observed that, although Brazil ' s economic structure 
should rest on agriculture, 
"the economic independence of a great nation, its 
prestige and its political activity as an independent 
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people in the concert of the nations can only be taken 
into due consideration if that country possesses an 
efficient Industrial Sector, on a par Hith its agri -
cultural development . 
Economic independence and , therefore, perfect political 
independence can only exist , in general , in the States 
in '''hich Agriculture and Industry are joined in strict 
harmony and int imate interdependence"o 39 
Consequently, he attacked those Brazilians "'ho Here o:Dposed to indus-
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trialisation for: 
""Torking , consciously or unconsciousl y , for foreign 
nations \'Tho are interested in conquering our markets 
and [ ••• ] labouring for our return to the position of 
a colony OT foreign producers, still at the mercy of an 
economic blockade in case of vTar". 40 
Such sentiments must have sounded strange coming from the lips of 1>1essrs. 
Lazard Brothers ' agent in Brazil and in later speeches he played do'm 
the combative tone of his appeal to nationalism. 
Simonsen ' s ideas also needed to be coupled vrith some pragmatic 
suggestions, if they vTere to have any immediate applic8tion to the 
problems facing the country. He was forced to consider these problems 
directly in 1930 ,,,hen, on the instructions of Ju]io Prestes , he had 
an intervievT vTi th President Vi8.shington LUls to request direct 
assistance from the Bank of Brazil for the Bank of the State of Sao 
Paulo t9 help it meet its coffee oblie;ations. Durin,?; the courRe of 
this intervievT, Simonsen outlined his ideas on the causes of the crisis 
in Brazil and the meA.sures ",hich might be taken to attenuate it. He 
listed the causes of the crisis as the over-production of coffp.e , the 
international financial crisis , the policy of the Bank of Bra~il , the 
political agitation and the lack of elasticity of the currencyo In 
response to this fairly comprehensive list of causes , he COQld offer 
only a series of partial expedients , namely: the adoption of meR.8UreS 
to restore cHlm and confidence , at home and abrond; credit facilities; 
the prohibition or restriction of i~mic~ation; measureR to increase 
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the purchpsing pOVler of the rural population , including eovernment8.1 
purchases of coffee stocks ; res t rictions on i mports and measures to 
prevent dwnpine ; and finally , a programme of public ,-Torks and the 
channelling of State purchClses to Bra?ilian industries. These Here 
essentially emergency I'lea::mres intended to keep up internAl demand 
and tide the country ovec ? period of crisis. Yet they are interesting 
for their expansionist outlook instead of the then orthodox attitude 
of retrenchment . In justifyine them, Simonsen noted the danger of 
- elyine; on a single export crop and urged a policy of expandine; industry~1 
By 1935, however , Simonsen Has ready to develop his ideas into 
a systematic a gwnent and to make some practical proposals . He have 
seen hO"T , in 1934 , he systematised his ideas on the economic state 
of Brazil and its effec t s on internal conditions. NO'vT he set himself 
to do the same thing i n regard to its effects on the country ' s ela-
tions '-Ti th foreign countries. The immediate reason for the sgeech 
he made in September 1935 in the Chamber of Deputies 'vTas the U. s . -
Brazilian Commercial Treaty of February 1935 , \'Thich i'Tas then being 
discussed in the Brazilian Congress . This treaty i'Tas signed ae;ainst 
a background of increasine; trade rivalry beti'Teen Nazi Germany , Vlhich 
\'las pus4ing for bilateral conunercial agreements involving non-conver47 
ible currency (compensation marks ), and the United States , Hhich stood 
by the traditional free trade system , based on treaties "Ti th the DOst 
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favoured nation clause . At the same time , bondholders from Britain, 
the Uni tec1 States and other countries ,.,ere puttine; pressure on Brazil 
to fulfil its obligations on the foreign debt ; payments on this had 
been drastically reduced l)ecause of the c01.mtry 1 s parlous financial 
si tuation and lack of foreign exchange .43 In the cOf!lT"ercial treaty , 
the Brazilians. reduced the rluties on some liGht indust:cial e;00d8 in 
retu:rn for the Americans not imposing any restrictions on coffee 
sales in the United States. 44 
Simonsen and the other indnstrialists in the Chamber foueht Elgainst 
ati ication of the treaty. Their reasons for OPIlosin2 it emereed 
cle rly fron the interruptions uhich Simonsen made to speech by 
Pau~o Bartins defendin~ the treaty ~5 On the one hand , he conplained 
that Brazil lacked a definite commercial policy and had not produced 
a set of its own proposals ; instead , it had confined itself to o.is-
cussine; the .Aljlerican proposals and considered itself luclC1J to have 
managed to grant less than the Americans had originally demanded . On 
the other hand , there should have been reciprocity i n relation to the 
value of trl'lde , but in this treaty ""re got only a consolidation of 
favours , vTe did not increase our exports to the United States because 
of this cOnf301ida.tion and He are givinG reductions and favours , 
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favourinG the C1Jrrent in this direction". Furthe morE" , the treaty 
implici tly contained the danee 0118 principl e of sacrificinG existing 
activi ties by e iving favours to American .1anmactuJ:'ed products uhich 
i'rere aLeady being produced in Brazil. HOvrever, he Has able to give 
feliT convincing concrete examples and had already admitted that the 
fall in .the exchanee rate since the si(3ning of the treaty had cancell~d 
out t he concessions made to the Americans . 
Nevertheless , on 11 September , Simonsen delivered a major speech 
to justify his opposition to the commercial treaty~1 In this speech , 
he gave his vie", of the problems facing B azil ' s trade and economy 
and suggested that they miGht be solved by the creation of an insti-
tute to encourage exports and a general plan or the rationalisation 
of the country ' s ae;ricultural and industrial p.roduction . Simonsen 
began by taking U~) a posit ion of moderate economic nationalism : he 
asserted that finHncial problems connected ",ith hudeetary equilibl'ium 
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depended upon the solution of t he cOlwtry ' s basic economic problems 
and that " the existence of 
existence of an independent 
the independent 
48 . 
economy". The 
State presupposes the 00-
governments of the advanced 
nations ",ere busy strengthening their economics and yet Brazilians 
had failed to understand the need to defend their mm national economy. 
This '-laS because they had cl une; to doctrine , insisting on the inter-
dependence of political liberalism and free trade theories . 
"But the experience of nore than a centuI"J is there to 
demonstrate that if political liberalism determines the 
equality of the political rights of all the individuals 
'-/1 thin the same cOlwtry and the inviolable observance 
of the political rights of the nat i on itself , the free 
trade idea signi fies the predominance of the strongest 
and of the one bes t organised in economic matters , "'hich 
means to say , to be quite candid, that it can bring 
individuals and countries almost to economic s l avery".49 
Thus , unlike Argent i na , '-/hich had a favoUTable climate and products in 
great vlorld demand , Brazil c01.ud not base its prosperity exchls i vely on 
foreign trade but "must resort on a large scale to the development of 
50 
its home commerce". 
HOIveve-r- , Brazil "as a poor country , indespe~cate need of Ca.I;li taJ , 
and so it VIas desirahle to establish a connection betueen the p:r:oblem 
of its foreign debts and the needs of its nat i onal economy . The home 
market \-[8S continuing to thrive , largely because of the 10vT exchange 
rate , ':Thich meant that the problem vTas not so FlUCh ohtaining a return 
on the capital invested in the country as tral1f'ferring it to the 
credi tors abroad . Therefore , it '-Tas necessary to forn an alliance 
behTeen the foreign investors and the domestic producers, and " to link 
courageously the problem of our exportation Hith that of the satisfac-
tion of our obligations abroad" .51 Brazil shou~d seek to negotiate an 
adjustment vIi th its creditors , for example, by reducing the capital 
on the basis of the average exchange rate at ':Thich it came into the 
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country or by bringing interest rates into line \·.ri th the rates pre-
vailing in foreign capital markets . At the same time , it Hould have 
to componsate for the cessation of the influx of neH capitaJ. by 
exportin~ goods to the value of the Sluns required for remittances . 
Consequently, Simonsen suggested the creation of 8. National Export 
Institute to regulate exports , foreign exchange and payments on the 
foreign debt ; a general policy for the rationalisation of agri -
cul tural and industrial production , to be dl'alm up by the :r.1inistrics 
of Agriculture and Labour; and the restriction of imports by control 
of the exchange marke t and the establishment of an order of preference . 
The remainder of the speech "laS devoted to a lengthy revie\v of 
Brazil ' s past trade policy, or rather lack of policy , and a vrarning 
of the dangers Hhich faced its economy. Simonsen Has particularly 
Horried by the sloH rate of capital formation in Brazil and by the 
fact that the country ' s population Has increasin~ rapidly '''hile the 
eold value of its trade and production remained stationary. Further-
more , the closed- door :oolicy of the great pmlers , the competition from 
other tropical and sub-tropical regions and the ove- - product ion of 
coffee threatened to repeat the pattern of earlier economic cycles , 
vlhich had ended in colJ.apse . Therefore , Brazil should reorgani se its 
agricultural production and , "so far as concerns industry , .0110\{ a 
frankly protective policy".5
2 
Simonsen ended Hi t h a strong appeal to 
his countrymen to adopt a definite economic policy , Hith the aif'1 of 
stimulating the i nternal economy , increasing exports of coffee and 
other products , controlling i mports selectively and solving the 
problem of remittances on the foreign debt. 
Thus in this speech , Simonsen delivered a sHingeing attack on 
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the effects of economic liberalism and established as his basic pre-
mise an independent national economy. On this foundation , he built 
up a critical analysis of the economic problems facine Brazil \'Tith 
regard to foreign trade and foreign capital investment . In fact , he 
foreshadOi,red a great deal 0 post-I'lar economic thinkinG on under-
developed countries. On the one hanCi , he noted that the terms of 
trade vrere turning inexorably gainst the primary producer , Hi t h the 
consequent shortage of foreign exchange stimulating the grovrth of 
industry producing for the home market. On the other hand, there \'Tas 
the probl em of attrac tine; foreign investment to an economy \'Thich \'las 
short of domestic capital and experiencing a rapid groHth of popul ation ; 
al though the main difficulty in the 1930s I'ras servicing the foreign 
debts already acq.uired , Simonsen \'Tas al so thinking of the need to 
attract ne\'T foreign investment to aid the further development of the 
Brazilian economy. In the idea of an independent national economy , 
he had found a basic premise I·/hich , like the idea of raising the aver8.ge 
standard 0 living outlined in his speech of 193Lj, was potentially 
capable of appealing to a \'Tide range of opinion. Yet , despite its 
autarchical overtones, it vr8.S a vague image , capable of ,·ridely-
differin~ interpretations in practice . In. essence , it Has typical of 
Simonsen ' s " consensus" outlook, "'hich envisaged pr02ralmr18s ,·rhich ilould 
benefit everyone . 
Some time later , a bill settinG up the Nation81 Export Institute 
53 . Has presented to Congresr; . The Instltute Has to be an autonomous body , 
the board of administration being composed of a ~)resi.dent nominated 
by the President of the "Re:r!ublic , a deliberating council to be formed 
of ten representatives from the various economic regions of the country , 
and a. consultative council to be composed of one delegate each from 
the Ninistries of Labour and Agricu~ture , one representative of the 
Bank of Brazil and nine experts in national and international economic 
ffa.irs. One half, at least , of the consultative council \Tas to be 
composed of Brazilians , representing agricultural , industria.l , banking 
and commercial activities . 
Once the Institute \'laS organised , the federal c;overnmcmt \'las to 
enter into agreements Hi th the re~)res entatives of foreign creditors , 
granting them 9reference in the alloc tion of foreign exchange f~om 
the surplus on the balance of t ade . idhilst the international sitl1.-
ation remained abnormal , the existinG exchanGe estrictions Hould 
remain in force , VIi th the e.ddi tion of the follm·ring: no imports ,'rere 
to be pe~('ffii tted unless the Bank of Brazil onfi:cnlf>d the existence of 
a bank credit , in foreign currency , to meet the necessary payments; 
the federal gove- nment vras to a9ply the system of import Quotas to 
those countries "'hich applied them to Brazilian 9roducts; the Bank 
\'rould only give foreign exchange cover to ir.1porters a ter the Quotas 
foT' foreign creditors had been deducted from the value of exports ; 
ne", capital entering the country on a permanent basis Has not to be 
subjected to these restrictions . Finally , an agreement Has to be made 
betHeen. the federal gove nment , the gove nments of the states , the 
Bank of Brazil and the Export Institute , vlherehy the Institute uould 
take charge of all transactions relating to the service of the foreign 
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public debt and , eventually , the transfer of earnings of foreign capital 
invested in the country . 
The Natiol1!".l Export Institute VIas based on Dr . Schacht I s "Ne\'T 
Plan" for foreign trade in Germany .54 Its ~nrpose ,.,ras to encourage 
exports and to cont rol imports so as to ensure 8. favoD able trade 
balance \'Tith "'hich to meet the service of the foreign debt and other 
4 
gove. nment re~uirements abroad . Imports Hould be egulated by cont rol 
of the exchange market , in such a "'ay that they \'!ou~d only am01ID t to 
a figure corresponding to the values normally exported , minus a quota 
necessary or remi t tances abroad; importation could only take place 
if ,there were funds to pay for it and an order of preference vras to be 
established , vd-th ravr materials for Bra?iilian industries , \{heat and 
fuel , pharmaceutical IJroduc ts a nd elements necessary for the c01mtry ' s 
economic s t ructure in fi- st place . 55 
Reaction to Simonsen ' s proposals Has not enthusiastic . In the 
Chamber of Deputies , Nor es Andrade Harned against enterine; into 
cOI'lpe ti tion Hi th gngland and the United States , an intention "'hich 
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Sirnonsen cl isclaimed . The British Ambassador , ,-rhile reporting the 
project , thOl~ht it unlikely to he put into pL'actise and the British 
Chamber of Comme_ce in Sa o Paulo, calculating in the '-laY Simonsen 
suge;ested in hiR speech , estimated that the am01mt to be L'emi tted vould 
be about £13 , 500 ,000 s t erling or a sum slightly in excess of that 
required yearly under the Omraldo A anha End other schemes f or the 
liquidation of frozen credits , so the bondholders Hould be no better 
off than they \-re e under the existing arraneement. r1eamrhile , the 
~[oni tor -Merce.ntil , a comJTlercial journal , ,-ras attacking the project , 
clai lning that its real purpose was to restrict to the minimtun Brazil ' s 
purchases abroad , Hhich ,-rould eventually reduce the count~J ' s export 
57 trade . The Folh a da rlanha. of S8.0 Pallio \<Tas far more outspoken , lam-
bas t ine the plan as " a bolel offensive by the Brazilian protectionists 
and the international bankers ae;ainst the interests of the nation", 
and criticising it foL' " favourine; even moo e the fictitious industry 
_ 58 
,-rhich is impoverishing BraZll". 
It "'as , hmrever , the oPIJosi tion 0 aeri.cul tural interests ,·rhich 
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finalJy killed the project . The Sociedade Rural Brasileira campaigned 
against it on the grounds that it \'Tould inevitably lead to severe 
restrictions on the export trade , and ''larned that it \'101,ud compromise 
the autonomy of Sao Paulo and the other states . The Gov rnor of Parana 
also voiced the opposition of the producers and exporters of that state . 
Consequently , the Conselho Federal do Comercio Exterior , to Hhich the 
project had been sent , recommended its rejection , arguing that it vTas 
the responsibility of the Minister of Finance to drau up a plan' or 
the revision of the external debt and that the protectionist nature 
of the l')roject conflicted Hi th the spirit of a recent lavT by Hhich 
Brazil had denounced most of its foreign commercial agreements ; there 
59 Here also certain contradictions Hithin the text of the plan. Thus 
Simonsen ' s first essay in developmental planning rancounter to 
contemporary government poli y and he did not have sufficient influence 
either on public opinion or in the inner circles of policy- making to 
get this policy changed . His project \'Tas soundly rejected . 
Neamrhile , Vargas had put pressure on Euvaldo Lodi to cease the 
industrialists ' opposit ion to the commercial treaty and it passed 
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through Congress and Has ratified in December 1935 . As for the general 
plan for the rationalisation of agriClu tural and industrial production , 
Hhich Simonsen su.e;gested should be dravm up by the lIIinistries of 
Agricul ture and Labour , a meetin~ "TaS held in July 1935 between the 
}.1inister of Labour , the experts of the N.T . I.C . and various "class 
deputies" "'hich dre"T up the bases for the discussion of such a plan , 
but nothing more Has heard of it . 61 
Brazil ' s exports continued to stagnate , hm-rever , and as it becc1Jlle 
clear in the mid- 1930s that the ol d international system of free 
exchange ''laS not likely to be restored , the e;overnment beean to look 
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round for means to replace the traditional expo-t economy. Its attention 
increasingly focussed on industry and the home market . In early 1935 , 
a member of the Conselho Federal do Come cio Exterior , Artur Torres 
Filho , suggested that the Council should commission a study on uays 
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to expand Brazil ' s internal market and trade . After an initial flurry 
of interest , the project "ras dropped but eiehteen months late , in 
November 1936 , the C. F. C.E. began a natiomride inquiry into the possi-
bilities of Brazilian industry . The telegram "'hich \'las sent out 
asking for inforJnation stressed the personal interest uhich Getulio 
Vargas \'/as taking in the project . It empl1asised that the government 
did not intend to restrict the import trade but merely \'lanted to dis-
pense vlith unnecessary imports . It requested that particula attention 
should be given to the potential for exportine; industrial goods to 
other South American cOill1tries . 63 
The response I'las disappointin~ . Replies trickled in froT'1 isolated 
firms and industrialists ' ssociations , but the sugeestions they con-
tained Here scarely ne\v and some \·rere merely requests for government 
loans . The most comprehensive reply Came from the Federation of 
Industries in S!5o Paulo . Originally , Simonsen ' s friend Euvpldo Lodi , 
1;1ho \vas .uresident of the ConfederB.~5.o Industrial do Brasil , Has to 
report on the results of the inC!.uiry bllt he vras abroad and so the final 
report 'vaS dral'l11 up by Simonsen instead . 
Firstly , F.1.E.S.P . had sent in a reply "'hich clearly boY'e the 
mark of Simonsen ' s thinkine.64 F. 1. ~ . S.P. "relcomed Vareas I s initiative 
in openin~ the incluiry and emphasised that governmental action COU~(J 
aid the industriel development of a cOlmtry , noting the example of the 
great industrial nations . It I>ointed out that industrial expansion 
",ould not conflict vIi th the interests of fa mine; ;:md r:oincided Hi th 
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the most vital interests of the nation. The princil)al need was to 
fix the e;uidelines of a broad ae;ric,utural and industrial policy for 
Brazil , since the lack of a stable economic policy Has the greatest 
factor impeding the country ' s progress . Therefore , the first step 
to e;ive Brazilian industry the vigour required to face foreiGn compet -
i tion ,vas to adopt a general policy of real SUl)port for production. 
As for foreie;n trade , F.I.E. S.P. claimed that there Has no antag-
onism between the need to support farming by expanding external markets , 
and protection for industry by developing internal markets nd 
conqnerine; foreign ones . Because of the vastness of Bra7.il ' s territory , 
the rate of growth of its pO!:lUlation and the bacl0'rardness of its 
economic structure , the iElports it needed Here enormous . The country ' s 
purchasing pm,rer ' .... as limited, so preference ShOlUd be given to the 
acquisition of productive capital goods rather than luxury items for 
immedi te consuJTIption . But greater industrial Cal)aci ty \'lOuld increase 
Brazil ' s needs for purchases abroad , since fevr industries used 
exclusively national ra," materials and semi- manufactured products , so 
it ,·ras possible to reconcile Brazil ' s agricultural and industrial 
expansion Hith its need for international trade . 
AS ' a preliminal"J measu e , F.I . E. S . P. ' s memorandum Sug2e::lted that 
a cOJrunission of experts should be created to decide \,hich industries 
should be stimulated by the public l)m-rers , Hi th the aim of defending 
the country , strenethening its economy and conrluerin,5 foreie;n markets. 
These industries ShOlUd be e;ranted security in the knmlledge that 
customs ta if S \·,ovld reI'lain stable; they H01).ld have eXeml)tion from 
tariffs for the import 0 raH materials not produced in Brazil , 
d8fence a5ainst dU!:lping, a statistics service and a better c1rm,,- back 
113.'1' • 
a 
F.LE.S.P. stresRed that internal markets ,·rould have to form the 
basis for industri ,.1 development and thought that greater internal 
trade \-{ould both strengthen the nation and increase the demand for 
ral'T materials. It then sue;gested specific measures to stirmlate the 
production of rroi materials (credit , official standardisation , etc) , 
the mobilisation of small savings , mail-order l'lech8.ndising and the 
simplifioation of the tax system. It also urged the general need for 
measures to help penetrate foreign T'1arkets , especially credit fac -
ilities for exports . Finally , the memorandum raised a number of other 
problems , such as the need to investigate the 10\'1 standard of living , 
and the conseCluently lo\'[ consumin[S pOvTer , of a large part of the 
Brazilian population , the desirability of favouring the immigration 
of specialised vrorkers , in vie,'r of the lack of sufficient vocational 
schools , the l1urdens imposed on industry by the government t 13 lahour 
legislation and the need for an adeau8.te statistics service . 
The F. LE. S.P. memorandum vTas signed by its President , Paulo Alvaro 
de Assump~ao , but it is fair 
responsible for i t .
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Some of 
to assume that Simonsen Has lare;ely 
the :>uggestions 'tTere familiar themes of 
his : the need for protectionism and 8. definite government policy to -
"!Brds industry, the harmony of interests behreen agriculture and 
industry , the need for selective imports and gree.ter attention to 
the home market . Hm.rever , novel features Here the desire to ex~ort 
manufactured goods and the call for a government commission to make 
a deliberate selection of industries I'Thich should bp enconra.ged . 'rhis 
viaS a clear step in the direction of State planning of the economy. 
Hm'rever , it should be noted that in his ovm report to the C.F . C.B. , 
Simonsen returned to a more general ca.ll for the government to adopt 
an economic policy . 
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In this report , delivered on 27 September 1937 , shortly before 
the establishment of the Estado Novo , Simonsen "Tent beyond his immed-
iate brief concernine industrial expansion and e;ave a general survey 
66 
of the Brazilian economy and economic policy. Nevertheless , most of 
his arguments were refinements of earlier themes . The princip8.1 
significance of the report lay in the fact that it Has commissioned 
by the government , "'hich thus demonstrated 8. nevr interest in the 
possibilities of j_ndustrialisation , and the variety of measures ';Thich 
Simonsen ",as able to suggest . 
In his gener'11 conside-rations , Simonsen emphasised that the 
interests of Brazilian industry coincided "i th those of the Nation. 
He again urged the need to raise the average purchasing pm-reI' of 
Brazilians , trebling it from its present annual average of around 
500 milreis , 0- a little over £6 , to £20, thus raisine; nnual pur-
ch8.sing power to a total of about £900 million . This purchasing 
pOVTer could only be obtained through internal exchange , since there 
",ere liEli ts to the expansion of the exportation of Bra~il ' s agricul-
tural products . 
"The dilemma Hhich inexo ably faces us is the 
follo';ling : either \'le shall produce \'Ii thin our 
Jrontiers 8or~ of "'hat we need to raise t he aver8.ge 
standard of living of the country , reserving the 
external purchas ing pOV1er deriving from our exports 
for the acquisition of articles necess8.ry for our 
defensive and economic structure and of the products 
of specialised industries , or we shall be condemned 
to a gro .... , ing state of poverty". 67 
Turning next to the compl aints and sugge. tions sent in by the 
various commerci8.J and industrial pssociations , Simonsen quoted at 
length f om those presented by F. r .E.S . p., paying particular attention 
to measures needed to develop foreign markets for Brazilian manufact-
ured products (a revision of the drav,- back 18.\'1 , export redits to be 
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granted by the Central Reserve Bank, etc) . Regarding internal oredit , 
he noted that the organisation of the industrial banks legislated under 
the Provisional Government had been hampered by the reduction of 
guarantees f ormerly enjoyed by debentures and morte;age bonds . 
He then Hent over the old ar e;ument that the high cost of living 
vl8S caused , not by the tariff, but by the fall in the exchange ra tp , 
and asserted that if , instead 0 fiscal protectionism , Brazil had 
adopted a heal thy industrial protectionism , its industries \'lou1d nO\'T 
be much more devel oped , the averae;e standard of living vlOuld be higher 
and the currency much less devalued . Brazil Has gradually losinc its 
external m8.rkets and RO to do EHmy Hi th some of the char8.cteristics 
of a bachrard , almost colonial economy, it should adopt a programmp 
of strengthening its internal markets and t ade Vlithin its frontiers . 
He claimed that the interests of Brazilian farming and industry \vp-re 
not antagonistic because , in future , the Brazilian industrial sector 
\-Tould have to be agriculture ' s main market , consuming its vegetable , 
animal and mineral raYT materials . Industry , in turn, needed prospero1.1S 
farming in order to provide it \'Ti th capital and consumers 0 
Turnin3 to oreign trade policy , Simonsen repeated his opposition 
to free trade and reciprocaJ tre8.ties based on the most favoured 
nation clause . Brazil , as a poor cOlmtry \·,i th a minimum and falling 
per capita exportation , could not adopt standardised commercial treaties 
but should make different adjustments \vi th different peoples • The 
United States should l)e given absolute preference for the import-
ation of economically- productive articles Hnd a trianeular:' solution 
involvine; the U.S. should be found to the problem of Brazil ' s economic 
and financial relations Hith Britain . 
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Simonsen ended \'Iith a series of conclusions \-Thich recommended: 
a ) the setting of euidelines for a stable agricultural and indus-
trial policy; b) the revision of Brazil ' s foreign economic policy 
\'1i th the aim of securing markets for its export products and allo\'Tin['; 
only selective imports; c) measures to encourage credit for production 
and the mobilisation of smalJ. capital sums , the creation of savings 
stamps and export credits, and the reform of the debenture laH to 
help the creation of industrial hanks; d) the institution of State 
insurance to guarantee export credits; e) mail -order marketing and 
the use of savin:.;s stamps as a means of payment; f) the reform of 
fiscal policy, creating a gold customs tariff , relieving exports of 
the exchange confiscation and abolishing the import taxes ,·,hich still 
existed in some states; g) the readjustment of various tariffs and 
t ariff rates; h) the modernisation of the means 0 transport , using 
surpluses from the gold tariff fund to re-e(~l1ip transport and to solve 
the crisis on the Central do Brasil Rail,.ay; i) the reform of the 
T\'TO trhirds La"l and of some of the rest ictions on immigration so as 
to allo", the use of specialised uorkers in certa.in industries ; j) 
absolute preferonce fol.' national products in public bodies and services; 
k) measures to expand the exportation of herva-mate; 1) an urgent 
revision of the dro.",-back la"'; m) official support for the indus-
trial mjssions organised by the Confederacao Industria} do Brasil and 
1 
the state federations to study the pOFlsibilities of sUPIJlyin,3 manu-
factured :products to South American markets; n) meDS11res to reduce 
the hostility of the tax inspectors tov!8.rds the entrepreneu S; 0) a 
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solution of the crisis of over-production of coffee . 
Thus , Simonsen ranged over the .Thole 8rea of economic policy in 
hjs e;eneral consider'ltions and dre", up a comprehensive list of practical 
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suggestions but , perhaps bearing in mind the fate of his National 
Export Ins t itute , he refr~ined from attempting El single overall 801u-
tion to the vlhole problem. Indeed , he pointed out that most of these 
measures i.,rere Hi thin the jurisdiction of the various ministries , the 
legislature and the state governments , doubtless hoping that at least 
. 
some of them ,·rould be put in to prac tice . 
In this he was to be disappointed. The e.F.e.E. rent out mimoo-
graphed copies of his report to all the ministries , askine for their 
comments. Only the Lloyd Brasileiro shipping line replied positively. 
Reneued reCluests in 1939 succeeded in eliciting replies from the 
Ministries of Transport , Foreign Affairs and the Navy , but no concrete 
measures ,.,rere taken to implement the proposals . 69 
Nevertheless , in 1941 , i'lhen consideration '-TaS being given to ways 
o coping 1:lith the Hartime emergency , the e. l!' . e.E. decided to study 
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in detail the eleven main sugges t ions ~'Ii th i'lhich Simonsen had concluded 
his report YO It found that some of the P1atters had already been resolved 
by subsequent legislation and that others "Iere no 10n,3er opportune 
because of the Vlartime ond i tions . Hm.rever , the s tudy on credit for 
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production and inoust- inl banks d:ragged on until J946. The lethargy , 
delays and lack of response "Ihich characterised this parti.cular inve._ . 
tigation illu. trate the difHculties Vlhich faced 2.ny proponent of a 
programme of rapid industrialisation in this period . Yet , not the 
least of the delaYA \'las caused by Simonsen and I,odi themselves , \,Iho 
ignored repeated reC?uests for information behleen 1944 and 1946 . 
The direct :results of the e . F . e . l~ . ' A in(~uiry into the possibil-
ities of Brazilian industry vrere , in practice , negligible . Neverthe-
less , the very fact that it Has carried out Rt 811 marked a consider-
able shift of government thinking in favour of industrialisation . This 
----------------------......... . 
change in emphe.sis Has Given greater nr~ency by external events in 
the late 1930s 2.nd 1940s . The outbreak of the Second \vorld \var thre\'T 
Brazil back on its mm resources and dramatically underlined the 
import ance of a self-sufficient Jocal industry . Brazilian factories 
He~e able to supply most of the country ' s needs for consumer and 
military products; in the process , the industrialists gained pO\'ler 
and prestige , as "Tell 2.S hieh profits. These developments "Tere 
reflected in the government ' s grmving concern ",ith industrialisation 
and its greater i'Tillingness to consult and accommodate the interests 
of the existing industrialists , not least in the field of social 
legislation. 
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Chapter 7. OLIVE IRA VI ANA AND THE PROB~1 OF THE SINDICATO. 
tlHere they all dedicate themselves to the study of law, unless 
they decide to dedicate themselves to \<lomentl , commented an Italian 
1 
socialist on the Brazilian upper classes. In an earlier chapter, we 
have seen that the intention of the Provisional Government was to 
submit labour relations and the social Cluestion in general to the 
rule of la\<l. Furthermore, the overall concept of the social legis-
lation was essentially a liberal one: the working class had genuine 
grievances in regard to working conditions, which legislation would 
remove. In return, it was hoped, the vlOrkers vlOuld give up their 
revolutionary aspirations and would work to resolve their remaining 
problems within the legal structure of the existing social system. 
Such a concept depended not only upon a fundamental belief that 
the conflicting interests of the various social classes Here recon-
cilable, but also upon a tl reasonabletl and co-operative attitude on 
the part of the workers. The first Minister of Labour, Lindolfo Collor, 
soon learnt from practical experience with working class militants 
in Rio and Sao Paulo that not all workers vlere prepared to be 
2 
tlreasonabletl and co-operative, and so initiated a policy of control 
over wo~king class organisations and their activities. This grad-
ually intensified in subseCluent years as a result of changes in the 
political situation and the growth of the bureaucratic structure of 
the Ministry. Inevitably, this was reflected in the labour laws, 
resulting in discussion on the manner and degree of State control over 
labour relations. 
The top administrative posts in the ne\dy-created Ministry of 
Labour were initially occupied by supporters 0f the Alian~a Liberal 
vTho, as lmvyers, had long been active participants in the working 
class movement. Evaristo de Moraes, the first juridical consultant, 
had defended many workers in the courts whilst Joaquim Pimenta, vTho 
became the procurator of the M.T.I.C. 's Department of Labour, had 
3 
acquired a formidable reputation as an agitator in Recife. Once 
installed in his administrative post, however, Pimenta's views became 
considerably more moderateo 
Lindolfo Collor resigned from the government in 1932 as a result 
of political differences and Evaristo de Horaes vlent with him. At 
the latter's suggestion, Oliveira Viana was appointed his successor 
as Juridical Consultant of the M.T.I.C. by Afranio de Melo Franco, 
the interim Minister of Labour, on 19 March 1932.4 Viana remained in 
this position until late 1940 and exercised a formative influence on 
Brazil's fledgling social legislation. As Juridical Consultant, he 
was called upon to give his advice on most of the laws passed by the 
H.T.I.C. and his legal opinion on the numerous individual cases 
which reached the Ministry. 
Perusing Viana's archive, one can see that he made his decisions 
on individual cases in a spirit of fairness, ostensibly favouring 
neither the employers nor the \·lOrkers. As for the social legislation, 
looking-back in September 1940, he reminisced: 
"Salgado, hovlever, in matters concerning social legis-
lation, always listened to the Consultoria and always 
concurred with it: he even \"ent to the point of 
sacrificing his personal 6pinion in order not to break 
the uniformity of my interpretation. This allowed me, 
in the very period in which lap-our legislation was 
beginning in our country, to clarify and define, 
through the solution of numerous concrete cases, the 
fundamental concepts of this new type of lavl, which 
were then undefined and fluctuating in matters of 
syndical organisation, holidays, the duration of work, 
labour disputes, labour justice, social insurance, etc". 5 
The third Minister, Agamemnon Magalh~es, also consulted Oliveira 
Viana regularly but for different reasons: although intelligent and 
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acute, he had the mentality of a provincial politic.mn and feared the 
opinion of the Capital. 
"Like Salgado, he never failed to hear me: but he 
heard me not through confidence in my good judgment, 
since he never liked me, but through cunningness -
to cover himself against the blows of this same 
opinion, which was then free and uncontrolled. [ ••• ] 
He used my opinions as if they vTere the leather clothing 
of a cowboy - in order to cross in safety the obstacles 
barbed with the cactus prickles and Indian spears 
[ xique-xigues ~ mundurucus ] of6 the press, the courts and his position in Parliament". 
Oliveira Viana implied that he did not have a close relationship 
with the Minister of the time, Waldemar Falcao, but, nevertheless, it 
was under this Minister that he produced his two most important and 
lasting contributions to Brazilian social legislation: the Labour 
Justice law of 1938 and the syndical law of 1939. In these laws and 
the controversies which surrounded them, Oliveira Viana helped define 
the nature and limits of State intervention in the delicate field of 
industrial relations, not only for the Estado Nevo but also for the 
post-war democratic regime. 
Viana's predecessor, Evaristo de Moraes, had a long history of 
involvement in the working class movement and held a reformist, social 
democratic outlook. Oliveira Viana, on the other hand, had never taken 
any part in labour affairs and, as the son of a rural landmvner, came 
from a totally different background. vlhat was his attitude towards 
the social question? 
In an article reviewing Populaxoes meridionais written in May 
1929, the Marxist intellectual and general secretary of the Brazilian 
Conununist Party, Astrojildo Pereira, wrote that the whole book "aims 
to justify historically, politically and socially, the predominance 
of the fazendeiros, the great landowners, those vThom the author calls, 
with admiration, the 'rural aristocracy' " and berated Oliveira Viana's 
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work because it was "intended to prove that the class struggle does 
not 'exist' in Brazil - it never 'existed ' in the past and so it should 
not 'exist' in the present ••• " . It was, in short, a "reactionary, 
anti-revolutionary, anti-proletarian philosophy from the first to the 
las,t line". 7 
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Looking back at Oliveira Viana's subsequent career, these criticisms 
seem valid but at the time they were made, they represented a gross 
exaggeration~ Viana's main targets, explicitly named again and again, 
were the defenders of the Constitution of 1891 and the liberal refor-
mers who wanted to institute a more democratic regime. Prior to his 
appointment as Juridical Consultant at the Ministry of Labour in 1932, 
he had scarcely even considered the social problem created by the 
growth of an urban working class. As he himself later observed, he 
was one of those who "had never taken the existence of a communist 
ideology in Brazil seriously [ ••• ] , so unviable did it seem to me 
9 
in our environment" . Before 1930, he only referred to the social 
question once, in an article entitled "Nacionalismo e questao social", 
published around 1921.10 
In this article, he condemned communism, socialism and anarchism 
as "retr"ograde utopias" and urged Brazil to follow the example of the 
English-speaking nations, who were solving their social problem by 
means of syndicalism. He praised the efforts of the trades unions to 
improve the living conditions of the workers by developing their 
individual well-being and the spirit of co-operation and solidarity. 
Then, using an argument which was later to become familiar, he claimed 
that maximalist communism was not justifiable in a country like Brazil, 
with vast stretches of land requiring the action of individual initiative 
and bold, entrepreneurial capital. It was really ridiculous to be 
debating the distribution of wealth when the most elementary problems 
relating toits production had still not been solved. Communism and 
egalitarianism would be the negation of Brazil's history, he went on, 
evoking the daring individualism of the bandeirantes, and a communist 
republic would mean the end of its civilisation and its annihilation in 
the face of the strong and progressive peoples of the world. Therefore, 
he concluded - and this was the crux of the article - the reaction of 
the country's ruling and conservative classes against these foreign 
ideas ",as fully justified by their duty to defend the nation. 
This one article was, however, lost amid a welter of attacks on 
liberalism. Consequently, Oliveira Viana entered the Ministry of 
Labour with little intellectual preparation on the subject of urban 
labour and his early years there were spent in an enormous effort to 
master the juridical and technical complexities of social legislation. 
Only in his last years as Juridical Consultant did he publicly artic-
ulate a philosophy of coping with the social question, a philosophy 
which coincided with the official position of the Vargas regime. 
This philosophy is most succinctly explained in a typewritten 
note "rhich exis ts in his archive: 
"What 'V'e need to do is to sweep aylay, drastically 
and violently, all these proponents of the class 
struggle. There is nothing more completely foreign to 
our civilisation than the class struggle. We have 
never known it. We have never had class antagonisms. 
We have always been brought up in the shadm.,r of a 
benevolent, patriarchal system".ll 
However, Viana ,.,ras willing to admit the existence of a social question 
in Brazil. Consequently, he thought that they should avoid the perils 
of communism, not so much by "beating back and trying to crush, 
through persecution, the proponents of these absurd ideals" but rather 
by: 
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"trying to find, within the system of present insti-
tutions, a formula which would be capable of satis-
fying the aims and aspirations for social justice 
\vhich they preach and demand. These aims are just and 
the criticism vlhich they level at the present social 
and economic order, stemming from untrammelled 
capi talism, seems to me unanswerable". 12 
The answer lay in social legislation. The conservative rationale 
behind Viana's acceptance of this policy was explained in a paper which 
he wrote on the role of the social security and syndical institutions 
in the social policy of the Vargas regime. Oliveira Viana said that 
its objective could be: 
"summed up in this formula: progressive raising of 
the standards and dignity of the working classes vTi th-
in the capitalist regime. This means, however, that 
the raising of their standards and dignity must be 
achieved not by suppressing the steps in the social 
hierarchy nor by eliminating the upper classes nor 
by levelling all the categories of society - as 
bolshevism tried to do (in any case, without success), 
but, rather, by making the \vorking classes share 
progressively in the advantages and emoluments \vi th 
which our civilisation has been providing comfort, 
well-being and human and social dignity for the upper 
classes for more than a century"o13 
This emphasis on the worker's dignity as a human being was, 
Oliveira Viana explained on another occasion, an advance on the early 
social legislation, in Brazil and abroad, which merely aimed to protect 
the individual worker from the rapaciousness of the bosses, in the way, 
one would look after a machine. The new social policy had five main 
objectives, namely, to modify the attitude of the employers towards 
their workers; change the workforce's hostility towards the employers 
as well as the s ense of their mill inferiority; create a material and 
social environment vlhich would develop the workman's avlareness of 
his human dignity and value to society; organise the social mobility 
of the vlOrking class (i.e. the means of rising for its more intelligent 
members); and officialise social assistance, raising it to the status 
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of a public service. 14 
Oliveira Viana vTaxed lyrical over the benefits of the various 
social security services. Yet he was anything but a socialist or 
even a proponent of the Welfare State. He declared openly that he 
did. not believe in a society without misery; misery was as eternal 
as the world and there would always be a certain percentage of 
degenerates (~ncapazes) vTho could not rise or improve themselves. 
This derived from hereditary, not social, causes and so the social 
system was unable to eliminate it. On the other hand, the most unjust 
misery was that of capable people '''ho were able and willing to leave 
their misery but could not do so because society did not give them 
the means. This was unjust misery because it stemmed from bad social 
organisation, and it could be corrected and eliminated by the combined 
action of the State and private initiative. 
Brazil, continued Viana, had millions of proletarians who were 
capable of running small-holdings and small businesses, and achieving 
an average level of technical education. The way to solve the social 
problem was to create the social, economic and spiritual conditions 
'''hich vTould allow the best-endowed and most capable elements of the 
vast proletarian masses in the towns and countryside - principally 
the countryside - to rise peacefully. Thus, Oliveira Viana advocated 
the encouragement of small-holdings: this policy would achieve, not 
the general proletarianisation of society, but rather the deprolet-
arianisation of Brazil's proletarian classes. This, he concluded, 
was possible without altering the structure of the country's traditional 
institutions because of the vast amount of spare land in Brazil; 
consequently, there vTas no need for a collectivist solution or the 
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elimination of the bourgeois classes, especially the large landowners. 
Thus, Oliveira Viana returned to his old theme: the root of 
the problem, and its solution, lay in the countryside. Social 
legislation for the urban working class was, in his eyes, essentially 
a holding operation. Nevertheless, this did not mean to say that 
Viana's activities in this area were of purely secondary importance. 
Indeed his two most practical and lasting contributions were the out-
come of his ,york in the M.T.I.C. The Labour Justice la'" of 1938 was 
the result of his growing interest in corporatism, \'Thich had begun 
in the mid- 1920s with his proposals for technical and consultative 
councils and which was further stimulated by his extensive reading 
of Italian writers in the 1930s. The reform of the syndical legis-
lation which Viana conducted in 1939, on the other hand, "'as a 
continuation of existing government policy rather than of his O\'Tn 
thinking, yet even here he tried to give it a personal interpretation. 
In a speech on the subject;601iveira Viana observed that the main 
principles governing Brazilian syndical policy since 1931 had been, 
firstly, the deliberate separation of the two characteristic elements 
of European syndical organisations: trade-unionis~ and socialism; 
Brazilian syndicalism was neither revolutionary nor reformist but was 
vocatio~al, corporative and Christian. Secondly, there was a rigorous 
separation between syndical organisations and political parties. 
Thirdly, the sindicato in Brazil was "not so much a techtlique of 
occupational organisation but rather a technique of social organisation 
of the people" since it covered not only the workers but also the 
employers and even the liberal professions and self-employed persons. 
This was because the central thinking which guided the creation of 
the syndical organisations was not to prepare a climate for social 
struggles. On the contrary: 
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"The intimate thinking, the great idea behind our 
syndical policy is to organise the people: to give it 
a structure, joints and a backbone; to create in it 
those centres of social solidarity, those focal points 
of collective life and consciousness vThich our historical 
evolution [ ••• ] has not allowed to be formed" .17 
The main aim of the Revolution of 1930 had been to counteract 
the situation existing in the Old Republic where the people had been 
absent from the State. Thus it had brought the employers and vlOrking 
classes into the structure of the State through the sindicatos, aut-
archies, pensions funds and institutes, class representation, etc., 
151 
with the result that the State tended to identify itself with the people 
and the people with the State. Consequently, the social policy of 
the Revolution had two main objectives: on the one hand, the elimin-
ation of the spirit of internationalism and the infiltration of 
Marxism and bolshevism by forbidding the syndical associations to 
affiliate with foreign ones and, on the other hand, the elimination 
of the spirit of localism by the subordination of all the syndical 
associations and social vTelfare institutions to the federal government. 
Together, these measures vlOuld restore the unity of the Nation and 
the strength, prestige and authority of the Central Power. In this 
way, Viana tried to reconcile the guidelines of the government 's 
social policy with his own ideas on Brazil's need for political recon-
struction and national unity. In both cases, the sindicato held the 
key. 
The basic pattern of Brazilian labour relations vTas established 
by Decree 19770 of 19 March 1931, which regulated the formation 
of sindicatos.18 This lavT, vThich vIas based on the French loi Waldeck-
Rousseau of 21 !l1arch 1884, vTaS drawn up by Joaquim Pimenta and 
Evaristo de !l1oraes and was Signed by Collor and Vargas.19 The decree 
provided for governmental recognition of the sindicatos but did not 
make their creation or belonging to them compulsory. It applied to 
both employers and workers, who were to organise separate sindicatos, 
and restricted the sindicatos to defending the immediate economic 
interests of their members and providing social services, "lhile it 
proscribed political activity. It also restricted their scope to 
identical, similar or connected occupations and provided that only 
one sindicato \olOuld be recognised for a particular category of \Olorkers 
or employers in a given area (sindicato Unico or unidade sindical). 
In return for legal recognition by the government and protection 
from reprisals by the employers against syndicalised \olOrkers, the 
sindicatos had to accept a considerable degree of direct and indirect 
control by the M.T.I.C. The measures of indirect contr ol included 
the prohibition of religious or political propaganda within the sindi-
catos and of their involvement in outside elections, as "lell as of 
interference in them by outsiders; restrictions were also imposed 
on the participation of foreigners and on links with international 
labour organisations. There ",ere also a number of direct controls: 
to obtain legal recognition, the sindicatos had to comply 'vi th the 
basic organisation laid dovm by the law and also had to present the 
M.T.I.C. with a copy of their statutes, a copy of the act of install-
ation and a detailed list of their members; they had to send annual 
reports to the M.T. I.C. and their relations 'vi th the government vTere 
to be conducted through the Ministry. M.T.I.C. delegates had the 
right to attend the general assemblies of the sindicatos, examine 
their financial situation and report any irregularities, while among 
the penalties for breaking the la\{ was one which allm{ed the M.T.I.C. 
to depose the leadership of a sindicato, appointing a delegate to 
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run it until elections for new leaders could be held, or even to close 
it altogether. Finally, a pretext for ministerial intervention \vas 
provided by the right granted to aggrieved members of sindicatos to 
appeal to the Minister against any acts of the leaders or general 
ass~mblies \vhich infringed their rights or ,·,ere contrary to the la"l. 
To complement this law, Collor also dre\v up decrees instituting 
commissions to conciliate in collective labour disputes , tribunals 
to deal with individual disputes, and collective l abour conventions 
20 
to es t ablish minimum standards for working conditions. These measures 
vrere promulgated by his successor , Salgado Filho. 
The militant leaders of the 'oJOrking class saw the threat to their 
21 
position posed by this la"l and pro tested vehemently agains t it, but 
those of a reformist or opportunistic bent found it sufficiently 
attractive to co-operate with the government. Their activities can 
be seen both in the steady increase in the number of sindicatos 
recognised and in the acts of personal homage (homenagens ) to the 
22 
Minister vrhich "lere reported in the press. This \-laS particularly 
so under Salgado Filho \vho, despite his origins as the head of the 
4th Auxiliary Delegacy (the forerunner of the infamous DOPS - politi-
cal pollce), had attracted a considerable personal following amongst 
the \vorkers of Rio.23 Salgado Filho tried actively to encourage 
syndicalisation by attempting to make membership of a sindicato a 
precondition for the right to claim holidays and by dispatching 
delegates of the M.T.I.C. to other states to help found sindicatos. 24 
Another factor ,vas the attitude of the employers towards 
syndicalisation. Although some accepted the principle phlegmatically 
and merely suggested minor changes in the lavr, others protested 
vehemently, claiming that it would encourage the ",orkers to make 
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impossible demands; yet others took the pragmatic course of dismis-
25 
sing \-JOrkers \-'ho joined sindicatos. l-luch to t he chagrin of the 
M.T.I.C., they remained quite indifferent to the provisions for their 
own syndicalisation until 1933, ,.,hen the sindicatos \-,ere given the 
opportunity to elect class representatives to the Constituent Assembly. 
26 
The number of employers' sindicatos then mushroomed. 
However, the most effective opposition to the syndical lm., came 
from two other sources: the tenentes and the Catholics. The experts 
of the M.T.I.C. vlanted single sindicatos concerned only ,.,ith economic 
and occupational matters. The tenentes, on the other hand, wanted to 
give the sindicato a political role, so they persuaded Vargas to allow 
the sindicatos to elect class representatives to the Constituent 
27 
Assembly. There \-Tas much discussion of the virtues and dravTbacks of 
class or professional representation in the Assembly and eventually 
the Constitution of 1934 provided for the eJect ion of a sixth of the 
28 
Chamber of Deputies by the sindicatos. This provision gave a great 
stimulus to the process of syndicalisation but many of the sindicatos 
thus formed had little more than a paper existence or were more 
interested in party politics than protecting ,.,orkers' interests.29 
Me am.,hile, the concept of the sindicato Unico, or single sindicaroo ~~~~~ ----- e· 
representing a particular group of workers in a given area, came under 
attack from the Catholics. The latter had started organising the 
working classes in the late 1920s under the influence of Cardinal 
SebastHi'o Leme and in 1931, they "Tere planning to set up a National 
Confederation of Catholic Workers; at the same time, Catholic Workers' 
Circles were beginning to spring up in Rio Grande do Sul and to spread 
t t h . 30 J . p' t h o 0 er reg~ons. oaqu~m ~men a, owever, waS a notorious anti-
clerical and by stipulating the sindicato Unico and prohibiting 
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religious propaganda in it, he had effectively squashed these efforts. 
Led by A1ceu Amoroso Lima, the Catholics protested against this 
discrimination and demanded that the law be changed to a11m'T more 
than one sindicato to be formed for each group (p1uralidade s indical) 
32 
and permit religious prop.a ganda to be carried on in them. 
A memorandum to this effect "Tas presented to the M.T.I.C. and 
the task of replying fell upon 01iveira Viana. In his legal opinion, 
Viana considered that a special case might be made for Catholic 
propaganda, since it was the religion of the vast majority of the 
Brazilian people, but he condemned the idea of abolishing the sindi-
f 33 
cato unico. A project for the reform of Decree 19770, "Thich among 
other things would have permitted the formation of religious sindi-
catos, was published in the Di~io Oficia1 in :r.iay 1933 but, despite 
Catholic promptings, no action "las taken by the Government. 34 
The Catholics, therefore, brought up their demands in the Con-
stituent Assembly and one of the representatives of the liberal 
professions, Ranulpho Pinheiro Lima, managed to obtain the insertion 
in the ne", Constitution of a proVlswn assuring syndica1 plurality 
and the complete autonomy of the sindicatos:5This coup infuriated 
the emp1Qyees' representatives, Hho stood up, one after another, to 
denounce it: they wanted autonomy from the M.T.I.C.'s control but 
feared that plurality ,,,ould divide and '''eaken the working class move-
36 
ment. 
The M.T.I.C. bowed to the will of the people's elected repre-
sentatives vlith a singular ill-grace. It already had its ovm rep1ace-
ment for Decree 19770 ready and waiting to be promulgated. As soon 
as the final provisions of the future Constitution were knmm, it '''as 
shorn of the most flagrant measures of ministerial control and other-
wise modified to follow the letter but not the spirit of the Constitu-
tion; it was then signed by Vargas, still using his discretionary 
powers as Head of the Provisional Government, just before the new 
Constitution was promulgated. 37 
. This law, Decree 24694, \'las largely dra\m up by Oliveira 
Viana and, in lay-out and terminology, was heavily influenced by 
the Italian fascist la\,1 of April 1926 but, in essence, it maintained 
the basic pattern set by Decree 19770. To comply with the Constitution, 
more than one sindicato could be recognised for a given group in each 
area, but the requirement that such sindicatos had to include at 
least a third of the respective group effectively limited the number 
of sindicatos in each case to two. The sindicatos still had to seek 
legal recognition from the M.T.I.C. and the more subtle forms of con-
trol, such as the requirement to send reports to the M.T.I.C. and the 
right of aggrieved members to appeal to the "appropriate authority", 
were retained. Mischievously, the law continued to prohibit religious 
propaganda in the sindicatos. 
From the point of view of the M.T.I.C., the changes imposed by 
the Constitution could not have come at a more inopportune moment, 
as there' was a series of major strikes in 1934, \'Thich provoked public 
criticism of the Provisional Government's social policy. Salgado 
Filho replied defensively that the social legislation was not intended 
38 
to do away \'ri th strikes but merely to ensure their peaceful settlement. 
Nevertheless, the British Ambassador noted a hardening of the author-
ities' attitude to\>lards strikers. 39 
Functionaries in the M.T.I.C. suggested various subtle ways of 
maintaining their control,such as imposing conditions for granting 
legal recognition and refusing to have any dealings "Ti th recalcitrant 
sindicatos, and their task viaS eased in the aftermath of the communist 
uprisings of November 1935, when the courts upheld the legality of 
these and other forms of intervention in sindicatos against appeals 
40 based on the constitutional provision for complete autonomy. Early 
in the follO\ving year, the then Minister of Labour, Agamemnon Magalhaes, 
made a revealing speech to Congress in which he defended himself against 
accusations of being sympathetic to communism by cataloguing the ways 
in which he had manipulated and intervened in the syndical movement 
in order to combat communist infiltration. He concluded: 
"In Brazil, the revolution [of 1930] found the ",orking 
masses scattered [ ••• ] and, instead of allmving them to 
organise themselves autonomously, in conflict with the State, 
itlearnt from the experience of other peoples and organ-
ised the sindic~l0s, transforming them into organs of the 
State itself" o 
Furthermore, the National Security Lavl of 1935 allovled employers 
to dismiss workers accused of being communists without notice or com-
42 pensation, and the savage police repression vlhich follO\ved the uprisings 
effectively broke the remains of the independent working class move-
ment. The Estado Novo was then installed without opposition and 
Oliveira Viana had a clear ground on vlhich to establish the definitive 
structure of Brazilian industrial relations uith his Labour Justice 
law and the reform of the syndical legislation. 
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Chapter 8. OLIVEIRA VIANA v. ROBERTO SIl'10NSEN: THE REFORM 
OF THE SYNDICAL LEGISLATION. 
The Provisional Government had instituted permanent councils to 
conciliate and judge in individual disputes ( Juntas de Concilia~a'o e 
Julgamento ) and joint commissions to conciliate in collective disputes 
. 
(Comissoes 11istas de Concilia.s:ao): both "rere formed on a "pari tarian" 
basis , i . e . they had an equal number of representatives of employers 
and workers, presided over by a government nominee . The government 
had also instituted collective labour conventions to establish minimum 
standards for \vorking conditions in a given occupation in a certain 
area : these were to be agreed upon and signed , in the first instance, 
by employers and Horkers or their respective sindicatos , but if three-
quarters of the employers and \'lOrkers in a particul ar occupation in 
a given area had signed a convention , the JvI .T.I.C. could extend it to 
cover all other members of that occupation in the same area. 1 
The labou.r tribunals ,'rere not very successful because their decisions 
had to be executed by the ord inary justice, \'Thich led to interminable 
delays , and the arbitration in collective disputes was optional and , 
2 
therefore , \'Tas usually ignored . The major st ikes of the period "rere 
settled by the JvIinistry of Labour , the police ( sometimes violently 
and sometimes by negotiation) and even , on occasion, by the personal 
intervention of Getulio Vargas himself .3 Consequently , the tenentistas , 
the employees ' representatives and others \'Trote into the Constitution 
of 1934 a provisi.on establishing a permanent, autonomous labour justice 
to settle disputes. 4 
Oliveira Viana, in consultation \vith other sections of the lI1. T.I.C ., 
dre", up hro draft lal·rs to give legal form to the Labour Justice . The 
first "ras ready in late 1935 but it \Vas held back for over a year by 
5 
Vargas before being sent to Congress in 1937. The second , which 
replaced the earlier one, Has drm-m up after the cou9 of November 1937 
6 
and formed the basis for the final decree . 
Both projects had a number of features in common: they establis-
hed a mechanism for settling both individual and collective disputes; 
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they created a hierarchical structure Hith courts at the local, regional 
and national level; all the courts vTere to have a "pari tarian" compo-
si tion 'vi th an equal number of representatives of employers and 
employees and a government-appointed president; the mechanism was 
designed to obtain rapid decisions, with the same judge throughout, 
oral procedure , immediate proof and a restricted right of appeal ; 
finally , the Labour Justice ,vas to execute its mm decisions . 
The most "political" aspect of the projects \'Tas the question of 
collective disputes: governmental interference in collective bar-
gaining was the price the vTorkers had to pay for an efficient means 
of settling individual disputes . The Constitution of 1934 did not 
specifically permit or deny the right to strike but Oliveira Viana ' s 
first bill virtually outlm'Ted strikes in a large section of the 
economy by providing for compulsory conciliation and compulsory 
arbitration for stoppages in public service industries and those of ~ 
public utility. In all collective disputes , either side could request 
conciliation but in the case of stoppages in the public service indus-
tries , the Labour Justice Has empovTered to start conci,liation on its 
mm initiative; if conciliation failed , the case ,.,rent to compulsory 
arbitration. The bill established penalties for both sides for 
suspending ,vork without prior conciliation and for refusing to obey 
the decisions of the courts: these penalties Here increased for ring-
leaders and vocational associations , and doubled in cases concerning 
publ ic services . 7 
The Constitution of 1937 prohibited strikes and lock- outs , and 
so the Labour Justice became , in effect , the only means of resolving 
. 8 
collective dlsput es . The second project allovred i t to start concili-
atic:n in all cases of suspension of ,,,ork and , again , established 
penal ties for employers and vlOrkers vrho ignored the procedures for 
settling grievances . 9 
The main controversy , hm-rever , arose over the scope of the labour 
courts ' func t ions . It seem~ from some papers in the Oliveira Viana 
archive , that some sections of the M.T . I . C. Hanted the Labour Justice 
to be empovrered to dra'" up minimum vrage scales for the various occu-
10 
pations o Oliveira Viana observed that this ,-TaS beyond the scope of 
11 
a court of justice, \'Thich could only decide in the case of disputes o 
In the end , the project presented to Congress gave the Labour Justice 
the job of resolving all questions betvreen employers and employees 
and also of : a ) establishing , when judging collective disputes , the 
vrage scales and standards "'hich ,,,ere to regulate the conditions of 
vlOrk in particular occupations ; b) supervising the execution of its 
decisions and sentences and imposing sanctions on those "'ho infringed 
160 
them ; c-) interpreting the lavrs for vlhose application it \·ras respons le 
and d ) collecting the fines imposed by it , or by the administrative 
authorities , for the infraction of the social lavrs . Vhen the decision 
of a tribunal concerned the conditions of Hork , it ",as to have the 
force of a collective convention and could be extended by the supreme 
labour tribunal to other occupations in the same or in other regions 
concerned . The Labour Justice "ras also given povIer to dissolve 
12 
vocational associations in certain cases o 
When the bill reached the Chamber of Deputies , it Has the subject 
of much discussion both inside and outside Congress , and over 100 
amendments to it ivere submitted . The most important objections , hOv1-
ever , Here put fonrard by \'laldemar Ferreira , a professor of Commercial 
La,,," from Sao Paul 0 , \-1ho , as president of the congressional Commission 
on the Constitution and Justice , ,,,rote an opinion on the bill.13 
vlaldemar Ferreira thought that the Labour Justice Has unconstitutional 
because of the normative pOi"ers conferred on the labour courts . He 
161 
criticised their ability to settle collective disputes by issuing 
general norms or standards regulating the conditions of i,,"ork , especially 
vrage scales , as Hell as the pOHer to execute their decisions and to 
~ 
extend them to third parties not involved in the original diipute. 
ThiS, he contended , amounted to a delegation of the pOHers of Congress , 
"rhich Vias forbidden by the Constitution , and did not obey the principle 
of the separation of pOvlers "'hich Has inherent in the liberal repub-
lican regime. He also attacked the labour courts ' ability to extend 
their decisions to third parties because , traditionally , the decisions 
of judicial bodies applied only to the litigants . He considered the 
project fascistic. 
Oliveira Viana defended the bill, replying to these criticisms 
in a series of articles published in the Jornal do Commercio which 
14 Here an intellectual tour de force . He accused \'ialdemar Ferreira of 
interpreting the Constitution i n a narrow, old-fashioned , legalistic 
manner and urged a more "constructive" approach , using a series of 
arguments i'Thich consisted of a subtle mixture of references to foreign 
legal doctrine, actual examples of foreign and Brazilian practice , 
and appeals to a commonsense assessment of the purposes of the labour 
courts and the vTay in which they ,",ould have to Hork. 
On the one hand, he produced many examples to ShOH that institutions 
,dth normative functions existed in other cOW1tries , including liberal 
ones like the United States . He argued that in modern States, fW1c-
tional or institutional decentralisation ,·/as replacine terri to~cial 
decentralisation (federalism , etc .). The State had taken upon itself 
many ne"r f1.ffictions but the technical complexity and need for efficiency 
of these functions required that the institutions concerned should 
have administrative autonomy: they Here a form of indirect adminis -
tration by the State . Some Here purely administrative in form , Hith 
members appointed by the government , \'Thile others had a corporative 
structure , composed of representativffiof the interested parties . In 
either case , these modern administrative bodies had legislative , 
executi ve and jurisdictional povrers , i . e 0 pO\·rers to issue norms and 
regulations bindine vri thin their general areas . Besides examples 
from the United States and other cOW1tries , Viana cited instances of 
deleeated legislation in Brazil , such as the Departmento Nacional do 
Cafe , the Instituto de A~ucar and the Delegacias do Trabalho IvIarl timo . 
On the other hand , Oliveira Viana showed hmi , in reality , the 
nature of the problems to be dealt Hith by the labour courts required 
them to have the pO\ver to extend their decisions to other employers 
and vrorkers in a similar situation . Other\·rise, instead of settling 
disputes, they \'lou~d p ovoke ne,'r ones and Viana ' s objective Has , above 
all , order. He ,·ranted economic life to be regulated and disciplined, 
both in the relations of producers amongst themselves and in their 
relations ,·rith the Horking class . 
" "Ire consider this povrer [ to extend their decisions J , 
granted to the labour courts , as one of the finest and 
most efficient instruments of discipline in labour 
relations . On the one hand , the use of this pOHer is 
going greatly to reduce the number of disputes and , on 
the other , it "./ill eliminate unfair competition bet"reen 
companies in a single locality or reeion , "'hich is one 
of the main objectives of corporative organisation. 11 15 
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Oliveira Viana v!on the debate but the point vras taken and the 
second draft of the la"r \'Tas more circumspect in the pOvrers it granted 
to the Labour Justice , despite the promulgation in the meantime of 
the authoritarian Constitution of 1937. The functions specifically 
attr ibuted to it , besides settling disputes arisin~ from the relations 
bet"reen employers and employees , were: a ) to execute its decis ions , 
supervise their fulfilment and impose sanctions on those "'ho infringed 
them; b ) to interpret the Im,rs vThose application "'as incumbent on 
16 
to confirm agreements reached by private negotiation. it and c ) 
Hmrever , in the case of collective disputes aiming to secure ne,·r 
condi tions of \'lork in 1 .. Thich only a fraction of the employees of a 
company had participated , the tribunal Hhich gave the decision Has 
empmlered to extend it to another frac tion , or even all of the same 
17 
occupation or category as the dissidents . The povrer to fix ,·rage 
scales vras not explicitly stated and the provisions al loHing it to 
collect fines for infringements of the social lavrs and to dissolve 
associations Here dropped on the grounds that they Here unconstitut-
ional. Even then , the project "JaS completely r evrri tten before i t \'Tas 
18 
given the force of la", in May 19390 A number of changes ",ere made 
in matters of organisation and nomenclature but the basic structure 
and aims of the Labour Justice remained unchanged . 
Oliveira Viana vras vTell m'Tare of the political implications of 
the Labour Justice. Back in 1933 , he had applauded the povrer given 
to the Delegacias do Trabalho J!1arf timo to settle both individual and 
collective disputes and to fix the ,"ages of dock vrorkers , observing 
that: 
" the stevedores ' disputes , ",hich have so pre-occupied 
the public authorities , \'Till novr be settled by a sort 
of judicial decision , endowed vTith executive force [ • • • ] • 
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This seems to me a great conquest, because we are 
going to leave behind the period of temporisations 
and cautious compromises in which we, the Ministry 
and the Police, have lived up till nOyl, in the face 
of the formidable and arrogant pO'Vler of the Resist-
encias [ mili tant dockers' unions] , and move into 
a period of judicial s ettlements, sancl~oned by the 
authority and the force of the State". 
Referring to strikes and lock-outs in his exposition of motives for 
the second draft in 1938, Viana argued: 
"Both these expedients of the class struggle were 
severely condemned by the new Constitution - and, 
in truth, one cannot understand the recognition of 
the right to strike or of lock-out when the Consti-
tution itself provides for the solution of labour 
disputes by a special judicial system, which is easy, 
rapid, and cheap, placed at the disposal of the hlO 
groups concerned, the bosses and the employees". 20 
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The Labour Justice survived the fall of the Estado Novo and, largely 
because of its effectiveness in dealing with individual disputes, by 
1946 it was being hailed as a vlorking class conquest. However, it 
still retained its powers to intervene in collective disputes and in 
1962, an American observer noted that " the labor courts system thus largely 
takes the place of both collective contract negotiation and grievance 
procedure as practised in t he United States. [ •• • ] • It effectively 
channels most of the complaints of the workers through the government 
th th th h · d d t k · 1 . t . ,,21 ra er. an roug Ln epen en woI' Lng-c ass organLsa Lons • 
Significantly, Oliveira Viana entitled his book on the Labour 
Justice Problemas de Direito Corporativo, and so it is worth consid-
ering the nature of his concept of corporativism. One of the main 
features of corporativism was the insistence on equal representation 
of employers and workers, or capital and labour. "Paritarian" repre-
sentation was de rigueur in Brazil in the early 1930so Yet, 
although both projects maintained this form of composition of the 
labow:' courts, 01iveira Viana would have preferred a specialised 
22 magistracy of labour judges and had advocated this as early as 1932. 
Hov/ever , in the case of the first bill , the Constitution of 1934 
explicitly stipulated the "paritarian" structure , and it Has retained 
in the second one because the Constitution of 1937 did not give 
guarantees of stability to the judges of the Labour Justice , because 
of the expense involved in a specialised maeistracy and because of 
the Brazilian tradition of joint representation and the corporative 
23 
regime instituted by the Constitution of 1937. 
In fact, Olivei:ta Viana vTaS less interested in the trappines of 
corporativism than in devisine an effective instrument of State control 
and intervention . This control Has to be achieved by indirect 
intervention throueh semi-autonomous bodies endovred l,·ri th normative 
pmvers delegated by the State . The corpora tive or "paritarian" 
aspect Has secondary. As a publiCist, Oliveira Viana had stressed 
the importance of creating channels for economic and'social interests 
to convey their demands to the government but , once a public func-
tionary, he set out to achieve the opposite : orders were to be 
transmi tted dmm from the goverwllent, not up from the people . This 
chanee in direction was to be seen even more clearly in the contro-
versy "'hich surrounded his Syndical La\'/ and its implementation in 
1939-400 
The Constitution of 1937 provided for a Council of the National 
Economy, composed of representatives of the various branches of 
national production, desienated in equal numbers by the associations 
or sindicatos of employers and emlJloyees , and laid dovrn that the 
24 
economy ,·ras to be organised on corporat ive lines. The Constitution 
stipulated that the collective labour contracts concluded by the 
legally recognised associations of employers and Horkers ,-rere to be 
165 
applied to all the employers and Horkers "Thich they re:9resented ( i.e . 
25 
not just to their members) . I t also stated that occupational or 
syndical association Has free but that only the sindicato duly 
recognised by the State had the right of legal representation of those 
vrho participated in the category of production for "'hich it ,'ras 
. 
constituted. Furthermore , only a recognised sindicato could defend 
their rights before the State or other occupational associations , 
stipulate collective labour contracts "rhich Here obligatory for all 
its members , impose contributions on them and exercise delegated 
26 functions of the public pOHer in relat i on to them. 
The ne", !l1inister of Labour, Haldemar Falcao , immediately 
appointed a commiss i on of M. T. I . C. experts , headed by Oliveira Viana, 
to reform the existing legislation on sindicatos, in line Hith the 
corporative structure laid dO"ffi by the Constitution. The result \.Jas 
Decree- La"r 1402 of 5 July 1939. 'rhis retained the basic pattern 
established by the 1934 lavr , being modelled on the same fas cist 
legislation , but it restored the sindicato Unioo and re-established 
the provisions f or governmental oontrol in a more intensive form . 
These oontrols I'rere exeroised through requirements for the legal re cog-
nition of sindioatos , stipulations ooncerning their finanoial admini~ 
tration and expenditure , and intervention in their internal eleotions 
and administration; to facilitate the latter , various provisions 
required 11. T. I . C. approval of elected leaders and permitted the M. T. 1. C. 
to oust dissident leaders and to appoint delegates to preside over 
eleotions . The useful device of allOl.,ring aggrieved members to appeal 
to the N. T.I.C . against illegal aots of the leaderships or assemblies 
"ras also retained . Oliveira Viana justified these controls on the 
grounds that the sindicatos \"ere the basio elements of the future 
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corporative organisation of the State; however , he rejected the 
suggestion made in the commission that the sindicatos should be admin-
istered directly by the government through appointed presidents and 
leaders . 27 
. An innovation \Vas the distinction made betHeen vocational associ-
ations (associaQoes profissionaes) and sindicatos. The former , in 
order to acquire juridical personality , merely had to register v,ri th 
the M. T. I . C., presenting a copy of their statutes and a declaration 
of the number of their members , their assets and their organised social 
services , in return for '''hich they could make representations to the 
administrative and judicial authorities on behalf of the individual 
interests of their members . 
To obta.in recognition as sindicatos , hOvlever , which gave them 
the prerogatives of representing the general interests of their 
category , sicning collective labour contracts and receiving the proceeds 
from the syndical levy ( imposto sindical - a compulsory le~J equivalent 
to one day ' s pay per annum imposed on all employers and Horkers) , they 
had to go through a more complex procedure and submit to a greater 
degree of control by the State. Oliveira Viana adopted this device 
to give- the system greater flexibility and to comply uith the consti'!'l; 
28 
tutional precept that professional association Has free . Ho\Vever , 
his real thinking is seen in this much- quoted passage f om his exposi -
tion of motives : 
"vIi th the institution of this register , the "lhole life 
of the professional associations vTill then gravitate 
around the Hinistry of Labour: they Hill be born in it; 
they '-lill groH ,,,i th it; they will develop alongside it 
and they '''ill expire in it . It seemed to the Commission 
more reasonable , and also more convenient , that the 
professional associations should now be constituted in 
the }Tinistry vlhich has as its supreme purpose the pro-
tection of all the labour activities of the country , 
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rather than outside of it, beyond the reach of its 
assistance and tutelage" o29 
\fuatever _ they may have felt , the Horkers Here in no position to 
express any opinion on these sentiments but the employers vere some-
I·!hat uneasy . Nevertheless , in July 1939 , v·faldemar Falcao appointed 
thr e commissions under the chairmanship of Luis Augus t o de Rego 
Monteiro , the director of the National Depart ment of Labour of the 
M. T. I . C., to dravl up t he complementary lavTs needed to implement Decree-
LavT 140 2 . Olive i ra Viana v!as not involved i n t hese commissions ,.,hich 
30 \'Torked quickly and produced their sugges t ions by November 1939 . 
Euvaldo Lodi , the employers ' representat ive, dis sented from the final 
conclusions of t he commissions , \fhich Here causing grave apprehension 
in Sao Paulo, not least to h i s friend Robert o Simonsen. 
For , consciously or not , Oliveira Viana and Rego r10nteiro had , 
bet\.,reen them , devised a scheme ,-/hich demolished Simonsen ' s povrer- base 
in the Federa ao das Indus t rias do Estado de Sao Paulo . F.I. E.S.P. 
,vas not a federation of sindicatos but a civil association to vrhich 
indivi dual empJ.oyers and firms belonged directly ; since 1937 it had 
also run a parallel Federayao das Industri as Paulis t as composed of 
16.8 
sindicatos from all branches of industry , \'Thich fitted into the M. T. I.C . 's 
31 
syndical system. Simonsen managed Hith difficulty to have himself e ted 
president of F. r .E.S.p. in February 1938 and he had no int ention of 
relinquishing this hard- \'Ton position.32 NoVT , however , the H. T.I. C. ,vas 
proposi~g to forbid the re - election of the leaders of empl oyers ' assoc-
iations , to bring civil associations l i ke F. I . E.S . P. under the vring of 
the Ministry and to break up the federa t ions of employers ' sindicatos 
into small groups representing different branches of industry and trade . 
There thus began a cont roversy in vThich personal motives - namely , 
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Simonsen ' s survival - Here originally uppermost but Hhich ended by estab-
lishing important principles and precedents, defining the relations of 
the industrialists and employers to the State, the nature of State inter-
vention and the limits 0 State control • 
. The paulistas, ,.,rho had not been informed of the exact details 
of the H.T.I.C. proposals , expressed their fears to vlaldemar Falcao 
\.rhen he visited Sao Paulo at the beginning of December 1939. They 
feared that the changes in relation to the federations vrould destroy 
their vitality and pointed out that the employers ' associations , unlike 
the \'lOrkers ' , ,·rere concerned ui th economic questions as ,.,rell as purely 
occupational ones. The JI1inister asked them to send him their objec-
tions in i·rri ting and told them that he vras gettine Oliveira Vi ana to 
",rite an impartial opinion on the proposals of Rego I1onteiro ' s 
commissions ~3 Thus, Oli veira Viana came to uri te opinions both on 
Rego Monteiro ' s proposals and on the paulistas ' objections , "'hich 
eventually drevr him into a bitter dispute "i th both of them. 
The paulistas ' memorandum Has signed by Simonsen, as president 
of F.I . E.S .P. and the F.I.P., as vTell as by the presidents of the other 
main employers ' associations of Sao Paul 0 , and vras delivered to the 
!If.T.LC. -through Euvaldo Lodi, the president of the National Confed-
eration of Industry. -34 Some of the objections vrere directed against 
the main lavr, NOo1402, itself. For example , the paulistas i-ranted the 
minimum number of companies needed to form an employers ' sindicatQ 
in a given category reduced from one third t o one tenth, alleginc that 
the requirement of one third Hould make the formation of such sindicatos 
very difficult. Oliveira Viana replied that this Hould result in the 
formation of a series of insignificant little sindicatos ( sindicatozinhos ) 
and stressed the educational f,mction of the reCluirement, Hhich i'lOuld 
force the hitherto individualistic employers t o acquire the habit of 
solidarity and team spirit . 
The paulistas also requested a change in the article prohibitinc 
the re-election of the leaders of associations , suggesting that , in 
the case of employers ' (but not employees ' ) associations , only one 
third of the leadership should be rene .... Ted each time . They contended 
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that there .... lere far feHer employers than em:9loyees and that fe\{ employers 
'Vlanted to sacrifice their time and leisure to serve on associations . 
The requirement that the leadership be native-born or naturalised 
Brazilians also restricted the number of employers available , since 
so many of them .... lere foreigners . Oliveira Viana again roplied in an 
avuncular tone, vie""ling the adminis t ration of sindicatos as a practical 
school for the formation of leadership cadres for Brazil ' s economic 
groups; these cadres ""!Quld be aHare of the problems , needs and 
collective interests of their groups and \'Tould be accustomed to dealing 
vrith the State . Viana hoped to increase the number of leaders by 
prohibi ting re-election and forcing them to rotate the positions . 
Regarding civil associations like F.I. E. S .P. and the Commercial 
Associations, the paulistas cited the rights of representation and 
freedom of association assured by the Constitution and requested a 
change in the l'lording of Decree-Lm.,r 1402 to make it clear that such 
associations could continue to constitute and govern themselves according 
to the ordinary la""l ( and not the syndical 18.\'1). rrhey also \'lanted an 
assurance that such associations could admit members from any occupa-
tion or category of production and could continue to make represent-
ations to the public authorities in their mm name or that of the 
branch of production or class to "'hich their memlJers belonged o 
Oliveira Viana , in an earlier opinion , had already accepted the 
dis tinction betvTeen representation , meaning the right of makintS 
representations , and legal representation , meaning a mandate exercised 
on behalf 0 someone, "'hich \vas the preroga t i ve of legally recognised 
sindicatos . Conse uently, he reaffirmed the right of civil associa-
tions \'Ti t h a heterogeneous membership , like F. L E. S . P. and the Comm-, 
ercial Associations , to continue to make representations but he feared 
that if this "lere applied to all professional associa tions , then in 
the end only those "Thich \'!anted to become s indicatos ",ould register 
Hith the lIT . T. I . C. 
"In practice , Vlhat is go ing to happen if the amend-
ment is accepted is that only the employees ' associ-
a tions 'vill register VIi t h the MinistI"Ji the employers ' 
ones \'Till continue in their old t endency to flee from 
the control of the Hinistry or, what amounts to the 
same thine, from the control of the St ate , "Ti th t he 
right to oppose it quietly , as they have abvays done. 
Bas ically, Hhat they \'!ant is to free the employers ' 
associations from the nuisance of the Ministry of 
Labour ' s control over the organisation of t heir 
statutes". 35 
He vrent on to complain , rather naively , that : 
"They know full Hell that their associations would 
remain as free if they enrolled on t he register of the 
}1inistry as on the civil register [ ••• J but it pleases 
them to s t ay outside - as if the }1inistry were an 
enemy force from vThich it is alHays convenient to keep 
oneself at a distance" 0 36 
Ol iveira Viana vlOndered if this \vas in keeping vIi th the corporative 
organisa tion of the Constitution of 1937. 
The fourth point Has more complicated and led to' a long polemic. 
Fundamentally , it turned on the question of vrhether the regional feder-
ations of sindicatos should be organised like the local sindicatos 
(on the basis of i dentical , s imilar or connected occupations and 
activities , e . g . food processing industries , clothine i.ndustries , 
construction i nd,lstries , etc .) or like the national confederations at 
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the top of the structure (accordin~ to economic sectors , e . g . 
industry , commerce , transport , etc .). The distinction may appear 
academic but, in reality, it revealed a Hidely o.iffering concept of 
the role of the "lhole syndical structure and its relations Hi th the 
State. The question arose less from Decree-La,,, 1402 than from the 
interpretation placed on it by Rego JI1onteiro in his proposal knmm as 
the "Enquadramento Sindical Brasileiro", "lhich classified Brazil ' s 
industries and commerce into groups and categories for the purposes 
of forming sindicato~ and federations . 
In his opinion on the "Enquadramento", Oliveira Viana had con-
demned this proposal as being both contrary to the laH and out of 
touch \'li th reality .31 He maintained that Decree- Lavl 140 2 a.llm"ed people 
to form sindicatos , and sindicatos. to form federations, on the basis of 
occupations or activities which \'l8re identical , connected or similar 
( e . g . ,,,heat milling industries = identical ; food processing indus-
tries = connected or similar) . But the "Enquadramento" insisted that 
the activities be identical \'lhen forming sindicatos and connected 
,,,hen groupin~ sindicatos into federations. There Has no justification 
in the laH for this; it Has the result of copying Italian corporative 
leg islati<?n and following ptU'ely technical criteria, vii thout taking 
social facts or Brazilian reality into account o It Has particularly 
reprehensible because it subdivided the employers ' sindicatos ,,,hile 
concentrating the Horkers ' , vThich 'Ilould prevent the bosses organiSing 
to face the powerful Horkers ' organisations . " On this point , the 
Commission '''ent against the dominant principle of any corporative 
org::misation in Hhich companies are the centre of the syndical system -
38 
and not the mass of vlOrkers ". 
The paulistas condemned these aspects too and also criticised 
a 
112 
Q 
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the innovations introduced by Rego r·lonteiro I s proposals, such as the 
requirement that, Hhen adaptinG themselves to the ne", la"" the existing 
federations of sindicatos should observe the groups of activities or 
occupations set out by the classification (i.e. limit themselves to 
con~ected activities , e . g . food processing industries ). Another inno-
vation Has the conversion of an exceptional prerogative, granted to 
the President of the Republic in Decree-Lm'l 1402, into a general rule, 
by giving the government the right to organise fed erations vd.th partic-
ular occupations or groups of occupations, as "Iell as to stipulate the 
conditions under Hhich they should organise and administer themselves. 
Basically, the paulistas "'anted to retain the regional federations 
representing all branches of industry, arguing that Brazil "Ias com-
posed of a number of economic regions, roughly corresponding to the 
states, Hi th their mm problems and interests, ;'Thich affected all 
categories of employers. For example, in each state there Has a local 
administration and a federal tax collector "Ti th vThich they all had 
to deal. Consequently , they Hanted a federation in each s t ate Vlhich 
HOl.ud correspond to each of the confederations in the Capital. 
To this, Oliveira Viana retorted that a federation containing 
the former liberal regime , but that it "Tas not possible under the 
corporative regime , "'hich granted professional associations public 
functions, such as signinG collective conventions vThich covered the 
,·,hole category, and made them the basis of the corporative organisation 
of production. There had to be a positive bond of interests bet"Teen 
their members (on the basis of identical, similar or connected 
occupations or ac tivities). Thus associations of a heterogeneous 
type Here impossible. 
The paulistas also suggested some changes in the classification 
of various industries and on one thing they and Oliveira Viana ,-rere 
agreed : most of Rego Nonteiro ' s proposals had been carelessly written 
and needed redrafting . 
rr1he argument continued. in pri va te betHeen the N. T. 1. C., on the 
one hand , and F.I . E. S. P. and the C. N.I., on the other , throughout the 
early part of 1940. Then , for some reason , Oliveira Viana chose to 
Hri t e an article in the J ornal do Commercio in Hay 1940 , i n \'Thich he 
outlined the paulistas ' main objections to the proposed syndical system 
and repeat ed his arguments against them. In this article , he suggested 
that civil associations of the F.I.E . S. P. type could be incorporated 
into Brazil ' s corporative structure by recognising them as consulta-
tive organs; h01vever , they could not be recognised as sindicatos as 
this 1l0uld destroy the syndical structure . 39 
Angered at this breach 0 con idence , Euvaldo Lodi replied , 
accusing Oliveira Vi ana of being unrealistic and a proponent of State 
control . He said that under the H. T. I.C . ' s proposals , 1"hich provided 
for 14 federations of industries in each state , the C. N. I . would be 
composed of 294 federations instead of the 5 existing at the moment 
and the present maximum possible of 21 . The federations ",ould not 
be able to deal v1i th economic matters , vrhich Here the - esponsibili ty 
of the confederation, but only \'Tith occupational matters , so they 
Hould be pointless . He also noted that the sindicatos , and not the 
federations l \-lere responsible for signing collective conventions . 40 
\'Iith this final point , Lodi had fOlUld Oliveira Viana ' s Achilles ' 
heel , for in his legal opinion and his first article, he had used 
the terms sindicato and federation indiscriminately. He nm'l replied , 
attacking Lodi personally and tying to prove that federations could 
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sign collective contracts , but his argument depended upon a strained 
interpretation of the Constitution. 
Euvaldo Lodi then returned to the attack , claiming that no em-
ployers ' fede ation had ever signed a collective contract , although 
they' had been consulted by sindicatos on them, and shO\<Ting , vrith 
various quotations, that Oliveira Viana ' s arguments had no basis in 
the Constitution. On a practical level , he observed that for the 
solution of their problems, there Has a greater affinity bet"Vreen 
different activities ,vi thin the same economic region than betHeen 
identical activities in different economic regions . Regiona1 feder-
ations were needed to deal Hith local economic problems , negotiate 
,vi th the local governmental authorities and settle disputes behreen 
the sindicato~ . Then , in the unkindest cut of all , he concluded: 
"It is my turn to tell Sr . Oliveira Viana that , des -
pi te his claim to a deep knmrledge of the popula-
tions of Brazil , the Brazilian people and its compo-
sition , in truth he only knOHS all this in theory , 
throueh books, but not from his mm experience , 
throueh direct examination . Of commerce, industry , 
farming , transport , raw material s , he knmrs "'hat he 
has read or Hritten but he has never seen or felt 
the reality". 41 
Oliveira Viana ' s discomfiture ,vas complete . He replied vIi tll some 
comments on the role of the confederations but , in fact , he had lost ~ 
the argument , both on juridical and pragmatic grounds . The i ony 
of the situation lay in the fact that , as a publicist in the 1920s , 
he had condemned the supine attitude of Brazil ' s productive classes 
tovrards the 130vernment and had urged them to form strong , independent 
6r;3anisations to force their vieHs on the public authorities ~2 Hmv 
the industrialists did just that and in the process they publicly 
and ostentatiously hoist Oliveira Viana with his 01,0111 petard ! 
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The paulistas Gained all their mHin points. A series of decrees 
issued in June and July 1940 permitted the re- election of tvTO thirds 
of the leaders of employers ' associations and gave the President of 
the Republic the pow-er both to recognise unregistered civil associa-
tions as technical and consultative bodies and to authorise the 
- t - f f d t - 0 f - f - d - t 43 recognl lon 0 e era lons composea. 0 varlOUS groups 0 Sln lca os . 
Only in the case of the requirements for the foundation of sindicatos 
",ere their demands not satisfied : the minimum number of companies 
remained one third , not one tenth , as they had requested . A year 
later , in J uly 1941 , F . LE. S.P. "Tas granted recognition as a technical 
and consultativ e body Hhich 'ww_d collaborate "Tith the State .44 
Oliveira Viana ' s polemic Hi th Rego Nontei:co "Tas of much lesser 
moment , thOUGh more acrimonious . In late 1940 , he published an article 
i n "'hich he repeated the criticisms of Rego Nonteiro ' s "Enquad 8.mento 
Sindical" "'hich he had made in his earlier opinion and claimed res:90ns-
ibili ty for the text of Decree-Lmr 2381 , ' -Thich laid down hOH the clo.ss-
ification of activities 'vas to be used in practice ~5 The main point 
of this vTaS that both sindicatos and federations C01)~d constitute them-
selves on the basis of either identical or similar and connected 
activities. 
Rego Nonteiro replied saying that he had not made such Cl clear-
cut distinction bet'-Teen identical and similar or connected acti v i tics 
as Oliveira Viana made out , and claimed that the class-ification of 
activi ties had been mainl y dra,m up in response to the requests of 
the respective sindicatos themselves ~6 The polemic dragged on throueh 
the early part of 1941 , becominc; increasingly esoteric and personal , as 
each claimed responsibility for Decree- LavT 2381. By t his time , Oliveira 
Viana had r e signed from the N. T. 1. C. III and increasingly disillusioned 
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Hith development s in the Fi. T. I.C ., he had become aut ocratic and 
cantankerous , as can be seen in this excerpt from the polemic : 
"The s t a t ement that I \-Tas ordered to co- ordinate "ri th 
Sr . Rego T10nteiro is also false , completely false . I 
appeal to the judement of reasonable and sensible men : 
is it possible to admit that I , an old expert on' the 
social and juridical problems of my country , 'vi th a 
tradition of specialised studies on the subject , set 
out in ,.,orks in circulation , \'li th an intellectual 
aut ho i ty '''hich "Tent far beyond t he . cope of the Nin-
istry , placed in the hiehest position in the hierarchy 
of its jurists , since I Vlas its general consultant 
and treat ed the Ninis t er himself Hith superiority , 
[- is it possible ] that I could subject myself to 
the guidance or admit the doctrinal ascendancy of a 
rhetorical and pompous ImT graduate , such as Sr . Rego 
lVIonteiro is , Hithout qualifications or any noticeable 
traditions of culture "'hich could assure him any 
shadow of intellectual authority over anyone at all, 
and least of all over me?" 47 
The prolonged debate over the syndical legislation mirrored the 
situation in r.lussolini ' s Italy. Not only \'Tas Oliveira Viana ' s la'" 
inspired by fascist models but the response of the Brazilian indus-
trialists parallelled the resistance raised by their Italian counter-
part s to similar proposals there . In a recent detailed study of the 
activities of Confindustria during the fascist regime , Roland Sarti 
points out : 
"The Italian industrialists pursued a clear and simple 
goal with tenacity and determination . [ • • • ] They 
concentrated on retaining maximum independence in the 
management of their enterprises and trade associ-
ations . rrhey held that these establishments \"ere 
the source of their economic pmTer I'Ihich no govern-
ment could ignore , and that manaeerial independence 
and organisational autonomy ,·,ere closely related". 48 
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Exactly the same struggle went on in Brazil on a smaller scale . HOI"ever, 
Vargas1s authoritarian Estado Novo did not have the totalitarian aspir-
ations of fascism and once a satisfactory compromise had been reached, 
it became increasingly amenable to the interests of the industrialists. 49 
... 
Two further examples will serve to show this process in action: the 
implementation of the minimum wage and the creation of the SENAI 
industrial training scheme o 
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Chapter 9. THE MINIMIIT1 WAGE. 
The idea of the government legally fixinl.3 the minimum level of 
wages had been aired as early as Sept ember 1931 '-Then Lindolfo Collor 
sent a draft la.T to this effect to Gethlio Vargas ; Collor sa", the 
mini um wage as a measure of social justice , protecting the rights 
of the ''fOrkers , as ".Tell as a means of eliminating the differences in 
1 
the cost of production between the different regions . Ho\·Tever , 
nothing came of this proposal and it ".Tas quietly shelved by Collor ' s 
successor , Salgado Filho , \'lho concentrated instead on Horking con-
ditions and pension funds . 
The minimmn ,.,age re-emerged as a subject of debate in the 
Consti tuent Assembly of 1933- 34 "Then the employers ' representatives 
tried to replace the Itamarati project ' s provision for " a minimum ",age 
capable of satisfying the normal necessities of life of a ".Torker ",ho 
is head of a family" by one for a ,-rage .rhich satisfied the minimum 
subsistence needs of an adult employee .2 The employees ' representa-
tiv es resisted this attack and the Constitution of July 1934 event-
ually guaranteed a "mi nimum . raee , capable of satisfying the normal 
needs of a , .. rorker , according to the condit ions of each region"! The 
acrimonious debates shm-red that the ".rorkers ' representatives vie,-red 
the minimum ,-rage as a protection for the \'lorking class "'hile the 
employers ' representatives ,-rere concerned to keep production costs 
dmrn . N evertheles s , there Here a l ready experts in the ]\1. T. 1. C. at 
this time ".lho sa".T an adequate ",ages policy as a means of stimulating 
the wage-earner ' s capacity to '-lork , increasing !)roduction and 
reducing costs . 4 
Thanks largely to the efforts of the carioca deputy , Ruy Santiago , 
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Congress passed a ImT providinG for the establishment of a minimum 
Hage . Santiago ' s aims ',Tere primarily to help the Horkers , in part 
by preventing the abuses resulting from the implementation of the 8 
hour day , "Thich had provoked some employers into decreasine; ''!ages in 
5 
proport ion to the reduction in vTorking hours . This laH , No . 185 of 
14 January 1936 , Has one of the fe,.". examples of social legislation 
passed by the Congress and thoueh not implemented during the demo -
cratic interlude , it formed the basis for the establishment of the 
minimum vTage under the Es tado Novo . 
6 
La", 185 instituted the minimum vTage, definine it as " the 
minimum remuneration due to an adult \'Iorker for a normal day ' s "Tork" 
and establishing that it could be reduced to a half for apprentices 
and increased by the same proportion for Horkers occupied in unhealthy 
jobs . The minimum vrage "Tas to be fixed for each region of the country 
by permanent commissions formed of 5 to 11 members , vIi th equal numbers 
of employers ' and Horkers ' representatives elected by their sindicatos 
and associations , and a chairman appointed by the President of the 
Republic . 'I1"Tenty- t,'lO commissions \'Tere to be set up , one in each of 
the state capitals and in the Federal Dist ict, and the reGions thus 
demarcated cou~d be divided into zones , each "'i th its mm commission; 
sub- commissions could be created to cater for local variations in the 
economy. 
The ~1 . T.I.C . Has to carry out a detailed investigation of l ocal 
economic conditions , including the real level of \'laGes , before each 
cOTlunission fixed the minimUJ:l "Tage for its region or zone; a period 
of grace was alloHed for interested parties to make representations , 
after "Thich the President of the Republic vTas to issue a decree laying 
dOvffi the minimum YTage in each region or zone . Ti'lis minimum "'aGe 'ofOuld 
then remain in effect for three years , althoU{jh in exceptional 
c ircumstances it could be al tered vIi thin that time by a vote of 
three- quarters of the commission. Any contract stipulat i ng a remun-
eration belovl the minimum Hage established \'las nul and void and a 
wor~er could claim the di fference from his employer . 
Vareas did not hurry to implement the ne1,,/ la\'! until after the 
installation of the Estado l'T6vo vlhen , in an attempt to curry favour 
for the nevr regime among the Horkinc class , he siGned a decree-la\'! 
setting up the apparatus of the minimum Hage , just in time to be 
announced at the first of the Estado l'T Clvo ' s notorious Hay Day rallies 
in 1938 .1 Hm-/ever , GetUlio HHS at pains to insist that his motives 
vlere not purely demagogic and he demonstrated the government ' s 
increasing awareness of the need to expand Brazil ' s home m rket \'/hen 
he spoke about the minimum Hage in a press interview in April 1938: 
"Besides bringing real benefits to the proletariat by raisine their 
material and moral level of life , this initiative \lil l produce 
advantageous effects for the general economy [ \'lhich J \'/ill be 
invigorated Hith the increase in purchasing povrer of a substantial 
mass [ •• J of Horkers r. .. 1 in the great urban centres and in 
8 
the nuclei of rural production". 
The decree- lml of April 1938 elaborated upon the law of January 
1936 and set in motion the machinery nec~ssary for its imPlement ation .9 
The minimum \·Tage Has defined as " the minimum remuneration due to 
every adult worker , Hithout distinction of sex , for a normal day ' s 
\York , and capable of satisfying , in a determinate period and region 
of the cotmtry , his normal needs for food , housing , clothinG , hygiene 
and transport", and vIas to be calculated on the basis of his daily 
expendi ture on these five items . The decree- lmT a 10\<led part 0 the 
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minimum vrage to be paid in kind but at leas t 3CJl~ had to be paid in 
10 
cash. Special arrangements vlere made for piece \>Torkers and those \'lho 
\'lorked at home so that they could be covered by the la\'! and the pro-
visions of law lS5 in relation to apprentices and \'lOrkers in unl1eal thy 
11 
occupations v[ere maint ained . The investigations leading up to the 
fixing of the minimum vTage v[ere to be carried out by the cOlllmiss ions 
in accordance \>Tith ~ e t echnical inst~lctions laid down by the Depart-
mento de Estat{stica e Publicidade of the lvI .T.I.C., but the final 
decision \'Tas to be made by the commissions, \.,ri th right of appeal to 
the Regional Labour Tribunal. 
Various pioneer studies of vlOrking class living conditions had 
been carried out in the mid-1930s but, vrith the survey carried out 
for the minimum vrage l a\'1 , a clear picture emerged for the first time 
of the incomes and expendituIe of the poorest classes in Brazil . The 
survey covered \.,rorkers earning up to 400,iOOO per month and the result 
revealed that, in the Federal District , the average wage in this 
group vTas 202,i500, the median \.,rage \'las l50,iOOO and the modal \'rage vTaS 
l50-200,iOOO. I n Sao Paul 0 , the average vTage \.,ras 220~600 i n the Capital 
and l70~lOO in t he Interior, the median vage \.,ras 20l,i200 and l5l,i700 
respectiv:ely, and the modal \'Tage l50-200~OOO and lOO-150,iOOO. In a 
poor Northeastern stat~ like Alag~as, on the other hand, the figures 
for the average ",age vTere 116~900 and S6~300, for the median vrage 
lOO~SOO and 52,iSOO, and for the modal vrage 50-l00~OOO in both Hacei6 
12 
and the Interior. 
Once the s t atistics on the lm'lest existing \'Tages had been coll-
ected and analysed, t he individual commissions began to formulate 
the legal minimum wage levels for their respective regions . Generally, 
t his process began with proposals made by the employers I and vTorkers I 
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representatives. In Pernambuco, both sides aereed a t the outset on 
the figures of l50iooo per month for the state Capital and looiooo 
for the Interior and these were maintained throughout , but in most 
cases, the levels proposed by the \'lorkers ' representatives vrere sub-
stantially higher than those recommended by the employers ' represent-
atives. The extreme case VIas Par~ ';There the \wrkers "ranted 304i079 
for the Capital and 200iooo for the Interior ,,,hile the employers 
countered \·ri th 135iooo and looiooo respectively, thus thrm"ine the 
onus of decision on the government-appointed pres ident of the com-
mission, which ended by recommending 150iooo and losiooo respectively. 
In Sa o Paul 0 , the figures proposed by the ,·rorkers ' representatives 
were 240iooo for the Capital and 200,1000 for the Interior , to Vlhich 
the employers replied \'/i th 160,1000 and 100,1000; af ter a further rOlmd 
of proposals, the president of the commission finally decided on the 
figures of 220,1000 for the Capital and 200iooo, lsoiooo and 160iooo 
for different B.reas in the Interior. The president of the commission 
in the urbanised Federal District, faced vfith counter proposals of 
360iooo and 200iooO from the workers ' and employers ' representatives, 
13 
came dovm on the side of the latter at 240iooo. 
'l'he divergencies thus revealed demonstrated the bankruptcy of 
the " pari tarian" principle in practice :-4 Another problem which soon 
emerged \'las caused by the fact that the commissions \'lere vforking in 
isolation and ended up by proposing vridely di vergine figures: the 
minim1.Un \{age proposed for Hanaus , in Amazonas, 270iooo, vIas hieher 
that that in the Federal District. The Ninister of Labour , Vlaldemar 
Falcao, therefore decided that the final decision must lie vii th the 
~1.T.I.C. and so Costa rhranda , the head of the newly-renamed Servi<?o 
de Estat I stica da Previdgncia e Trabalho devised a formQla, based on 
183 
state Real wages 1938/39 M\V set MW MW AWl T.\r~'J+ MW AWI MW+ ANI MW + 
Aver- rv'l edis.n Modal by Corns. V/40 1/43 V/43 AWl X/43 X/43 AWl 11/44 ANI Ui ("";) 
ALAGOAS .§:.ge {135 I I ,..,... >-'-< 
Capital 116.9 100.8 50-100 100 125 156.25 33.75 190 210 60 270 l:J ~ •• ...1 
Interior 86.3 52.8 50-100 90 i 90 117 33 150 170 40 210 ;l> s 
I H 
AMA:60NAS 
-
\ 160 
0 
Ca pital 192.2 152.9 '150":'200 270 200 20 220 260 40 300 1-3 
Interior 127.7 103.3 100-150 210 ! 120 156 24 180 210 20 230 ~ 
i tt'! 
BAHIA ~ 
: 150 
trj 
Capital 167.8 103. 8 100-150 190 187.5 22.5 210 240 90 330 60 300 C/2 
Interior 1) 114. 8 105.0 100-150 140 ; 120 156 24 180 210 50 260 30 240 p:; 
2) 110 i 110 143 27 170 1195 55 250 35 230 0 :f: 
3) 90 90 117 33 40 210 !(40)(210) H 150 1170 ~ 
I Q 
FEDE...RAL i 
310 I 380 I DI STRICT 202.5 150.0 150-200 240 240 300 10 30 410 I 1-3 I ::r:: 
l\HNAS GERAIS 
230 I 270 350 I 
GJ 
Capital 181.8 151.9 150-200 170 170 212.5 17.5 80 \:=j 
260 I <: Interior 135.6 102.1 50-100 112. 5 ~ 120 156 24 180 i 210 50 0 [-! 
I Cl 
PEHNAl\mUCO I i 
330 1 60 
1-3 
Capital 144.8 103.0 100-150 150 . 150 187.5 22.5 210 I 240 90 300 H 0 
Interior 1) 112.2 54.7 50-100 100 , 100 130 30 160 i 180 70 250 go 270 ~ 
2) I 40 220 0 
3 ) I 20 200 I-;:J 
{200 1-3 HIO DE JAN .fn l{ O I I ~ 
Ca pital 206.1 154.7 150-200 150 ; 200 \ 250 10 260 I 320 50 370 I t'j 
Interior 1) 151.3 103.7 50-100 100 . 150 195 15 210 245 45 290 ~ 
2) 100 1130 30 160 180 40 220 H :z 
I 
H 
HIO GHANDE DO SUL 
t:=.I 
I""::=' 
Cl 
Capital 212. 8 201.7 150-200 200 200 1250 10 260 320 50 370 I is 
Interior 186.9 152.5 150-200 160 160 1208 12 220 260 40 300 I ~--::: ~ 
SAO PAULO Q t;rj 
Ca.pi tal 220.6 201.2 150-200 220 220 275 10 285 360 30 390 
Interior 1) 170.1 151.7~ 100-150 200 200 260 5 265 320 50 370 30 350 t-l t;rj 
2) 180 170 221 9 230 275 35 310 <: 
160 ! 150 : 195 15 210 I 245 15 . 260 t;rj 3) r (JJ 
Key: ItiI'N = lVl inimum Wage; AWl = Additional Wage for Industry. For sources, 
see footnotes to the text. Note: fig~es represent mi1reis and cruzeiros. 
the financial, economic and demogL'aphic statis t ics of each region and 
the \o./age levels ascert ained in t he initial investie;ation, "lhich pro-
15 
duced a more uniform resul to Thus , in effect, it \o./as the government 
vlhich fixed the minimum \o./age levels, despite the " pari tarian" t rappinc;s . 
Nevertheless , the minimum \o./age la\'! represented a marked technical 
advance on earlier social leg i slation because of the thorough statis-
tical su:rvey which preceded it and t he relativel y methodical Hay in 
Hhich it Has dravTn up . 
The lavl instituting the minimum Hage was finally signed wi th a 
flou.L'ish at the Hay Day rally in 1940 and came into effect tHO months 
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later. The monthly minimum Hage \'!as fixed at 240,,000 for the Federal 
District , 220~000 for the Capital of Sao Paulo and 200~000, 170~000 
and 150~000 for various localities in the Interior , 200~000 _ or Rio 
de Jane.iro ( Interior : 150~000 and 100~000) , 200~000 for Rio Grande 
do Sul (Interior : 160~000) and 170~000 for the main cities in Minas 
Gerais (Interior: l20~000) . The figures for the Northeast Here Im'ler , 
Hith Bahia at 150~000 (Interior : l20~000 , 1l0~000 and 90~000), and 
Pernambuco at 150~000 (Interior: 100~000), and the 10\'!est levels \'lere 
in :t-lar anha o and Pi-aul, v!i th l20~000 for the Capital and 90~000 for 
the Interior . 
The minimum \.,rage law had been one of the main demands of the 
Horkers ' r epresentatives in the Constituent Assembly and Varc;as pre-
sented it as a triumph of labour aspirations yet , pa;radoxically , the 
his tory of its development durinc; the Estado Novo sheds more light 
on the role of the industrialists and their relationship with the 
government . Right from the beginning , the government emphasised the 
conse:rvative nature of the new laH , stressing the prudence of adopting 
the minimum , rather than t he v ocational or family \'rage , lllhils t Vargas, 
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Falcao and Costa Miranda all held out the inducement to the employers 
that such a measure Hould increase the purchasing pOvrer of the masses 
17 
and so stimulate business. This line of reasoning appealed to the 
employers, particularly those in the textile industry , \'1hich vras 
experiencing a crisis at the time the minimum wage Has under discussion . 
In a memorandum Hhich they sent throueh Simonsen to the s tate inter-
ventor in Sao Paulo, they pressed for measures to increase purchasing 
pmver as the bes t "ray of solving the cris is, although they v/e:r:'e more 
concerned to raise the income of agricultural employers than the "rages 
18 
of their own vlOrkers . H01-TeVer, one of their number , O.Pupo Nogueira , 
\'/ho he.d served on the Sao Pau10 minimum ,·rage commission and had, in 
earlier years , been an outspoken critic of Yargas ' s social leg islation, 
strongly endorsed the theory that the minimum vrage vrould raise the 
purchasing po"rer of the worker and pointed out that , paradoxically , 
fl the first beneficiary of the lmr \-Till be Capital , Hi t h Labour in 
19 
second placefl. 
Nevertheless , the employers \oJere by no means unanimous or "lhole-
hearted in their support for the 1a\'1. At El. meeting in the Uniao dos 
Sindicatos Patronais , one asked that the project be put into suspense 
because of the situation created by the ''lar in Europe , and in June 
1940, literally days before the la\·r was due to go into effect , the 
Confedera<tao Nacional da Indt{s tria , shm·ling a considerable lack of 
pol · tjcal sensitivity , requested that the law be impJemented gradually 
20 
over the follo\'ling six months. Falcao not unnaturally refused . 
The real key to the industrialists ' atti tude towards the minimum 
\oJage lies, hm-lever , in the levels at which it 'das set, both absolutely 
and in relation to regional differences . Simonsen sa\·r the real impli-
cations, as far as the paulista industrialists "rere concerned, in a 
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speech in Sept ember 1940 ,·!hen he pointed out that most '>'rell- equipped 
industries 'Ilere already payine "/ages abov e the recently- fixed minimum , 
whilst the really 10yl v/ages were pai d in the zones with abundant un-
skilled manpower and excessively 10'" productivi tYi in these zones , 
the decreeing of the minimum wage '>[Quld a110"T only those manufacturing 
activities "'hich did not depend on the exploitation of human misery 
to survive.21 Thus , in effect , Simonsen Has saying that the mi nimum 
"/age would eliminate competition from industries in areas of Brazil 
,,,i th cheap labour , a reason which had also been put fOl.""ard in the 
original pro j ect of 1931. This acc01.mts for the importance "Thich the 
industrialists attached to the relative level at "Thich the various 
regional minimum "rages "Tere set . In this vlaY , social welfare became 
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a means of achieving the corporativist objective of eliminating "unfair" 
competition . 
The subsequent history of the minimum vlage and related social 
legislation shoHS the degree to Hhich the Estado N8vo '-'ras responsive 
t o the interests of the industrialists. The government was the 
innovator and was clearly in charge: it brooked no opposition to the 
broad lines of it~ policy but , in matters of practical detail , it Has 
more than ready to accommodate itself to sectional interests. Thus 
the industrialists , led by Simonsen , carved out for themselves a 
comfortable niche Hithin the ove.all structure of the neH State o In 
the course of this process , the interests of the "rorkers "Tere freely 
manipulated and they had to content themselves with increasingly empty 
trabalhis t a (labour) rhetoric . 
The industrialists I manoeuvres began even before the ne.·, la1v "Tas 
decreed . \'[hen "'aldemar Falcao visited F. LE.S . P. in December 1939 t their 
spokesman , r.10rvan Dias de Figueiredo , accepted the minimum Hage lavr 
in principle , admitting that they vrere not harmed by it since ,-rages 
22 
in Sao Paulo vrere normally higher than those fixed by the laVl. HO\v-
ever , he objected to the provision of equal pay for men and ,-romen, 
suggested that minors should be paid a proportion of the minimum \'Taee 
rising progressively from 40% at age 14 to 80% by the age of 20 and 
i-rorried that handicapped '-lOrkers would be dismissed if they had to 
be paid the full minimum vrage . In reply , Waldemar Falcao confirmed 
that " the minimum ,,,ages established vrere al1vays 10Vler than those 
commonly paid" but he declined to conunit himself on the other points. 
Hmrever, during the next six months , Simonsen and F.I. E. S.P. 
Here engaged in protracted negotiations vrith the H.T.I.O . over the 
implementation of Oliveira Viana ' s syndicaJ lavr and , shortly after 
Simonsen had obtained sati.sfaction on that account , Falcao shovred 
that he had also changed his mind on the question of the minimum \'Tage 
18\-r 0 A decree-lavT issued at the end of Augus t 1940 alloVled employers 
to reduce the wages of workers aged 18 to 21 by 15% provided that 
they vrere given vocational training in exchange; employers ,-rere also 
permi tted to reduce the i·rages of their iwmen vTorkers by 10"fo if their 
establishments observed the hygienic conditions stipulated by the la\'l 
on female labour. 23 
This change ,vas too much or Oliveira Viana, already smartine 
from his defeat ove the syndical lavl. In his archive, there is a 
fragmentary and badly typed' memorandum in vrhich he rails against the 
nei-l decree , calline it " the most authentic piece of juridical roguery 
vThich this i'finistry has given bLrth to in its 10 years of existence" 0 
He vTent on: 
"This is taking up a position contrary to the "lhole 
spiri t vrhich presided over and inspires social leeis-
lation. The latter created for the bosses certain 
fundamental duties, Hhich are rooted in the human 
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conscience and, mainly , in Cluristian civilisation 
- and one of these dlties is preci.sely this: to 
ensure hygienic and healthy vrorking conditions for 
their vrorkers. This is one of the vrays in Hhich he 
respects the innate rie;hts of the HO kman as a 
human being . It "lOuld not be [ gap ] for him to 
charge for fulfilling these duties: if he ,-reIB to do 
this , it "'ould not tru.ly be even an act of gener-
osity, that is , an act of charity , but a pure deal , 
carried out Hith a merely business spirit, under 
the strict principle of do ut des . Decree 2538 
[ i. e. 2548 J [ gap ] this nevr orientation of the 
Ninistry , in vrhich the boss I s duties are trans-
formed into simple deals , in ,{hich the vlOrkers buy 
the most elementary guarantees for their persons and 
their labour: hygiene and technical trainine;" . 24 
HOHever , the " ne'-l orientation" did not change and Oliveira Viana left 
the rHnistry at the end of the year . 
Another change pr.oposed by the industrialists concerned the 
minimum "/age in Sorocaba , in the State of Sao Paulo . The 8mployers 
there vranted the tOVTl1 moved from the second to the third group and 
after a visit by Costa Niranda , the M. T.I . C. complied , thus lm.rering 
the minimum "rage 
. 25 
from 200~000 to 170~000 . 
vlhether the minimum ",age fulfilled the hopes placed in it is 
cJ.ifficul t to say bec use its implementation coincided \-ri th the be-
ginnine; of the distLU'bed conditions created by the '{ar . One indus-
trialist and government supporter thought that the sudden rise in 
26 . 
textile sales in 1941 ,vas caused by the minimum '"age but any notice-
able effects Here soon overwhelmed by the Have of wartime inflation. 
By the beginning of 1943 , the levels fixed in 1940 Here hopeJessly 
inadequate and in January 1943 the Co-ordinator of Economic HobiJis-
ation ordered the minimum ,-rage to be increased by 25% in the state 
capi tals and the Federal District , and by 3Cf;~ in other places , at 
th t · d - . f 27 e same -~me ecree~ng a pr~ce reeze . 
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Increasing the minimum ",age by percentages created greater 
differences between the various regional levels in absolute terms and 
gave the areas with a low minimum ,{age, mainly in the interior of Sao 
Paulo and the Northeast, a competitive advantage in relation to the 
28 
more advanced areas. F.I.E.SoPo therefore started a campaign to have 
the minimum wage levels readjusted but this solution v,as opposed by 
Costa Miranda on the grounds that the minimum wage was to satisfy the 
needs of the worker and had nothing to do with the law of supply and 
demand. By now, Waldemar Falcao had been replaced as Minister of 
Labour by Alexandre Marcondes Filho, who was a paulista and a personal 
friend of Simonsen. Marcondes Filho and F.I.EoS.P. got their heads 
29 
together and finally "reached a complete agreement" . The result was 
a decree-law in May 1943 instituting the Addi t ional Wage for Industry, 
a compulsory bonus to be paid by all industrial employers (and later 
30 
by transport and communications companies). In the South the figures 
were relatively low: Cr~lO in the Federal District and the Capitals 
of Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Rio Grande do Sul and with figures 
of Cr%5, 9 and 15 in the Interior of Sao Paulo o The increases in the 
Northeast ho",ever, · ",ere much larger: Cr~22.5 in Recife and 30 in the 
Interior of Pernambuco, Cr~22.5, 24, 27 and 33 in Bahia and Cr%33 075 
31 
and 33 in Alag~as and Sergipe. The additional wage, taken together 
with the new minimum wage levels, restored the differentials in 
absolute money terms existing in 1940. 
32 
The minimum wage levels \{ere increased again in November 1943. 
The Confedera9ao Nacional da IndJstria thought that the rise should 
not exceed Cr%50 and requested that direct responsibility for the 
revision of wages should be given to the employers' sindicatos. The 
M.T.I.C. decided, however, on an average increase of 60% over the 1940 
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figures which, deducting the increases given in January 1943, gave 
33 
actual rises of between Cr~50 and 85. According to a later estimate, 
the new minimum ,.,age was worth only 81% of that of 1940, because of 
inflation.34 The additional ,.,age for industry was also increased at 
the same time and here there was some blatant regional pOliticking.35For 
,.,hilst the additional '''age was increased from Cr~lO to Cr%30 in the 
Capital of Sao Paulo and from Cr~9 to Cr$35 in the third group of 
towns in the Interior, in Campinas, S.P. it was increased from Cr~5 
to Cr~50. In the industrial towns of Minas Gerais it v,ent up from 
Cr~17. 5 to Cr%80 ,.,hilst in the Northeast it reached Cr%90 in Recife 
and Cr~70 in the Interior and Cr~90, 50, 55 and 40 in the various 
localities of Bahia. 
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At the same time a "compensation wage" v,as created. This raised 
the level of wages betv,een the minimum v,age and double its value, 
thus aiming to prevent a concentration of wages around the minimum 
wage level, which vlOuld then have become the norm. 
The British Ambassador reported that "it is claimed ,,,i th some 
bitterness that the Federation of Industries in Sao Paulo were given 
a hand in the fixing of the new scales, and the Government of Pernam-
37 
buco has. submitted a strong protest". The complaints of the areas 
most severely hit had some effect and in February 1944, the additional 
wage level in Campinas was reduced from Cr~50 to 30 and in Bahia from 
Cr~90 to 60, Cr%50 to 30 and Cr~55 to 35 with the Cr~40 axea remaining 
at that figure:8 In Pernambuco, a more complicated solution was adopted: 
the additional wage in Recife was reduced from Cr~90 to 60 v,hilst the 
Interior ,,,as nov' divided into three groups: in one, the additional 
v'age v,as actually increased from Cr%70 to 90 while in the other two, 
it was reduced to Cr~40 and 20 0 This suggests that manoeuvres of a 
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nature similar to those described above '-lere going on at a local 
level. It also ShovlS the limits of Simonsen ' s influence in the 
Es t ado N8vo . 
The detailed history of the minimum wage thus illustrates the 
nat ure of social legislation under the Es t ado Novo. Vareas took over 
an old ",orking- class aspiration and incorporated it into his trabal-
hista policy to show tha t he had the best interests of the workers 
at heart : almos t al l the maj or annolmcements concerning it ,.,rere made 
at the rallies on !'1ay Day or on the 10th November , the anniversary 
of the install ation of the Estado Novo . Yet , in practice , the minimum 
vlage levels ,.,rere fixed 80 low that they did not adversely affect the 
int erests of the employers and the M. T. I.C . acquiesced in the 
industrialists ' mani pulation of the de t ailed Fl.pplication of the laH . 
This attitude \.,ras indicative of the "ne\'l orientation" of the 1'Unistry 
denolJnced by Oliveira Viana , "'hich became noticeable after the appoint-
ment of \Valdemar Falcao as Ninister . Forgetting his initial interest 
in the corporative aspects of the Constitution of 1937 , Falc~o was 
explaining by March 1940 that : "The Minis t ry of Labour , Industry and 
Commerce is not just an oreanisation to attend to the needs of labour ' s 
aspirations . [ ••• J It is , rather , an organisation \'Thich aims at th 
development and economic progress of the countI'1J in a climate of 
social harmony and balance . It enC01ITages industry , eiving it all 
necessary co- operation and support , and aims to develop internal 
trade and its expansion abroad,,?9 One of Falcao ' s objectives Has to 
improve the feedin~ of the Horkers , thus increasine; the i r productivity . 
The lavl of May 1939 \'Thich p ovided or vocational training in fact-
ories vIi th over 500 Horkers also required them to instal canteens 
for their employees .40 I'1od i i.cations to the l a'" on the minimum wage 
allowed up to 65% of it to be discounted in return for the provision 
of meals and in August 1940 , the Servi~ o de Alimentayao da Previd~ncia 
Social \'Tas created; this set up a number of \'Torkers ' res t aurants at 
41 
which Vargas took well-publicised meals . Such measures , though in-
tended indirectly to aid the industrialists , "ere also, of cOUL'Re, 
of benefit to the workers . 
A new chapt er opened \,hen lVlarcondes Filho viaS made lI1inis ter of 
Labour at the end of 1941 , an appointment which the British Ambassador 
interpreted as " probably intended as conciliatory measure tOv/ards 
'paulistas ' . C ... ] his present selection may in part be due to 
President ' s need to soft-pedal his advanced labour policy with a view 
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to increasing Brazilian productive capa.ci ty". Marcondes Filho immed-
iately point ed out in his inaugural speech that: 
" to benefit capital , it is necessary to make labour 
efficient and thi s efficiency can only be obtained by 
improving all the c onditions of the \'lOrkman. Raising 
the level of the employee is , therefore, a thoush t for 
capi taL But to benefit the \,orkman , it is essential 
that industry and commerce should prosper and this 
depends largely on capital. 'l'herefore, avoiding use-
less sacrifices of the latter is a thoueht for the 
\'lOrkman" . 43 
Under Marcondes Filho, the plethora of social lavTs \'Ias gathered to-
gether and giv en a more permanent form in t he Consolidaf ao d s Leis do 
Trabalho, ""Thich signalled to the employers that there \,ere unlikely 
to be any more major innovations in that field .44 
Brazil ' s participation in the \'Tar also provided a pretext for 
El. further tigh tening of control over the \vorking class. A decree-ImT 
of ]\1ay 1943 required all oreanisationR intending to assist 0 guide 
the proletariat during the state of \,ar to obtain prioT authorisation 
45 
from the r1 .T.I.C. and in September 1943 , further restrictions "V/ere 
placed on collective disputes : they could nO"T only be started by 
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"TOrkers ' or employers ' sindicatos after they had informed and obtained 
the approval of the Minister of Labour; in order to be able to do 
even this , the sindica tos had to count amongst their membership a t 
46 least half of the \·rorkers or employers concerned. 
The most blatant example of this process, however, \'laS the LaH 
of Industrial Mobilisa.tion , decreed in July 1944, \'/hich concerned the 
textile industry , the country ' s major manufacturing activity~7 Brazil 
Has making uniforms for its armed forces and also hoped to provide 
clothing for European refugees , but a considerable proportion of its 
production ",as being exported to other South American cOlmtri.es , giving 
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the textile manufacturers notoriously high profits . The Law of Indus-
trial Mobilisation declared that the textile industry was of national 
interest and mobilised its installations . No worker in these activ-
ities could change his job without prior authorisat ' on from the 
N. T.I.C . ",hUe a specially-created Textile Executive Commission could 
order the transference of workers from one textile facto .. y to another 
within the same city. \nth the prior authorisation of the M. T.I.e ., 
the normal working day could be fixed at 10 hours , \vi th the last b-ro 
hours being paid ai a higher rate of at least 20%, and continuous shift-
Hork and night-\"ork for women and minors a.eed over 16 Has permitted; 
the right to holidays could also be converted into an indemnity, paid 
in double , except in unhealthy activj_ ties and for "TOrkers under 18 . 
The PlObilisation was supervised by the Executive Commission , which 
"/as composed of 6 e;overnment representatj.ves and 8 employers ' rp.pre-
49 
sentati ves. Later a single workers ' representative \vas added . The 
British Ambassador commented that "for a belligerent as little affected 
by the Har as Brazil the regimentation of textile operatives introduced 
by this decree-law is fairly severe". 50 
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Such, then were the realities of the Rstado Navo ' s social 
legislation: small wonder tha.t the authorities had to lay on special 
football matches to get t he ''10 kers to attend the rallies and that 
Vargas ' s triumphal drive round the stadium vras considered " an B.ct of 
pefsonal courage and intrepidity" by his entourage . 51 
As fo the industrialists , they had the last \"lord on Getulio ' s 
" procressive" labour legislation. As is \·rell - knmrn , the Dutra Govern-
ment did not raise the minimum \vage , despite the continu ' ng rise in 
prices after the war. Less well - knmm is the fact that t he decision 
to maintain the minimum \vage at its existing , and by then derisory , 
level was made in 1947 by i'1orvan Dia.s de FiGueiredo , Simonsen ' s protege 
in F. I.E . S.P., vrho vras Ninister of Labour at the time . 52 
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Chapter 10. INDUSTRIAL TRAINING. 
The reoreanisation of Brazil ' s industrial training system and 
the creation of the SENAI apprenticeship scheme in 1942 reveal another 
aspect of the relations beti·reen the government and t he private indus-
tri~lists during the Estado Novo. SENAI represents Simonsen ' s ereatest 
practical contribution to the process of industrialisation and the 
discussions surrounding its creation ShOH both his virtues and his 
shortcomings in this area. For it is clear that al though Simonsen 
thought that vocational education was a good thing, in practice he 
failed to press actively for the training of Brazilian Horkers, pre-
ferring, like other industrialists , to encourage the immigration of 
skilled foreign labour. Only when events shov18d that Vargas and the 
1 
experts of the I1inistry of Education (11oE. S.) Here determined to force 
the industrial ists to contribute to the training of native-born vlOrkers , 
and iifar-time conditions made such training an urgent necessity, did 
he come round to actively supportine it . HOiifever, once the decision 
had been taken, he set out ",ith great energy to create the most 
efficient organisation possible and to ensure that it Has controlled 
by the industrialists themselves . The result, SENAI , was an anomaly 
Hithin the Estado Novo ",hich has stood the test of time and become a 
model for the rest of Latin America. 
The colonial economy set a pattern of supplying Brazil ' s labour 
reQuirements by immigration from abroad "'hich '''as follOi·red for the 
next four centuries. Though some rudimentary training iifas given to 
slaves on the fazendas and to free yrorkers in the shipyards and mints , 
skilled labour yras generally provided by VTorkers \-Tho inunigrated from 
2 
Portugal. During the nineteenth centuIy, a feV! vocational schools 
",ere set up by governmental and philanthropic bodies but these Here 
intended primarily to help poor orphans and the economy continued to 
1 f . .. t 3 re y on oreLgn LmmLgran s . 
Interest in vocational training began to groyr at the beginning 
of the hrentieth century, \-Then the Central do Brasil raihlay established 
an apprenticeship school at Engenho de Dentro in 1906, and President 
Nilo Pe9anha signed a decree in 1909 instituting a school for appren-
tice artisans (Escola de Aprendizes Artlfices) in each state capital. 4 
This marked the beginning of federal government activity in the field 
of industrial training. Nineteen schools yrere established in nineteen 
ci ties in 1910, but the installations and the staff ,.,ere often very 
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inadequate, and so attendance was only half of the matriculation ( although 
5 
this was quite good f or the period ). In the follo"ring years, some 
efforts "rere made to improve this situation and these "rere supplemented 
by other initiatives at local level. 
By the early 1920s, Brazil had a network of vocational schools 
"rhich, besides the Schools for Apprentice Artisans, included a school 
in Rio for training vocational teachers (the Escola Normal de Artes 
e Oficios Venceslau Bras , later the Escola Tecnica Nacional ) and a 
nwnber C?f municipally and privately run schools in Rio , Sao Paulo and 
elseHhere, amongst "Ihich the Insti tuto Profissional Nasculino in Sao 
. 6 Paulo and the Instituto Parobe in Porto Alegre were the most ~mportant. 
Many of the schools, hOvrever, catered mainly for female domestic 
Horkers and most of them vrere installed in unsuitable buildings , 'vi th 
poorly-trained staff , a shortage of materials and vridely-differing 
and over-complicated courses. lIioreover , they faced \-That ,·ras to be a 
permanent headache for Brazilian educators : the general disdain for 
manual labour, and the poverty and 10\'1 level of education of their 
pupils , i'Thich led t o h i gh drop-out rat es . 7 
The l1inistry of Agriculture , i'Thich i'TaS in charge of the federal 
apprent i ceship schools , vTaS ai'Tare of t hese shortcomings and in 1920 
cont racted J oao Luderitz , t he Direc t or of the renovrned Instituto 
Parobe , to suggest vrays of improv ing the effic iency of the school s . 
Luderit z set up a Servi~o de Remodela9B.o do Ens i no Profissional Tecnico 
and , fighting an uphill battle against inertia , incompetence and pol it-
ical int rigue , managed t o make some i mprov ement s in the buildines and 
teaching staff . Reforms put into effect during t he 1920s es t ablished 
a uniform curriculum f or all the schools , allowed them to accept out-
side orders to help cover their expenses , ins t itut ed midday meals to 
encourage attendance and set up a Servi90 de Inspe980 do Ens i no Tecnico 
8 
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Profiss i onal to supervise vocat i onal educat i on . The federal government ' s 
budgetary allOi·Tances f or i ndustr i al training more than doubled and 
matriculations increased steadily , rising from 2904 in 1921 to t vTice 
9 that figure a t 5947 in 1932 . The l evel of attendance also i mproved . 
r1eamlhile , the heated debat es surrounding a bill presented to 
Congress by the mineiro deput y , Fide1is Reis , i llus t rat ed ano t her aspect 
of vocati onal education in Brazil. The b i ll made such education a 
compulso~ part of the courses of all primary and secondary schools 
maintained by the federal government , including the Colegio Dom Pedro 11 , 
and i<laS intended to strike a blOi'l against bacharelismo . After 5 years 
of controversy , it vTas finally passed by Congress and sanctioned by 
10 President \'iashington LUl s , but it Has never , in fact , put into effect . 
The attitude underlying this bill ivas shared by Get"lilio Vargas . 
Vargas Has a "fan" of vocat i onal education and frequently mentioned 
11 
it in his speeches . The PJatform of the Liberal Alliance , read out 
in J anuary 1930, specifically referred to the need for technical-voca-
tional courses; in 1933 Vargas said that " the education i'Thich vre need 
to develop to the extreme limits of our possibilities is the vocational 
and technical kind . 'vI i thout it , organized labour is impossible , 
especially in the age characte ised by the predominance of the machine", 
and Art icle 129 of the Constitution of 1937 contained a provision to 
this effect , inserted by Francisco Campos at Vargas ' s express insti-
12 
gat ion. Vocational education Has linked to the concept of " trabalho" 
vThich , 1,,,i th GetUlio , carried a vigorous technocratic connotation of 
i gnoring the vlOrdy Imvyers and politicians , rolling up one ' s sleeves 
and getting dmm to the job . 
Var gas had little interes t in the details of the subject but he 
facilitated the improvement of the existing system of schools . In 
1931 , the ne\<Tly-created Ministry of Education took over responsibility 
for vocational t raining from the Ministry of Agriculture , and the 
Inspection Service lmdeTIvent successive administrative reforms and 
changes in name in the years fol10vTing . Con tinui ty 1,-TaS provided , 
hmvever, by Francisco Hontojos , an engineer 1,vho headed the indus trial 
training department from around 1929 to 1949 and again from 1955 to 
13 
1961 . Throughout the 1930s and early 1940s , slovT but s teady progress 
1,-TaS made in refurbishing the existine; schools for apprentices , and the 
ones a t Recife , J'.1anaus , Sao Luis , Vi t6ria , Pelotas and Goiania were 
14 
completely rebuilt. FollovTing the reorganisation of the Ni nistry of 
Education in 1937 , t he Schools for Appr ent ice Artisans Here renamed 
Liceus and the Escola Normal de Artes e of i cios Venceslau Bras was 
closed and demolished , reopening in 1942 i n nevT buildings as the Liceu 
Nacional (later Escola Tecnica £acional ). 
Apart from the efforts of the federal govermnent , the other main 
contribution to vocational education vTas being made i n the State of 
Sao Paulo, already Brazil ' s most industr i al i sed region. Particularly 
important Here the apprenticeship courses organised for the Sorocabana 
and other Sao Paulo railHays in 1930 by the SVTiss-born engineer , 
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Roberto Mange , \'Those system of aptitude tests and methodical training 
15 \'iere later to have a profound influence on the SENAI scheme o Jl1ange 
and others also fOlUlded the Instituto de Organizayao Racional do 
Trabalho ( IDORT) in 1931, vrith the purpose of spreading the principles 
of scientific management and the rational organisation of labour 016 A 
. 
co-founder of IDORrr Has Armando de Sallas 01 i veira ,.rho, on becoming 
governor of Sao Paulo in 1934 , passed a number of decrees aimed at 
17 
encouraging the development of vocational schools in the state . By 
1936 , there were 28 vocational schools in Sao Paulo , 13 of them run 
by the state c;overnment , vTi th a matriculation of 10 , 365 students , of 
18 Hhich just over half vrere boys . 
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In Rio , there Here a dozen vocational schools of various descriptions . 
The score of federal schools for apprentices spread across the country 
had a total matriculation in 1938 of 7004 , of Hhich half vrere studying 
VToodvTOrk and metalvlOrk. Al together , there uere about 500 vocational 
schools in Brazil at this time , but the majority of them ,.,ere small 
private ones training girls for domestic Hork. They had a total matric -
19 
ulation of 55 ,000 , of Hhich 22 ,000 ,·rere male. 
Heamlhil e , a nevr attitude tm·rards the role of industrial education 
vras deve;toping among the government ' s experts . The preamble to a 
decree of 1934 , vrhich reorganised the section of the Hinistry of Education 
responsible for vocational training , no longer spoke of teaching a 
trade to poor Haifs but instead emphasised Brazil ian industry ' s need 
20 
for skilled "TOricers . From 1936 onwards , the experts of the Jl1. E. S. 
began to consider seriously a complete restructuring of industrial training . 
The problem \·ras two-fold: on the one hand, there Has the purely 
technical question of devising the most suitable system for Brazil ' s 
economic and social conditions ; on the other, the political question of 
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deciding vTho \Vas to pay for the service and hovr it Has to be administered. 
Already , industrial education experts from both governmental and private 
bodies had called for closer co-operation between the government and 
21 
industry , and eventually a system \'TaS adopted \'/hereby industry contr i-
buted tovrards the cost of training its \wrkers and administered the 
organisation v/hich carried it out. But all the running \'TaS made by 
the government experts. The industrialists, many of Hhom vTere them-
selves foreign, preferred to rely on foreign immigrrults to provide skilled 
labour and \'Tere not interested in training Brazilians for such jobs. 
Only the difficulties created by the Second \oforld \<{ar and continued 
pressure from the government eventually forced the more enlightened of 
them to volunteer their co-operation. 
As for the technical problems , the experts of the H. E. S . vTere 
particularly anxious to raise industrial education from the primary 
to the secondary level. They Here greatly helped by a circular sent 
round by the International Labour Office in 1939 and by the discussions 
at its 1939 Conference , which gave them the idea of differentiating 
between technical education (to produce high and medium grade experts 
. . 22 
and technicians ) and apprenticeship (to produce slnlled workers) . 
Brazil had a number of colleges producing \vell-trained engineers (Simonsen 
himself vIaS one such graduate ) but it lacked adequate technical schools 
and , Hith its still rudimentary level of industrialisation, had no 
tradition of apprenticeship . Hontojos attended the conference and 
23 
visited some industrial schools in Frru1ce and Suitzerland . 
Further stimulus to the debate going on \vi thin the government 
\'/as provided by a hastilY-"Tritten and ill-considered decree issued by 
the Hinistry of Labour , requiring establishments \·li th more than 500 
24 
employees t o maint ain vocat i onal courses for their 1,ororkers . This 
decree was dra1,olU up by the M. T. I.C . 1,oTi thout consultation ",Ti th the 
Ministry of Education or \1i th the industrialists , and may \1e11 have 
been inspired by a desire on the part of the Minister of Labour , 
Waldemar Falcao , to have some legislation on industrial education to 
his name before the I .L . O. conference in Geneva in June 1939 , Vlhich 
1,oTas to discuss the subject under his chairmanship. 
At all events , an interministerial commission , composed of 3 
experts each from the r1 . T. I.C . and the r-1. E. S. , "laS set up to. discuss 
implementation of the la''' . Al though a decree to this effect '''as issued 
in July 1940 , the laVT 1,oTas never put into practice : 5 Indeed , during its 
discussions , the Interministerial Commission had been made a>'lare of 
the shortcomings of the M. T.I.C . la1,ol and itself proposed an entirely 
26 
ne",T la,,, on the sub j ect . This proposal \Vas not put into effect either , 
but some parts of it \1ere later incorporated into the SENAI system. 
r-1eanVlhile, discussions continued bet,,,een the Ministries and ",ith 
201 
the industrialists and finally in January 1942 the Minister of Education , 
Gustavo Capanema , sent two decrees to Vargas 1,oThich \1ere s igned on 22 
and 30 January respectively. The former created SENAI (Servi90 Nacional 
de Aprendizagem dos Industriarios , changed to Servi90 Nacional de 
Aprendizagem Industrial in November 1942 ) Hhilst the latter approved 
27 
the Organic La"T on Industrial Education. The t\Vo decrees 1,olere comple-
mentary and yet , in some respects , contradictory: they r epresented 
the results of a long period of negotiations bet1,oTeen the government 
and the industrialists, led by Roberto Simonsen and Euvaldo Lodi. 
The Organic Lm-T \vas a blueprint "Thich provided a uniform, rational 
structure for vocational education throughout Brazil , and applied not 
only to the federal system but also to state , municipal and private 
schools , which it attempted to subordinate to the centralised control 
of the N. E.S. It raised industrial education to the secondary level 
and divided it into tvro cycles . The first or 10vrer cycle vras divided 
into four orders : I ) basic industrial education; 2) training of crafts-
men ; 3) training of artisans; 4) apprenticeship . The second or upper 
order consisted of I ) technical education and 2) pedagogical education. 
Each order VTas divided into sections and each section into courses. 
Besides the regular courses , there Here also to be extra ones to train 
unskilled vrorkers and to upgrade or specialise the graduates of voca-
tional courses , t echnical teachers and adminstrators . 
To provide this education, there ",ere to be four types of schools 
( technical , industrial , artisan and apprenticeship), each Hith a 
prescribed range of courses. Pupils Here to enter the basic industrial 
courses from primary education and the technical courses from secondary 
education; the courses VTere to be linked so that pupils could progress 
from one level to another , according to their vocation and ability. 
Industrial courses \·rere to last 4 years , craftsmen I s courses 2 years, 
technical courses '3 or 4 years and pedagogical courses 1 year. Finally , 
the Organic Lavr provided for the official recognition of industrial 
and technical schools maintained by the states and by municipal and 
private bodies , and laid daim detailed instr uctions for the admission 
of pupils, the functioning of the courses and schools , teaching staff , 
examinations , etc o The N. E. S . \·ras Charged \'lith drawing up an overall 
national programme for the development of industrial education. 
Subsequent decrees issued on 3, 21 and 25 February 1942 laid dmm 
precise instru tions for the organisation of courses, provided for 
the adaptation of existing industrial training establishments to the 
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terms of the nei., law and set out the bases for the organisation of 
28 
the federal nehrork of industrial schools. In practice , hO'.·Tever , the 
changes Here relatively modest . \v'ith a fe,., exceptions , the federal 
schools continued to function in their existing buildings , id th merely 
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a change of name. The government ' s budgetary allocations and the number 
29 
of matriculations continued to grOi'T but the increase Has not spectacular . 
Even so , Capanema ' s project \'las criticised as being too ambitious ; the 
ebullient American adviser , Morris Cooke , noted sadly that many of the 
pupils of the nei'Tly-opened Escola Tecnica Nacional Here under age and 
that some of the machines were going rusty through lack of use, although 
he thought that the provisions for industrial education Hould bear 
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fruit in the future o After the fal l of the Estado N8vo, omplaints 
Here made against the excessive centralisation and the bureaucracy of 
31 the system. 
If the Organic LmT Has a conservative measure of reform , the SENAI 
system was nothing short of revolutionary , both in technical and 
political terms . For the first time, a systematic attempt was made 
to deal Hi th the problem of training skilled ''lOrkers . Yet, although 
apprenticeship courses formed an integral part of the Organic LaH , the 
decentralised system adopted to administer them ran completely counter 
to the centralisation inherent in the Organic LaH. For , uhereas the 
rest of the industrial education system was clearly subordinated to 
the control of the lVI.E . S ., with SENAI effective pm/er lay with the 
federations and confederation of industrialists , \,1i th only nominal 
authority exercised by the M. E. S . The main person Eesponsible for 
this minor coup against the spirit and practice of the Estado N8vo 
,vas Roberto Simonsen. 
204 
The detailed negotiations leading up to the creation of S~qAI 
began in IVIay 1939. HOVlever, long before then, Simonsen had taken an 
interest in vocational education. On his trip to England in 1919, he 
arranged for some young Brazilians to be sent for training in Brihsh 
commercial firms and , \·rhen asked in the Constituent Assembly in 1934 
hoVl Brazilian industry Has to be developed, he stressed the importance 
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of training skilled workmen . Yet, despite these early signs of interest, 
"rhen he Has in a position to make positive suggestions to the govern-
ment Simonsen preferred to echo the complaints of his felloVl-industri-
alists , petitioning for an easing of restrictions on the i®nigration 
of foreign skilled Horkers and technicians. 33 
This vTas in the late 1930s, at the very time that the government 
experts vT8re beginning to urge the need to train Brazilian vrorkers ; 
it was these experts vrho Here the prime movers behind the subsequent 
developments in industrial education. At first , they ,.,rere lllsure hmv 
the training of skilled workers Vlas to be organised. Francisco Montojos, 
the head of the federal Divisao do Ensino Industrial , suggested a plan 
Vlhereby the employers ' and Vlorkers ' sindicatos should use the revenue 
from the syndical leVy to run vocational and pre-vocational courses 
for their ,·rorkers and their relatives, vrhile Horacio Silveira , in charge 
of Sao Paulo~ s industrial schools, proposed that the main responsibility 
be given to the states; 34 nei ther plan evoked any response . Decree-Lmv 
1238 of ~·1ay 1939 placed the burden squarely on the industrialists and 
there , despite their \vriggling, it remained e 
This l81·r required industrial establishments ,·,i th more than 500 
employees to provide vocational training courses for their 1'lorkers . 
Simonsen Has furious . In a strongly-vrorded memorandum to the Inter-
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ministerial Commission, he complained bitterly at the lack of prior 
consultation and railed against laws \"Thich were draHn up by theore-
ticians in the civil service and issued vTi thout warning to be put into 
effect immediately ; he even l ooked back ,,,istfully to the days "'hen 
such lavTs Here given a good airing in the debates of Congress . He 
thought that the decree-laYT "Tould have to be revoked because it "'as 
unconstitutional , unjust and impracticable. He particularly objected 
to the distinction made between firms with over 500 Horkers and those 
employing less , vThich he considered unfair both to the industrialists 
and the workers , and to the fact that the government vTas transferring 
to the industrialists , vTithout any corresponding recompense , the 
onus of providing vocational education, ,,,hich , according to the 
Consti tution , vTas the first duty of the government . 
On a more conciliatory note , Simonsen did not reject the idea 
of vocational education altogether but thought that the only solution 
vTas for the government of the Union (or the states , t hrough a subsidy 
from the Union) to found vocational schools situated in industrial 
areas , vThich would accept sui table vlOrkers from different trades and 
industries of all sizes . This "lOuld make a great saving in staff and 
material , permit t ing better installations of machinery and laboratories . 
Industry would be prepared to contribute its fair share towards the 
maintenance of these schools through a system of proportional contri-
butions Hhich should not , in any case , exceed 5% of the contribution 
205 
of each worker to the pensions institute , LA. P. L ; the vlOrker should 
contribute his fair share too . But Simonsen also laid dOvTn certain 
condi tions : the funds must be applied in the area in \'Thich they vTere 
collected and should not be sQuandered on costly bureaucratic structures 
and palatial buildings; the schools could func tion in cheap, hygienic 
sheds . He also hoped that there Hould be regional committees on 
vocational education , on which the industrialists would be represented . 
The Interministerial Commission took these points into consider-
ation uhen they dre\-T up their proposals for a la\-T to replace Decree-
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La\-/ 1238 0 These proposals , "'hich mark the real starting-point of the 
SENAI project , suggested that employers be obliged to hire and train 
a number of apprentices equivalent to 6 to 10% of their skilled ''forkers; 
the apprentices must be given both theoretical classes and practical 
,vorkshop activities ; groups of companies or individual companies \-lould 
be able to establish Centros de Forma <.( ao Profissional to carry out 
the training of the apprentices , and practical Hork \-lould be conducted 
at the \-Torkplace or in special \voI'kshops . The centres \-lould be main-
tained by an additional levy on the contributions paid by the employee , 
employer and government to the pensions institutes and funds , and 
the \-lhole scheme "lOuld be managed by a national council and local 
commiss ions on apprenticeship, "'hi ch , \-lhile subordinated to the N. E. S . 
and the M. T. I.C ., Here to include representatives of the employers 
and employees . 
Simonsen , in the meantime , went on public record in favour of 
industrial education at the Second National Convention of Engineers 
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in August 1940 . The recorrunendations of the commission ,.,hich he headed 
stressed the need to train skilled "lOrkers , technicians and managers , 
increase the supply of vocational teachers and expand the institutes 
of technological research; they also urged the government to upgrade 
the existing Schools of Engineering into Technical Universities . Hm'f-
ever , the means of organising and paying for these improvements Vlere 
not specified . 
Up to this point , the discussions on industrial training had gone 
on at a leisurely pace but a neH urgency \-Tas forced on them by the 
206 
effects of the Second Horld \var . The \\Tar in Europe had already cut 
off many of Brazil ' s sources of immigration and disrupted its trading 
relations; the grovling involvement of the United States meant that 
the country \vou~d soon have to rely on its own resources for its 
industrial needs too . The government vlaS increasingly determined that 
something should be done about vocational education and in 1941 Vargas 
asked a comnlission of three industrialists , Roberto Simonsen, Euvaldo 
Lodi and Valentim Bou9as, to suggest \-lays in "Thich Brazilian industry 
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could contribute to the training of skilled vlOrkers. The report "Thich 
they presented in September 1941, as a result of this request, was 
largely the vTork of Silnonsen, 'vi th the technical advice of Roberto 
Mange of IDORT, and its proposals formed the basis for the subsequent 
SENAI system. 39 
Simonsen began by discussing industry ' s requirements for skilled 
Horkers and calculated that Brazil needed to train annually 15% of 
the total existing number of specialised vrorkers, "'hich ,wrked out 
at 13 , 500 technicians and craftsmen, 30,000 skilled ''iOrkers and 
105,000 semi-skilled ,wrkers; it also needed to upgrade the existing 
vrorkforce. He reckoned that industry vlOuld be able to train a third 
of the tec~icians, craftsmen and skilled "Torkers needed and to up-
grade a considerable number of semi-skilled workers o 
vlhile continuing to insist that the main responsibility for 
t raining Brazilian manpo'ver lay Hi th the government, Si~onsen believed 
that industry could co-operate Hith it through the employers ' syndical 
organisations, provided that the government gave it the necessary 
autonomy , a convenient means of co-ordination and a series of comple-
mentary measures. To this end , he suggested the creation of the Servi~o 
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Nacional de Selepao, Aperfei9oamento e Forma?ao dos Industrilirios (SENAFI ), 
an autonomous organisation to be managed by the secondary syndical 
organs of industry ( i . e. , the employers ' federations) under the 
general control of the Confecle:ras:ao Nacional da Industria. 
To pay for the ne",! service , Simonsen recommended the creation 
of ~ monthly levy to be paid by the employer on each \'lOrker employed 
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in his factories , vrhich \.,as to be collected by the pensions institute, 
I.A.P.I., and placed at the disposal of the industrialists ' federations. 
In areas vrhere there \.,ere no federations , the C.N. I . \.,8S to co- operate 
directly Hith the regional sindicatos in order to set up the system. 
The government vrould have an inspector in each regional council of 
SENAFI; compulsory apprenticeship Has to be decreed but the courses 
\'lOuld be organised vii th the maximum flexibility . Indeed, efficiency , 
flexibility , economy and speed Here to be the essential rules of 
these courses . 
Simonsen estimated the cost of training each technician and 
skilled vlorker aj; 600 milreis per individual and calculated that SENAFI 
HOlud have the finan ial ability to train a minimum of 14 , 500 technic-
ians and skilled vlOrkers and 40,000 semi- skilled Vlorkers per annum; 
this number \.,ould increase gradually \'Ii th the development of industry 
and the improvement of its services . As an example of what could be 
achieved, he cited the good results obtained by Mange ' s courses for 
railway apprentices (CFESP) and the Technical School attached to the 
Mackenzie Institute in Sao Paulo . As for the factories with over 500 
Vlorkers , he suggested tha.t those Hhich contributed to SENAFI be 
relieved of the obligation to maintain training courses but , in 
recompense for this saving , they should be compelled to' create laboratories 
or contribute to the institutes of t echnological research. Finally, 
once SENAFI was functioning, other sectors of the economy could 
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organise similar services, vThilst the Horkers ' sindicatos should 
concentrate on developine post- primary education, courses for semi-
skilled vlOrkers, dr avTing and physical education , etc . 
To the report vTas attached a draft decree embodyine these principles . 
Among its provisions vTas one by vrhich the regional councils of SENAFI , 
to be installed in each state , \'lOuld be composed of at least five mem-
bers, including an expert on vocational education appoint ed by the 
M.E. S., an expert appoint ed by the state government and at least three 
delegates elect ed by the industrial employers ' sindicatos . This assured 
the industrialists control of the day-to-day running of SENAFI whilst 
the C.N.I. assumed responsibil i ty f or its overall direction , thus 
relegatine the M. E. S. to a merely \.,ratchdog role. 
Indeed, the whol e pro j ect , vThen compared 'Tith its predecessors , 
shm'Ted a clear desire to concentrate decision- making in the hands of 
the industrialists, "Tho assumed the entire financial burden of SENAFl o 
No contribution vTas a sked of the government or of the Horkers and , in 
return , they ,.,rere to have no direct say in the runnine of the ne"T 
service . Clearly, the desire to have an efficient t echnical organis-
ation , free of political intrigue, conflicts and the vagaries of 
governmeht budgetary allocations , Has paramount but the project also 
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gave a pOHerful instrument to t he industrialists. FtU'thermore, it 
ran completely counter to the centralising tendencies of the M. E.S . ' s 
Organic Law. The workers I sindicatos vTere in no posi tion under the 
Es t ado Novo to compl ain about '''hat vras being done and , in any case , 
shOi.,red no interest in the subject of vocational education , but the 
Hinister of Education , Gustavo Capanema, \Vas at first unhappy about 
the amount of decentralisation implied by the pro j ect . However , "Then 
he sa"T that the N.E. S. I S head of industrial education , Francisco 
Montojos , "TaS in favour of the idea on technical grounds, he acquiesced 
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and the project passed . Nevertheless , it Has re- Hritten before being 
issued as Decree-La", 4048 , '''hich created SENAI, and the nm'T organis-
ation I S internal statute specifically stated that it "TaS subordinate 
to the J.1 . E. S., although directed by the D. N.lo 
Decree-Lm" 4048 of 22 January 1942 laid dm-m that SENAI "Tas to 
be responsible for organising and administering apprenticeship schools 
for industrial "lorkers throughout the countryo It Has to be organised 
and directed by the C. N. I ., and industrial establishments of the type 
represent ed by the C.N.I. were obliged to pay a monthly cont ribution 
of 2 cruzeiros per "lOrker to help set up and pay for the schools. 
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This contribution was to be collected by the pensions institute , I . A.P.I., 
and placed at the disposal of SENAI ; the sum collected in each region 
was to be applied in the same region , after the deduction of a ~uota 
for expenses of a general character. Es t ablishment s "'hich maintained 
their mm apprenticeship schemes would be exempted from this contri-
bution if they "Tere considered adequat e by SENAI , \'lhile the contri-
bution of establishments Hi t h more than 500 \.,rorkers VIas to be increased 
by 2C1/o. SElITAI "Tas to use the proceeds of this additional contribution 
for trai~ing i n these same establishments , either by granting scholar-
ships to skilled "Torkers of exceptional ability "/ho needed upgrading 
and specialisation , or by promoting the establishment of laboratories 
which could improve their technical and teaching conditions . 
A subse~uent decree , issued in July 1942 , laid do\'1ll SEJJAI I s 
internal statute , "Thich described its purposes and struc ture in 
42 
greater de t ail . Its aims ",ere defined as being: a ) to organise and 
maintain throughout the country the teaching of trades t o apprent ices 
employed in industrial establishments ; b) to carry out vocational 
selection of candidates for industri.al apprenticeship ; c) to 
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organise and maintain extra courses for vlOrkers in industry; d ) to 
provide scholarships for exceptionally able skilled vlOrkers for voca-
tional upgrading or specialisation and e ) to contribute tOvlards the 
developlnent of technological research of interest to industry . 
~ENAI ' s overall guidelines vlere to be fixed by its National 
Council and administered by a National Department . Regional councils 
and administrative departments vTould adjust the general policies to 
local conditions and carry out the day-to-day running of the schools . 
The councils were to be composed of delegates from the Ministries of 
Education and Labour and representatives of the employers ' associations , 
with the latter holding the majority. 
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A decree-lmT issued on the same day obliged industrial establish-
ments to employ and matriculate in the courses run by SENAI a number 
of apprentices equivalent to at least 5% of their skilled and semi-
skilled \'Torkers as vTell as a number of other young \'lOrkers , "'hich vTould 
not exceed 3% of the total number of employees . The apprentices v,ere 
supposed to have completed their primary education or to possess the 
minimum knm·,rledge essential for vocational training . If they missed 
classes they were to lose a corresponding day ' s pay and they could 
be dismissed for repeated absenteeism. Fines Here also laid dmm for 
employers "Tho failed to employ and matriculate the required number 
of apprentices . 
Subsequent decree-laws extended the scope of SENAI · to incl ude 
workers in transport, communications and fishing , gave a legal defin-
ition of an apprentice ( since youths so classified only received half-
pay and there "1ere many abuses) and changed the system of collecting 
the employers ' contribution from 2 cruzeiros per vlOrker to 1% of the 
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contributing establishment ' s total payroll . Th is modification, adopted 
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at the time for administrative reasons , has , in fact , made SENAI 
reasonably proof against inflation , since wages have tended to follow 
th . . th t f 1" 45 e r~se ~n e cos 0 ~v~ng . 
SENAI was now a reality. During 1942 , it started to build up 
its, administrative structure and the first courses began to function 
in 1943. Many of the experts "'Tho had been instrumental in creating 
it occupied the top positions in the administration: Roberto Mange 
,.,as appointed director of the Regional Department in Sao Paul 0 , Jo8:o 
Luderitz became director of the National Department , and the Regional 
Department covering the Federal District and the States of Rio and 
Esp{rito Santo ,.,as headed by Joaquim Faria Goes Filho , another prominent 
expert on industrial training . The relative speed vTi th ,·/hich SENAI 
was finally created and put into effect \'las largely due to the effects 
of the "Tar , "Thich cut off the supply of foreign labour at the same 
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time that it stimulated the development of Brazil ' s domestic industryo 
The war "Tas also responsible for the initial inversion of SENAI ' s 
priori ties: so great "Tas the demand for skilled labour that the first 
courses ,,,ere part of a government crash programme to train and upgrade 
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existing industrial workers . Only in late 1943 and 1944 did SENAI 
begin t<;> run the basic courses for apprentices, starting Hith the 
flmdamental trades of metalvTork , "Tood",ork and electricity , "Thich ",ere 
of interest to all industries. At first, the courses operated in 
rented schools and workshops "Thile SENAI ' s mm buildings ",ere being 
constructed . It soon found that giving training in the factories 
caused too much disturbance and so decided to establish completely 
48 
separate schools Hith their mm vTOI.1kshops . 
Another problem \'Thich rapidly manifested itself VIas the poor health 
and undernourishment of many of the apprentices, compounded by 
illi teracy and a very Im'l educational level in the states of the North-
east. The experts in charge of SENAI ,,,ere a t first surprised by this 
problem , which hampered the process of apprenticeship, but , led by 
Jliange in Sao Paul 0 , they reacted quickly, setting up food , medical 
and de~tal services, and classes on hygiene and general education.49 
Related to these symptoms of the poverty of the Brazilian working 
classes 'Has the high level of drop-outs , which reached 44% in the 
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ordinary courses in Sao Paulo in 1945. The courses for young Horkers 
Hho vTere not apprentices , Hhich "/ere intended to improve the general 
education of youths vlho had left school early to start Hork , were 
a failure and Here virtually abolished in August 1946, \'Then the maximum 
proportion of apprentices ''laS raised from 5 to 15~~ of the number of 
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a firm ' s skilled vlOrkers . 
The 1942 reform of industrial legislation had been carried out 
entirely Hi th Brazil ' s ovm resources, al thoueh , naturally , foreign 
practice Has borne in mind by the experts responsible for the changes 
(for example, Mange had been in Germany in 1929 to study the system 
of training Horkers on the Reichsbahn and glm-ring references to the 
United States are frequent in the literature of the period ). HOHever , 
both SENAI and the M. E. S. turned to foreign assistance to meet the 
problems of the 1940s . A number of Swiss experts and a few Americans 
were contracted to help set up the Escola Tecnica Nacional in 19420 52 
In January 1946, the United States and Brazilian goverrunents signed 
an agreement setting up the Comissao Brasileiro-Americana de Ensino 
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Industrial; under this agreement , some 40 vocational teachers and the 
directors of all the federal industrial and technical schools attended 
special courses in the United States in 1947 and 1948. SENAI also 
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sent some technicians to study in American textile institutes from 
''''hich they returned to establish the Escola Tecnica de Indl1stria 
QUlmica e T~til in Rio . 54 
The reforms @f 1942 gave industrial education a rational structure 
and a. definite place in Brazil ' s secondary education system. From 
then on , despite the difficulties caused by the \'Tartime conditions 
and the defects cited by critics , steady progress was made , though the 
advances in the ne,,,, area of apprenticeship \",ere , naturally , more spec-
tacular than those in the area of technical education , ",here the 
existing upvTard trend ''''as continued . In 1946 , Brazil had 68 officially-
recognised establishments of industrial education , of "Thich 30 Here 
technical and 38 industrial schools; 24 of these establishments ,,,,ere 
run by the federal government , 32 by s t ate and municipal governments 
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and 12 by private bodies . By 1960 , the total number of establishments 
vTas 94 , divided into 44 technical and 50 industrial schools , of '",hich 
28 were federally- run , 31 state or municipally- run and 35 privately-
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run . The number of pupils doubled bet"leen 1943 and 1960. Matricula-
tions for industrial , craftsman and technical courses in the federal 
schools rose from 4,284 in 1943 to 4,669 in 1945 , 6,156 in 1950 , 
6, 274 in ~955 and 8,124 in 1960; over the same period , the total 
matriculation in all schools of this type rose from 13 , 285 in 1943 
to 25 , 549 in 1960 , \d th a large increase in the number of students 
in private schools compensating for a relative stagnation in the number 
at state and mUnicipally-maintained schools . 57 
The grmrth of the SENAI system \'Tas much more dramatic . By 1944, 
it had 38 schools of its mm and 27 others in firms "'hich ",ere given 
special exemption , making a total of 65 ; the total was 71 in 1946 (42 
S~~AI and 29 exemption schools ), 66 in 1950 (40 SENAI and 26 exemption), 
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112 in 1960 ( 75 SENAI and 37 exemption) and 200 in 1966 (105 SENAI 
and 95 exemption) . 'rhe matriculation in the apprenticeship courses 
shot up from 735 in 1943 to 3 , 570 in 1944 , 5 , 646 in 1945 and 7, 099 
in 1946 . The number of pupils aged under 18 matriculated ( apprentices 
and YQung vlOrkers ) ... ras 9 , 437 in 1944 , 7 , 249 in 1946, 13 , 856 in 1950 , 
19 , 940 in 1960 and 28 , 773 in 1966 , "lhilst the number of adult pupils 
on courses to improve their existing skills fluctuated according to 
the programmes vlhich Here being offered at the time . The number of 
certificates mTarded to apprentices \'Iho successfully completed their 
course rose from 315 in 1944 to 937 in 1946 , 2,190 in 1950, 6 , 837 
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in 1960 and 7 , 182 in 1966. Sao Paulo , of course , occupied a dominant 
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position in the SENAI system, since it accounted for 45% of the service ' s 
revenue , but schools vTere set up all over the country, a policy vThich 
has been criticised by some on the grounds that it vrouJ.d have been 
better to concentrate resources in the industrialised areas . 
SENAI ' s rationally-organised , decentralised system of industrial 
apprenticeship , vIi th its vocational selection and methodical training , 
\vas clearly a success and \vas fol1mved by other Latin American 
countries , including Argentina , where the government of Peran was , 
nevertheless , careful to place control in its mvu hands rather than ~ 
in those of the industrialists ?9 Simonsen also adopted the same system 
of administration "Then he set up the Servi~o Social da Industria in 
1946 , a system of social services intended to counteract the appeal 
of communism to the vlOrkers and for which all the industrialists paid 
Hi th a levy of '2!/0 on their total payroll. Both services, vTi th their 
guaranteed sources of regular income , served to strengthen the 
employers ' syndical organisations , thus incidentally helping to preserve 
the corporative structure vrhich Oliveira Viana had helped to establisho60 
Both have been amply exploited by the industrialists ' public relations 
to shO\" hO\'T progressive and concerned they are. Simonsen grasped 
this from the start; glossing over the pressure "Thich had been exerted 
by the government , he said in 1944: 
"SENAI , being paid for by t~e industrial employers 
and managed by them and by proficient Brazilian 
experts , certainly constitutes an unmistakable demon-
stration of the great public spirit6Hhich inspires the leaders of Brazilian industry". 1 
l 
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Chapter 11. ROBERTO SIMONSEN AND ECONOHIC PLANNING. 
The debates over the reform of the syndical legislation, the 
minimum ,.,rage and the industrial training scheme show the degree to 
which the Vargas government favoured the interests of the Brazilian 
industrialists during the Estado Nevo and the extent of the influence 
of their leader, Roberto Simonsen. As we have seen, the initiative 
for all these measures came from the government: technical experts 
set out to make reforms and the industrialists limited themselves 
to reacting to their proposals. Hm'lever, the government started to 
pay much greater attention to the detailed demands of the industrial-
ists than hitherto. Thus a process of negotiation began and a mutually 
satisfactory compromise was eventually reached, which was then embodied 
in legislation. The institutions "lhich were set up as a result of this 
process of negotiation and compromise proved successful and have 
survived relatively unchanged dO"1ll to the present day. 
Nevertheless, the process was rather one-sided. The government 
kne\.,r ,."hat it wanted and, although it was "Tilling to make more prag-
matic changes in matters .of detail than hitherto, it was determined 
that the main lines of its policy should be maintained. Simonsen and 
the industrialists, on the other hand, produced no major initiatives 
of their own and "lere forced, often grudgingly, to acquiesce in the 
government's proposals. Cases of conflict were limited largely be-
cause Simonsen could see that the government ' s plans "lere in the 
industrialists' own long-term interest. 
Still, the passivity and "Tariness of Simonsen' s attitude to"'ards 
specific government measures contrasted with his public appeals for 
a bold policy of industrialisation. This contrast is even more 
marked if we consider the measures which Simonsen and F.I.E.S.P. were 
urging on the government in private. They showed remarkably little 
concern with the installation of ne", processes and basic industries 
and, instead, concentrated on measures '-Thich "lOuld benefit existing 
industrialists, such as changes in the tariff and fiscal laws, the 
relaxation of restrictions on immigration, modifications to the social 
1 laws and measures to encourage the export of manufactured products. 
The ambiguity in Simonsen's attitude can be explained by his 
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position as leader of the industrialists' association, F.I.E.S.P. After 
an unsuccessful attempt in 1936, Simonsen managed to have himself 
elected president of the Federation of Industries in 1938. His 
election caused a split among the membership and a large number of 
2 
firms, headed by the Matarrazzo combine, resigned. Nevertheless, by 
the end of that year, Simonsen ,,'as claiming a membership of 1,100, 
representing 60% of the total capital of paulista industry: Simonsen 
maintained his position as president of F.I.E.S.P. until his death 
in 1948, largely, it is said, by favoux'ing small and medium sized 
4 firms which he was able to dominate. In any case, F.I.E.S.P. gave 
him an important power-base which, as we have seen, he viaS loath to 
relinquish; in return, he built it up into a pOvrer in the land which 
no government could afford totally to ignore. Some industrialists 
even considered that his greatest contribution to their cause was 
his strengthening of the employers' syndical and representative 
organisations.5 
Simonsen's role as the head of F.I.E.S.P. was largely responsible 
for his apparently paradoxical attitude towards the process of 
industrialisation. On the one hand, he had to conduct a public 
relations exercise, trying to give Brazilian industry a progressive 
image by emphasizing the advantages of industrialisation to the nation 
as a whole. On the other hand, he had to represent the interests of 
existing industrialists, secure 'oJhat advantages he could for them and 
protect them \oJhere the requirements of an industrialisation policy 
conflicted vTith those of existing industry. The interests of the 
established industrialists and of industrialisation were not necess-
arily synonymous; for example, the decree of 1931 prohibiting the 
importation of new machinery had protected the industrialists from 
competition but it also meant that by 1945 almost all the textile 
6 
machines were obsolete and fit only for scrap. Simonsen managed to 
play both roles with considerable success in the 1940s; indeed, one 
of his main achievements "laS to reconcile the industrialists to 
industrialisation. 
In vie,v of Simonsen' s position as the leader of the private 
industrialists, it is something of a surprise, therefore, to find him 
throwing all caution to the wind in the mid-1940s and advocating a 
policy of planning and State intervention in the economy. Yet this, 
together with his call for American economic aid, is probably the 
reason for vlhich he is chiefly remembered today. 
The question of economic planning was closely linked with that 
of American aid and the key to both lay in the situation created by 
the Second World War. The Brazilian government had already begun to 
consider the possibilities of industrialisation and the home market 
in the mid-1930s but the outbreak of the \var marked a watershed in 
its economic thinking. The German blitzkrieg in Europe, the resistance 
of the Soviet Union and the mobilisation of the wartime economies of 
Britain and the United States impressed the Brazilian military and 
civilians alike with the vital importance of industry for national 
securi ty .7 At the same time, the war cut off Brazil's traditional 
sources of manufactured goods and forced it to rely on domestic 
producers. Despite shortages of transport, fuel and ra\'! materials, 
Brazilian industry boomed and viaS able both to supply the home market 
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and also to export textiles to other South American countries and to 
8 
South Africa. Inflation rocketed as imports fell and the earnings 
from Brazilian exports Here put into circulation but the industrialists 
were making larger profits than ever before • 
. The more far-sighted among them realised, however, that this 
situation could not last. Looking forward to the post-war 'wrld, they 
feared the competition which they would inevitably face when the vast 
war industries of the advanced nations were converted to peacetime 
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9 production and sought to reconquer their former export markets. Further-
more, the Allies, in their anxiety to avoid the economic conditions 
which had contributed to the outbreak of the Second \vorld vlar, were 
planning an international economic system based on full employment, 
growth of production, fixed exchange rates and the free movement of 
goods and capital. This return to a system of economic liberalism 
posed a double threat to Brazilian industrialists: a flood of cheap 
imported goods would deprive them of their markets at home and abroad, 
whilst an uncontrolled influx of foreign private investment, supported 
as it would be by greater resources of capital and technology, would 
ten~ to move into the most profitable sectors of the economy and, by 
reason of its greater efficiency, permanently expel the local manu-
facturers from their lucrative positions. 
At the same time, however, the United States ,.,as shovring an 
encouraging degree of interest in the industrialisation of Brazil. 
The American government was helping to finance and install the great 
steelvlOrks at Volta Redonda and in 1942, it dispatched the Cooke 
Mission, whose objectives were to increase local production and the 
local manufacture of products previously imported, maintain and improve 
transport facilities and lay the foundations for a long-range stren-
10 . . gthening of Brazil's industrial economy. Cooke's enthuslastlc and 
comprehensive report on the possibilities for Brazilian industria1-
isation and the utterances of various American government figures 
led the Brazilians to believe that they could count on extensive 
11 
American support. 
Simonsen's espousal of State planning and American aid should 
12 be seen in the light of this situation. Although not hostile to 
foreign private capital, he particularly wanted American governmental 
capi tal vlhich would not seek speculative profits or more than a very 
moderate rate of interest and vlhich would be invested in the economic 
infrastructure, particularly the transport system and the supply of 
energy, both highly politicised areas v,hich vlere essential to economic 
development but unattractive to private enterprise. The price of 
such government to government aid "'as State planning of the economy, 
since this "'as the only practical means of allocating the resources 
thus obtained. However, this solution had the advantage of leaving 
the Brazilian entrepreneurs firmly in command of the profitable 
manufacturing sector. 
Another factor was the attitude of the Brazilian government. 
Under the pressure of the wartime emergency, the State had already 
assumed a large degree of control over the economy through Joao 
A1berto's Coordination of Economic Mobilisation and other bodies, and 
"t h" " "" t t" "d t" 1" t" 13 L 1" ~ was s ow~ng an ~ncreas~ng ~n eres ~n ~n us r~a ~sa ~on. ooc~ng 
back at the ideas which he had first put fOrvlard at the inauguration 
of C.L E.S.P. in 1928, Simonsen observed in 1941 that "today they are 
14 
admi tted everY",here and by everyone". Furthermore, the idea of 
planning ' "TaS very much in favour in the democratic countries, all of 
vlhich ,.,rere making preparations for the post-war ,"[or1d. Thus, a 
combination of circumstances led Simonsen, Euva1do Lodi and other 
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leading industrialists to embrace the idea of planning. In part, 
their reasoning was that since planning and State intervention in 
the economy were inevitable, the interests of the industrialists 
\-Tould be best served by participating in it from the inside rather 
than futilely fighting against ito 
There were also, hO\-Tever, more immediate motives of a political 
nature. From late 1943 onwards, as the cost of living shot up and 
Brazilians began to perceive the anomaly of fighting for democracy 
abroad vThilst living under a dictatorship at home, support began 
gradually to drain away from the government and Vargas became increas-
ingly preoccupied with ensuring the survival of the regime. The 
appearance of the Manifesto dos Mineiros in October 1943 marked the 
rebirth of the liberal democratic opposition to the Estado Nevo and 
the brutal suppression of a student demonstration in Sao Paulo in 
November 1943 increased resentment against the government!5 With the 
eventual victory of the Allies already in sight, it was clear that 
changes \'lOuld have to be made in the regime sooner or later and 
. f t 16 manoeuvr~ng or advan age began among its leading adherents. Even 
within the government, there was a liberal-minded group, attached to 
GetUlio Vargas by personal loyalty, which gathered around the figure 
of Oswaldo Aranha. Aranha expressed support for democracy through 
the Society of the Friends of America but was forced to resign from 
his post as Minister of Foreign Affairs by pressure from Army hard-
liners led by the Minister of \var, Eurico Dutra. 17 
Another centre of liberal influence, although of the economic 
variety, was the Minister of Finance, Souza Costa, a fiscal conser-
vative with a decided dislike for the new-fangled Keynesian ideas of 
18 
deficit financing. Souza Costa attacked the protectionist tariff 
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vlhile on a visit to F. I.E.S.P. and imposed an excess profits tax on 
19 20 
the industrialists. He and Simonsen had frequent and violent arguments. 
Opposition to the liberal elements vii thin the government viaS led 
by Dutra and the generals, GetUlio's gangster-brother, Benjamin Vargas, 
and the Minister of Labour, Alexandre Marcondes Filho, who was also 
21 
Minister of Justice. Marcondes Filho outdid all others in public 
expressions of support for Vargas and remained loyal to him to the 
very end. He gave a series of \..reekly talks on the Hora do Brasil prop-
aganda programme on the wireless in which he discussed various aspects 
of the regime's social legislation, and later he devoted a series of 
22 
programmes to praising the Constitution of 1~37. Yet, despite his 
public image of servility to Vargas, Ivlarcondes Filho vIaS an intelli-
gent and ambitious man vIi th a liking for the good life, who staked 
everything on Vargas' s vleathering the storm at the end of the \{ar 
and continuing as President after.{ards. As Minister of Labour, he 
was rather attached to the corporativist trappings of the Estado Novo 
but the main element in his strategy was to secure Vargas's continu-
ation in power. In pursuit of this aim, he used the popularity "'hich 
GetUlio's labour legislation had gained among some sections of the 
working class to build the queremista movement, an embryonic form of 
populism which was intended to frighten the President's liberal middle-
class opponents from trying to oust him by demonstrating his popular 
support. Marcondes Filho \vas also accused of encouraging "communist" 
strikes and disorders as part of a conspiracy to allovl Vargas to 
23 
cancel the elections he had promised and continue in power. In 
addition to this grand strategy, Marcondes Filho was an "empire-
builder" in his OvTn right and, as Minister of Labour and of Justice, 
he tried to extend his influence in the government as far as possible. 
The functionaries of the Conselho Federal do Comercio Exterior 
complained bitterly of the deliberate obstructionism of the Ministry 
of Labour.24 
The government's sudden interest in planning in 1943-44 must be 
seen against this background. Not only ... 'as economic planning in vogue 
. 
at the time and, indeed, an essential prerequisite for the hoped-for 
American aid, but it also fitted into Marcondes Filho's domestic 
strategy. As eventually proposed, the planning body would give the 
Minister of Labour a commanding position in the management of the 
economy and largely displace his rival at the Ministry of Finance. 
The effort to achieve economic development vTaS to be popularised with 
the slogan of a "war against pauperism", v/hich fitted in with Marcondes 
Filho's desire to change the corporative regime into a "social democ-
racy", rather than the liberal democracy advocated by the regime's 
opponents. With the nation's attention focussed on economic matters, 
Vargas could quietly retain political pov,er. 
Simonsen was a close personal friend of Marcondes Filho and also 
went along vii th his arrangements for his ovm ends;5 For not only did 
the co-operation of the industrialists represent a significant token 
of support for the regime when others were turning against it, but 
it also gave prestige to the industrialists themselves. Furthermore, 
it allo ... ,ed important issues of economic policy to be freely debated 
before a relatively large audience and, had Marcondes Filho's political 
strategy worked, Simonsen and the industrialists would undoubtedly 
have had much greater influence on government policy-making. 
The movement towards planning began in late 1943 with the creation 
of the Conselho Nacional de Polltica Industrial e Comercial (CoN.PoI.C.) 
and the holding of the first of a series of three congresses of 
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industrialists and entrepreneurs vrhich met in Rio, Sao Paulo and 
Teres6polis in 1943, 1944 and 1945 to hammer out a consistent 
26 
attitude towards post-war economic policy and the role of the State o 
The general conclusions adopted by these congresses favoured a policy 
21 
of economic development, social vrelfare and State planning. Previously, 
Vargas had consistently opposed the attempts of Simonsen and the 
28 
industrialists to organise similar congresses. No", he openly lent 
his support and attended them in person. 
Opening the first of the congresses in 1943, Joao Daudt d'Oliveira, 
president of the Associa¥ao Comercial do Rio de Janeiro and of the 
Federayao das Associa9oes Comerciais, told his listeners that they 
must look into the future, particularly to the effect on a partially-
industrialised Brazil of the conversion of war industries in the 
industrial countries to export manufactures. The general desire for 
social reform could not be fulfilled \·,i thout an increase in national 
income, ,·,hich ",ould never be attained as long as agriculture and the 
production of rmY' materials dominated the Brazilian economy. "From 
this we draw a precise, clear, unmistakable course to which no Brazil-
ian economic policy can fail to be attached in the future: the indus-
trialisatj.on of the country" . Fuxthermore, "governments are respons-
ible for coordinating the disperse elements of [economic policy] 
with an overall plan and this justifies the need for the participation 
of the representatives of production on its technical councils and 
cabinets". Finally, he emphasized the need for co-operation "ri th the 
. 29 Un~ted States. 
In November 1943, Vargas created the Conselho Nacional de politica 
Industrial e Comercial under the presidency of the Minister of Labour, 
which represented an important step in the direction of planning 
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economic development. The purposes of the C.N.P.I.C. were to study, 
plan and propose measures to: a) adapt the Brazilian economy to 
peacetime conditions; b) encourage the industrial and commercia.l 
activities of the country; c) defend activities already in existence, 
as well as to form new ones, especially for the production of essential 
ra\v materials; d) found basic industries required for defence or 
the national economy, taking into account the natural possibilities, 
localisation, transport facilities or proximity of centres of con-
sumption and problems connected with internal migration, immigration 
and unemployment; e) promote greater trade betvleen the various 
economic regions of the country; f) give prestige to economic activ-
ities and propose coercive means capable of avoiding fraud and unfair 
competition; g) provide means for syndical bodies to collaborate 
efficiently in industrial and commercial activities; and h) consoli-
date an industrial and commercial policy, aimed at strengthening the 
economy, raiSing the general standard of living and increasing trade 
with other friendly nations. 
It was the sort of inquiry vlhich Simonsen had long pressed for 
and he vTaS given a seat on the ne,,, council. At its second ordinary 
meeting on 13 April 1944, two questions were set out by Marcondes 
Filho: a) if Bra.zil's economic evolution had already established 
the fundamental principles vlhich should guide its industrial and 
commercial development in the future; b) if it was possible to 
classify the industries deserving protection in view of their chances 
of success and permanence in the face of foreign competi tion.31 Simon-
sen was asked to report on the first one o 
The resulting report, ! planificayao da economia brasileira, 
summarised the ideas on Brazil's economic and social future which 
226 
Simonsen had been developing over the preceeding twenty-five years 
but its main significance lay in its express support for the principle 
32 
of government economic planning. He began by referring to the calcu-
lation made by the Diretoria de Estatlstica e Previdencia, at the 
C.N.p.r.c.'s request, which estimated Brazil's national income, based 
on the total capacity of consumption, at around 40 billion cruzeiros, 
or 25 times less per inhabitant than in the United States. He then 
quoted from various American technical experts to show the dominant 
position of industrial countries, the illusory nature of the pros-
perity brought to Latin America by the great rise in the prices of 
raw materials and the problems of adjusting to post\'lar prices, and 
the bottlenecks then existing in the Brazilian economy, which were 
mainly caused by the shortage of imported fuels and specialised metals 
and equipment; ho",ever, these experts also foresa\'i a bright future 
for the industrialisation of Brazil. 
Simonsen next reviewed the economic situation in Brazil; he 
noted that the transformation industries had grown conSiderably over 
the preceding five years but few basic industries had been created 
by private initiative, although the federal government had promoted 
some val~able undertakings. Looking at the Brazilian economy, he 
painted a sombre picture of rising prices, lack of fuels, deficient 
transport, absence of basic industries and difficulties with tech-
nicians and trained manpower. The urban areas and the extractive 
industries producing strategic materials had expanded at the expense 
of food production, which was stagnant; other problems were the 
shortage of hous ing in the great cities and the balances held abr oad 
which could not be transformed into articles necessary for the 
Brazilian market. Thus, the national income had not really increased. 
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Simonsen observed that there vTere many organisations in the United 
States engaged in preparing for the postwar vlOrld, \,Ti th the main objec-
tive of achieving full employment, and warned that the movement to grant 
essential economic rights to all men would highlight the insufficiency 
of Brazil's national income after the war. Therefore, the main objec-
tive of Brazil's development should be to strengthen its economy and 
its agrarian, industrial and commercial policy should be subordinated 
to this aim. 
Turning to the standard of living, Simonsen considered that the 
suggestions he had made to the C.F.C.E. in 1937 about the need to treble 
Brazilian consumption remained valid: at the prevailing rate of 
exchange, this meant that Brazil would need an increase of 80 billion 
cruzeiros in its national income, '-Thich vlOuld still be about seven 
times lower per inhabitant than the American one. Yet, the relative 
value of Brazil's national income was stationary and had even been 
declining in the last few years. He therefore concluded that Brazil 
needed a national income four times higher than the present one or 
about 160 billion cruzeiros. 
Such a gap could not be closed at a stroke. Production for the 
internal-market was subject to consumer needs, which in turn varied 
with productivity, the level of education, technical efficiency, etc.; 
at the same time, increased prosperity could not be achieved with new 
exports. Furthermore, the simple application of classical methods of 
hastening economic development by stimulating private initiative, 
productive sources and the internal market would not be able to over-
come the slow rate of Brazil's material progress. If this continued, 
it would condemn the country to deep social unrest in the near future, 
as the notions of comfort and better food, housing and clothing spread 
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among the undernourished and impoverished population. Brazil's 
present economic structure would not be able to provide the people 
in general with the fundamental elements of the new economic rights. 
"Thus it becomes essential to plan the Brazilian 
economy to enable it to satisfy the essential needs 
of our population and provide the country with a 
. strong, stable economic and social structure, supplying 
the nation with the resources required for its 33 
securi ty and for its prestige in the international sphere" 0 
Modern science and technology provided the basic elements for this 
planning whilst RusSia, Turkey, and the \vartime planning of production 
in the United States and Britain stood out as examples. Thanks to 
the numerous inquiries carried out, Brazil already possessed the 
elements needed to draw up such a programme and the entrepreneurial 
classes 'vere ready to collaborate in it. 
"The central part of a programme of this nature, [ ••• J 
has to be constituted by industrialisation. HO'IleVer, 
this industrialisation cannot be separated from the 
expansion and improvement of our agricultural pro-
duction, to which it is essentially linked". 34 
Transport and the processes of distribution and commerce should also 
be improved. Simonsen thus advocated a general plan for the 'vhole 
economy, rather than one restricted to industrialisation: 
"Thus planning to strengthen the national economy should 
deal equally with industrial, agricultural and commer-
cial problems as well as the social and economic ones 
of a general order. 
r ... ] we would propose, as a prime objective, a 
national income of over 200 billion cruzeiros, based on 
the purchasing power of the currency in 1942, to be 
achieved within a period of 10 to 15 yearso The 
programme would be developed in five-year plans, con-
tinuously and carefully reViewed, whose execution would 
follo", the lines of a genuine economic war against 
pauperism". 35 
He calculated the minimum sum necessary for the financing of 
this programme at around 100 billion cruzeiros, most of which would 
be used for the electrification of the country, the exploitation of 
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its various reserves of fuel and the organisation of its transport 
system. The programme would also cover the modernisation of food 
production and the expansion of agricultural production in general, 
the creation of key metallurgical and chemical industries capable of 
guaranteeing Brazilian industry relative self-sufficiency, together 
with a whole series of correlated measures such as the establishment 
of ne"l engineering schools, technological research institutes and 
vocational education, the creation of industrial banks and other 
financial establishments, and selective immigration of efficient tech-
nicians and workers. 
Finally, Simonsen asked how the financing necessary for such a 
large undertaking should be obtained and to what extent the State should 
intervene in carrying out the plans. As regards financing, he suggested 
that Brazil should begin by pledging at least 5Q% of its reserves 
abroad to the programme and intensifying production. But he thought 
that the general financing could be obtained from the United States, 
since the annual supplies "Thich Brazil "lOuld need, largely in imported 
machines and equipment, would represent less than 0.2% of the American 
national income. The operation should be negotiated in a different 
form from. the usual loans, as far as the fixing of interest, time and 
amortisation were concerned. Interest would be substituted initially 
by participation, for a certain period, in the profits of industrial 
activities and, eventually, in the balances from new exports in general, 
so as to avoid the over-capitalisation of investments. 
The degree of State intervention should be worked out \·Ti th the 
various representative associations in order to use private initiative 
to the maximum and prevent activities already functioning within the 
country from being harmed by the installation of new, competing 
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initiativesj means to renew existing equipment would also be provided 
at the same time. Finally, he obliquely demanded the curtailment of 
imports while the plan was being carried out. 
Thus, we see that in this brief report Simonsen provided a justi-
fication for the State planning of the Erazilian economy, based on 
the need to raise the average standard of living rapidly in order to 
avoid social unrest, and suggested in broad outline the areas which 
should be covered by the plan and a possible means of financing it. 
But he did not go into any detail either about these areas or about 
the actual mechanisms to carry them out. Since the idea of planning 
was already fully accepted by the other members of the C.N.p.r.C., 
Simonsen was, in effect , institutionalising approval for it from the 
private sector. 
Surprise is sometimes shown that Simonsen, as a representative 
of the private industrialists, should countenance and approve the 
notion of widespread State intervention in the economy. His attitude 
is not so surprising, however, if we consider some aspects of his 
past history. On the one hand, temperamentally, he was not the 
rugged individualist of nineteenth century laisser-faire industrial-
isationj .he attributed his success as an entrepreneur to the applic-
ation of the principles of scientific management and the rational 
organisation of labour and, as he himself pointed out to the C.N.p.r.C. 
in the discussion of his report, this experience inclined him towards 
. l36 M planning ~n genera. ore over , he had suggested a mobilisation of 
industry in Santos \'lhen Brazil entered the First World War, had him-
self conducted such a mobilisation during the Sao Paulo revolution 
of 1932 and ''las greatly impressed by the achievements of vTar production 
in the industrialised nations. 37 
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On the other hand, Brazilian industry, depending as it did on 
tariff and exchange rate protection, had ahlaYs been dependent on 
government policy. From his earliest speeches in the 1920s, Simonsen 
emphasized the need for stability and a fixed government policy. He 
constantly complained about the frequent changes in economic and 
financial policy, often made at a moment's notice and with no consult-
ation with the parties affected. He must, therefore, have welcomed 
any move ",hich promised to stabilise Brazil's future economic policy. 
Furthermore, he had himself suggested measures of partial planning 
with his National Export Institute in 1935 and the F.I.E.S.P. memor-
andum's suggestion of selecting industries to stimulate in 1937. 
Simonsen himself was too delicate to mention profits explicitly 
but other entrepreneurs were more forthright. Joao Daudt d'Oliveira 
told the Confer~ncia das Classes Produtoras, meeting in Teresopolis 
in 1945, that while Brazil needed a programme of planning and the 
State had to take the basic measures \"hich \"ere beyond the scope of 
private initiative, the two forms should not become confused: the 
State could have a monopoly but should not seek profits whilst private 
enterprise had to be free to make profits within a regime of free 
t 't' 38 compe 1. lone 
Meeting to discuss Simonsen ' s report , the members of the C.N.P.I.C. 
quickly decided that they were agreed upon the principle of planning 
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and moved on to consider what form this planning should take. There 
was some difference of opinion between Simonsen and Ar! Torres, a 
technical expert who had ",orked with the Cooke Mission during its 
visit to Brazil, as to whether the planning should cover all aspects 
of the economy, as Simonsen advocated, or should concentrate on indus-
trialisation. Simonsen also \'lanted various specialised technical 
commissions on agriculture, transport, financing , social, economic 
and political problems, coordinated by a central committee, vThereas 
T8rres said there should be only one central office in charge of all 
sectors. R$m~o de Almeida, a technical assistant to the C.N.p.r.C.'s 
secretariat, then produced a lengthy study on the theoretioal bases 
of planning and the possibilities for its application to Brazil, 
stressing that planning was a neutral technique, doubtless in defer-
ence to the growing democratic opposition to the Estado Novo and its 
methods. At a later meeting , Simonsen and Torres each produced an 
outline scheme for the planning bodies and a special commission headed 
by Simonsen ' s friend, Euvaldo Lodi, was deSignated to consider the 
suggestions and dravT up the C.N.P.LC. 's conclusions on planning. The 
draft decree-law vlhich they drew up retained the basic structure of 
Simonsen ' s scheme but vli th the significant alteration that the top 
planning organs would be composed of government ministers and tech-
nocrats rather than representatives of private economic activities, 
as suggested by Simonsen. Marcondes Filho then wrote an Exposition 
of Motives to go vli th the draft decree-Iavl, in vlhich he summarised 
the discussions of the council for Vargas. 
Meamlhile, the economic liberals in the rHnistry of Finance had 
responded to Marcondes Filho ' s offensive by persuading Vargas to 
create a Comissao de Planejamento Econ~mico, vrhich was subordinated 
directly to the President of the Republic through the Conselho de 
Seguranya Nacional.40 Vargas sent Simonsen ' s report and the deliber-
ations of the C.N.p.r.C, to this commission in order to hear its 
opiniono 
The commissi.on ' s verdict was delivered by Eug~nio Gudin, Brazil's 
leading apostle of economic liberalism. Gudin had spent much of his 
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life working for British-owned public utility companies and he 
favoured a system of free trade and free entry for foreign private 
caPital~l Although not entirely hostile to the idea of industrialis-
ation, he was sharply critical of the protectionist tariff and Brazil's 
existing industry and laid greatest emphasis on improving the 
efficiency of agriculture and mineral production for the export 
market~2Consequently, he opposed almost everything Simonsen stood for. 
In his report on the project for the planning of the Brazilian 
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economy, Gudin said that he did not disagree with Simonsen ' s consider-
ations about the weakness of the Brazilian economy or the pauperism 
of the population, nor with the general objectives aimed at in the 
report: expansion of fuel production, reorganisation of transport, 
modernisation of agriculture, industrialisation, etc. However, he 
then proceeded to lambast Simonsen's enthusiasm for the "plan" as the 
solution for all economic problems, "a type of magic \wrd Hhich 
resolves everything, the mystique of planning which was bequeat hed 
to us by the failed American 'New Deal', the corporative economies 
of Italy and Portugal and the five-year plans of Russia" ~4 Gudin 
preferred to analyse· the defects and errors. of each sector of the 
economy and study the means of correcting them. 
Hov/ever, he thought that this may have been more a divergence 
of terminology than a basic difference. Where the divergence became 
fundamental 1.,ras when Simonsen stated that private enterprise Has 
incapable of accelerating the growth of national income, asserted the 
need for a great government to government financial operation, and 
dealt with the essential question of State interference in the 
economy as a simple matter to be arranged betvTeen the government and 
the class associations. This would lead to the consolidation of a 
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totalitarian regime of State capitalismo In an unkind cut at Simonsen's 
position as president of F.r.E.S.p., he also attacked "his constant 
concern to guarantee the paternalistic protection of the State for 
'existing interests', especially those of the present industrialists, 
[ ••• ] not hesitating to proclaim 'the need not to prejudice activ-
. 
ities already functioning in the country with the installation of new 
competing ini tiati ves ' !" 4 5 
Turning to more detailed criticisms, Gudin attacked the accuracy 
and validity of the M.T.I.C. 's calculation of total national income, 
critically analysed the origins of the mystique of planning and warned 
against the danger of increased State intervention, particularly when 
its effect was to protect existing interests. He asserted that there 
was no middle path between State capitalism, with a totalitarian regime 
and the suppression of the private ovmership of the means of production, 
and political democracy and liberal economics. Brazil had already 
gone an alarming distance along the path towards State capitalism. 
"I am not discussing ideologies here. I am merely 
showing the grave legacy of State capitalism \'lhich 
has been left us by the totalitarian regime which 
is no,., being extinguished. If we want to march to-
wards State capitalism, tovlards communism, towards 
nazism or towards any other totalitarian type, we 
are on the right path. And the Simonsen project 
represents, unintentionally of course, another step 
in this direction. 
But if we want to travel towards Democracy and a 
Liberal Economy, then a change of direction is 
pressing and instead of broadening the industrial 
fieiLd of the State even more, \'le should, on the 
contrary, return the government-controlled i~dust­
rial undertakings to the Private Economy". 46 
Gudin attacked the notion that the private economy did not dispose 
of sufficient resources to undertake some commitments and that only 
the State had the financial capacity for this. He also thought that 
government to government credit operations would frighten away foreign 
capital. 
Nevertheless, this did not mean that the State should take no 
interest in the ec~nomy; on the contrary, Brazil had a pressing need 
for a series of legislative and administrative measures capable of 
permitting and facilitating the expansion and economic progress of 
the country, but the State must do this without invading the activities 
which were a function of private initiative. Thus he suggested a 
series of measures and favours by which the State could encourage 
private initiative. 
As for the inquiry '<Thich the Comissao de Planejamento Economico 
was charged '<Tith making, its object should not be to formulate a 
detailed plan of the minutiae of production, which could only be 
executed in a totalitarian State, but to investigate the capacity, 
productivity, efficiency and economic possibilities of each of the 
principal sectors of economic activity of the country, anal¥se and 
indicate measures to correct the deficiencies verified, and suggest 
measures of encouragement and support which the State could offer for 
the expansion and the productivity of new and existing companies in 
each sector of the economy. 
In the second part of his report, Gudin discussed the monetary 
problem and suggested a series of measures to curb inflation. He 
attacked the mercantilist spirit of Brazilian politicians who tried 
to obtain trade surpluses by restricting imports. The balance of 
trade was on;}.y one item in the balance of payments and he suggested 
that Brazil should, instead, control inflation, encourage the form-
ation of international bodies to defend the prices of primary products 
and create and maintain the conditions required to attract foreign 
capi tal. He attacked the protectionist tariff, "'hich raised the cost 
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of living, and the protectionist theories of Manoilescu, a writer 
much favoured by Simonsen, but admitted that, with the falling pur-
chasing power of the cruzeiro, the rise in wages and the artificially 
high exchange rate, Brazilian industry was deprived of its protectiono 
However, the remedy was to readjust the exchange rate to a level of 
pari ty with purchasing pm.,rer and not to adopt the system of "prior 
licence" (licenQa prJvia ) for imports, vThich he heartily condemned. 
Turning to the question of industrialisation, Gudin claimed that 
the argument that industrial countries were rich and agricultural ones 
poor, which '-Tas used in favour of industrialisation, ,.,ras not true: 
efficient agriculture could create a rich country "Ti th a high standard 
of living, as in the case of Argentina. 
"\fuat vTe need to do is to increase our agricultural 
productivity instead of scorning the only economic 
activity in which vTe demonstrate an ability to pro-
duce advantageously, i.e., the ability to export, 
And .:. if we continue to expand industries which can 
only live under the protection of 'heavy' customs 
tariffs and a falling exchange, we shall continue to 
be a poor countu beside the rich country vThich 
Argen tina is" . 4., 
Nevertheless, he admitted that Nature had not been especially generous 
to Brazil with fertile plains and land, and so Brazilians should try 
to exploit their industrial and mineral potential on a par with their 
agricultural economy. To this end, he suggested a series of measures 
to encourag e the formation and investment of private capital, attract 
foreign capital and, above all, increase productivity. "The banner 
which ,.,re need to raise in Brazil is not that of a ' plan' but, instead, 
that of 'productivity ' , not only in Industry but in all the other 
48 
economic activities". Finally, he ended with a bitter attack on the 
"reactionary interests of groups and industrial associations ,.,rho aim, 
above all, to defend the private interests of industrialists already 
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installed" and fight against everything which may come to compete 'vi th 
them. 49 
Simonsen was given the opportunity to appear before the Comissao 
de Planejamento Economico to reply to this attack. He began by defen-
ding his support for State intervention and planning of the economy: 
State intervention was being contemplated in the advanced countries 
as a solution for the problem of unemployment after the war and the 
technique of planning had given Russia the strength to resist the 
Hitler invasions. In Brazil, economic weakness and instability had 
led to a series of partial plans and interventions by the State, which 
had created a de facto situation: 
"It is not a question of choosing between the pres-
ence and absence of interventionism but, rather, be-
tween good and bad interventionism. 
This situation would have been largely avoided if all 
these interventions had obeyed an overall plan ". 50 
"Planning represents a coordination of efforts for a 
determinate purpose o 
If the national income is very low, if the levels of 
life, in large areas, are wretched, if we possess 
considerable natural resources and extensive stretches 
of unused land, if modern technology and science offer 
the essential instruments to correct this state of back-
wardness by rational planning, why not adopt it?" 51 
The concept of planning was not necessarily linked to anti-democratic 
political and economic schools: the liberal State has long been plan-
ning in fact if not in name. 
"Planning has emerged today as a more important tech-
nique because the problems have become very complex and 
the progress made in the economic and social sciences 
and in technology in general has been enormous" . 52 
"Economic planning is a technique and not a form of 
government 0 It does not exclude private under-
takings. On the contrary, it creates such an atmos-
phere of security that it facilitates the better and 
more efficient use of private initiative , which is 
intimately linked to the concept of property. In the 
countries in vThich universal suffrage exists and where 
the majority of the voters are not property-owners, 
private property "'ill only maintain itself fully as 
long as this majority is convinced that the exercise 
of this right represents the true interest of society 
as a ,,,hole",, 53 
Simonsen pointed to the possibility of obtaining American finan-
cing, along the lines of "Lend-Lease", for the economic reconstruction 
of Brazil, adding that "in order to be able to negotiate this financ-
ing i t is essential to draw up an overall plan, with the necessary 
details" ?4 Finally, to show that he had the backing of a large number 
of Brazilian industrialists and entrepreneurs, he quoted the conclusion 
of the Congresso Brasileiro da IndUstria accepting planning as a tech-
nique. 
The rest of the reply was devoted to a lengthy analysis and 
rebuttal of Gudin's report. Simonsen bitterly accused Gudin of insul-
ting him and various high public figures and of misquoting and dis-
torting parts of his report. He defended the M.T.I.e.'s calculation 
of the national income, showing the difficulties inherent in such a 
project, pointed out factual errors in Gudin's report and denounced 
his attachment to the liberal school, both for the problems "'hich it 
had created and for the fact that its theories were designed for the 
advanced .countries, which, even so, often did not apply it in practic 
"Will the Relator (Gudin) deny that the liberal regime 
has facilitated the rise of monopolies, the growing 
proletarianisation of the masses, the concentration of 
wealth in the hands of a small number and the imperial-
ism of the great financial and industrial centres '''hi ch , 
while controlling the markets for raw materials, pro-
duce the instruments of political and economic force?" 55 
"The defence which the Relator makes of free exchange 
is based on ideal conditions, which do not exist jn 
the present world and particularly in Brazil"o 5b 
"The Relator has not understood that these principles, 
worked out with reference to the over-capitalised 
countries, which are endowed ",i th an advanced · economic 
structure, in relation to full employment and the 
disequilibrium between the factors of production, are 
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not the ones vlhich are of most interest to the new 
countries, with a weak economic structure, a semi-
colonial economy and without diversified production, 
which, in the absence of economic and financial insti-
tutions and structure and with a lower demographic 
density, live in a state of permanent crisis, vlhich is 
aggravated by the repercussions of the cyclical de-
pressions in the over-capitalised countries".51 
Howev.er, Simonsen's most telling criticism of Gudin 'vas of his failure 
to understand and consider remedies for the slower rate of Brazil's 
development compared with that of other countries. 
"The Relator is not impressed by the state of pov-
erty of our country since the era of independence and 
our limited rate of progress, compared with that of 
other countries vThich have moved ahead over the last 
one hundred years; [ ••• ] None of this merited his 
attentiono We have to progress only through the 
improvement of the normal economic conditions indicated 
by British and American economists as necessary to 
maintain the harmony of evolution in the over-capital-
ised countries ••• " 58 
He also criticised Gudin for his complete lack of concern with the 
social problem and thought it unlikely that sufficient foreign capital 
vlould flovl to Brazil vIi thout a fair and frank government to government 
agreement. 
Finally, in contrast to Gudin's espousal of the classical laisser-
faire economic liberalism, Simonsen outlined the case for a mixed 
economy: 
"State intervention becomes essential vlhenever private 
enterprise shows itself defective or incapable. It is 
not true that this intervention is incompatible ,vi th 
an economic system based essentially on private i nit-
iative".59 
"Limitations and corrections of certain deficiencies 
observed in private enterprise are being applied by 
subsidies or by taxes, according to the case. The 
misuse of natural resources is being corrected by State 
intervention. Waste through the bad orientation of 
undertakings can be compensated for by selecti ve credi t, 
which is very difficult to execute outside a general 
pIano But the deficiency of the entrepreneur or 
employer factor can only be corrected by its replace-
ment by the State, in the form of autarchical or mixed 
economy companies. This State capitalism is not at 
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all incompatible with the regime of private initi-
ative as the essential basis of the economic system". 60 
And he ended by quoting the conclusion of the Economic Charter drawn 
up by the Conferencia das Classes Produtoras in Teres6polis recognising 
the need for economic planning. 
Despite Simonsen's spirited defence of planning, the economic 
liberals in the Ministry of Finance succeeded in emasculating the pro-
ject even before the end of the Estado N6vo. Then the military over-
threw Vargas and the industrialists, \<Tho \ofere closely identified \<Ti th 
the fallen regime, suffered a temporary reverse. With the return of 
democratic politics, such organs of planning as had been established 
were supressed or allowed to fade away, as unpleasant vestiges of 
Estado Novo totalitarianism. In 1946, in reply to an inquiry from 
the Inter-American Council for Trade and Production, Simonsen admitted 
sadly that, with the change of government, the Comissao de Planejamento 
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and the idea of planning itself had been relegated to a secondary level. 
The end of the Estado N8vo did not mean the total eclipse of 
Simonsen and the industrialists, hm·Tever. In 1945, Simonsen suffered 
the first of the heart attacks vlhich were eventually to kill him. 
While he vTas recuperating at his holiday home in Campos de Jordao, 
he hit upon the idea of founding SESI, the industrialists' social 
62 
service. President Dutra approved the idea and SESI 'of as set up in 
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1946. It was financed by a 2.% levy on the pay-roll on all industrial 
firms and administered by the employers ' federations . Not only did 
SESI provide social assistance for the working classes and present 
a ~enign image of the industrialists but it also served, together with 
the SENAI system on "Thich it "TaS modelled, to strengthen the employers' 
syndical organisations and ensure their survival in the new democratic 
. 64 
reg~me. 
Realising that he had only a short time to live, Simonsen threw 
65 
himself with renewed vigour into public life. In 1946, he viaS elected 
to the Academia Brasileira de Letras on the basis of his monumental 
Hist6ria econ8mica do Brasil, a distinction vThich he had long coveted.66 
The fo~lowing year, he ran for election as a senator f or the State 
of Sao Paulo to the federal Congress; running on the PSD ticket, he 
trailed miserably in the city of Sao Paulo and only secured election 
thanks to the votes delivered by the pro-government coroneis in the 
in terior of the s ta te ~ 7 Mean\.,hile, throughout this period, he viaS 
developing his ideas on the need for American financial and economic 
aid, to assist Brazil's economic development . 
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Chapter 120 ROBERTO SIMONSEN MiD AMERICAN AID. 
Brazilian interest in planning in the 1940s was closely linked 
to the question of American economic and financial aid. The spirit of 
wartime co-operation seemed to signify that the United States had 
espouS'ed the cause of Brazilian industrialisation. The steelworks then 
being constructed at Volta Redonda with American financial and technical 
assistance, the Cooke Mission ' s enthusiasm for industrialisation and 
planning of the Brazilian economy and the remarks of various government 
advisers in Washington led Brazilians who advocated planning to believe 
that they could count on American assistance in the post-war world o1 
S imons en , who had long been concerned with the shortage of capital 
in Brazil, readily saw the advantages of this situation. As early as 
1940, he had suggested that " the better equipped nations should 
facilitate the equipment and raising of the level of life of the other 
peoples, to prevent the formation of focal points of poverty and dis-
2 
content \vi thin tha American continent" . As the war progressed, however, 
and the outlines of the post-war world began to emer ge, Simonsen began 
to treat the question. of the economic relationships between the rich 
and the poor nations and the need for international co-operation and 
assistance with greater urgency. It was no longer merely a case of 
poor nations having to raise their standard of living as he noted with 
alarm that the gap between the industrialised nations and the under-
developed ones was tending to increase rather than to diminish o Worse 
still was the fact that the advanced nations seemed to have no concept 
of the problems faced by the poorer ones and were devising an inter-
national economic system whi ch, whilst serving their own interests, 
would be positively harmful to those of the developing countries. 
Simonsen first formulated his ideas on this subject in a speech 
which he gave in Rio de Janeiro on 8 October 1943.3 In this. general 
review of Brazil's present economic situation and future economic 
policy, he began by drawing attention to the tremendous progress in 
productive capacity and organisation achieved during the war in the 
Uni ted States and other industrialised countries. Hm"rever, he noted 
that, despite the real advances made, Brazil had not been able to keep 
up with this rate of progress. "Relatively speaking, ~le have, in fact, 
become poorer compared ~Ti th the rates of gro~lth of the democratic 
powers" 04 The studies on post-war policy in the United States and Great 
Britain were concerned with maintaining a high l evel of national income, 
avoiding unemployment, preventing war and improving the distribution 
of national income o But in Brazil and the other Latin American nations, 
such studies ought to deal vli th t\VO other fundamental Questions: how 
to raise the national income to a level sufficient to attend to national 
needs and how to provide each inhabitant of the country with a minimum 
amount of resources capable of giving him a decent existence o 
Emphasizing Brazil's low national income, Simonsen went on to 
explain that only in exceptional circumstances could a high national 
standard of living be based solely on extractive industries and agri-
culture, and that an economy based on a reasonable balance between pri-
mary, secondary and tertiary activities was to be preferred. Thus, 
he argued that while Brazilian agriculture should be improved by 
applying technology and organisat ion, increasing its profits and 
reducing the cost of foodstuffs, an intensive policy of industrial-
isation should be carried out in parallel. However, the cost of 
products manufactured by incipient industries was inevitably greater 
than those which were mass-produced in the over-capitalised countries. 
Thus, "to permit the free access of these manufactures everywhere is 
to suffocate the development of any regional industrial plant in the 
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under-capitalised countries" . Activities in these countries would 
then be shifted into the primary industries and as the population would 
not be able to obtain sufficient economic resources to ensure a suit-
able standard of living, this would lead to the existence of rich 
landmmers in the middle of an impoverished populationo 11 Indus trial-
isation of a country like Brazil is indispensable for it to attain a 
6 high level of civilisation", progress and the liberation of man. 
Returning to the question of commercial treaties, which he had 
discussed in his speech on the U.S . -Brazilian treaty of 1935, Simonsen 
warned: 
"When commercial treaties are signed between a highly 
industrialised nation and another in vlhich"the so-
called ' colonial products ' predominate as articles of 
export, they are, in fact, promoting the exchange of 
poorly-paid products f or highly profitable ones. Even 
if the balancesof trade and of payments between these 
nations are in monetary equilibrium, the exchange made, 
without doubt, favours the more industrialised country".? 
Similarly, with international movements of capital: a rich country 
might lend a poor country capital for its development and this capital 
might be used largely to purchase products from the creditor country. 
The latter would, in fact, receive the profits resulting from the sale 
of its industrial products, besides interest and amortisation of its 
capi talo International financial history showed the difficulties vlhibh 
debtor countries struggled against to maintain such agreements. 
Clearly, the advanced countries tended to control the world 
economy through their financial systems but, nevertheless, it was in 
their own interest to combat the centres of poverty, which were also 
centres of discontent and revolt, with repercussions which affected the 
social order and national and international politics o 
However, the unofficial post-war plans which were then being dis-
cussed in the belligerent countries postulated an inter national policy 
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based on the creation of a stable currency and the destruct ion of 
customs barriers. 
"This is an old-fashioned capitalistic point of view 
assumed, logically, by industrial groups with a strong 
financial system, who aim to maintain the pace of 
their great progress in the increase in world trade and 
the remuneration of their capital. 
The devaluation of the currency in certain countries 
does not always signify the existence of administra-
tive errors. It often reflects the automatic defence 
of their economy, impoverished by circumstances out-
side of their control. The suppression of tariff 
barriers, together with the stabllisation of the 
currency, deprives the countries which are beginning 
their industrialisation of two potential weapons of 
defence against a merciless competition because, un-
like the powerful nations, they cannot support their 
production with an advanced financial structure, easy 
means of transport and technical resources of all kinds, 
which are factors in reducing costs or arms with vThich 
to conquer markets" 0 8 
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Obtaining loans from rich countries for the purchase of consumer products 
meant the creation of an artificial standard of living for the debtor 
country, subjected it to violent fluctuations and crises, and contri-
buted to its economic instability. Foreign loans should only be con-
tracted for application in productive undertakings, since the transfer 
of interest and amortisation on these loans could only be achieved by 
the provision of services or the export of goods. He suggested that 
economic and social maps of each nation should be organised for the 
general guidance of post-war international agreements. 
"When dravTing up treaties, it is not sufficient just 
to consider the values involved in monetary terms; it 
is necessary to consider them qualitatively so as to 
introduce the necessary corrective coefficients into 
these agreements. So, nothing could be fairer [ ••• J 
than that, alongside each commercial treaty, there 
should be another fixing compensation of an economic 
order for the peoples and regions with a lower than 
normal standard of living".9 
Centres of poverty bred unrest which gradually undermined the sta-
bility of societies in general and encouraged the outbreak of war; the 
present "Tar was demonstrating to \vhat formidable expenditure the rich 
nations had been driven in defence of civilisation through having 
failed to prevent or destroy the causes which led to war. This in 
itself 
"would justify the maintenance of a considerable part 
,of the present war budgets to combat poverty and back-
wardness, which will allow the rich nations to contri-
bute decisively to raising the level of human life and 
to creating a world consciousness of social justice, 
'vhich would certainly be the most effective obstacle to 
the outbreak of future wars".lO 
Referring to the wartime agreements with the United States for the sale 
of strategic products and the development of Brazil's extractive 
industries, Simonsen continued: 
"When the war is over, such agreements could be followed 
by others, of a broader character, \vhich would provide 
us with a large amount of mechanical equipment".ll 
In return, he held out to the United States and Britain the prospect 
of a wealthier, industrialised Brazil as a more valuable and stable 
trading partner o 
The rest of the speech was devoted to the need for a vigorous 
domestic policy of industrialisation, which should include the system-
atic improvement of the- country's sources of energy and its transport 
system, technical and financial assistance for all industrial initi-
atives, guarantees for Brazilian and foreign capital, encouragement for 
the investment of Brazilian and foreign capital in industry, the spread 
of vocational education and firm international agreements o 
In this speech, therefore, Simonsen established that the economic 
situation of poor, backward countries was intrinsically different from 
that of the advanced nations and that their interests were often in 
conflict. However, he believed that if the rich nations were willing 
to make the necessary concessions, this conflict of interests could be 
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mitigated and the obstacles to development overcome. Everything depended 
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upon the industrialisation of the poor nations. 
Simonsen repeated these ideas in a paper on the concept of national 
income which he submitted to the International Economic Conference v1hich 
met in. New York in November 1944;2 In this paper, he criticised the 
preoccupation of the economists of the advanced countries with restoring 
. 
the international economic system which existed at the beginning of the 
century, emphasized the special position and interests of the poor 
nations and pleaded for financial and technical assistance from the rich 
nations to allow them to increase the rate of growth of their national 
income9 The paper was, hOv1ever, rejected by the conference; 3 Meanwhile, 
on the home front, Simonsen assured American businessmen that Brazilian 
industrialisation would increase the country's trade with the United 
States and he continued to defend industry against domestic critics, 
stressing its contribution to Brazil ' s war effort and demanding a firm 
policy of industrialisation and economic development from the govern-
14 
ment o 
Wi th the end of the war, the United States became absorbed v1i th 
the reconstruction of Europe and the prevention of Soviet penetration 
in vulnerable areas, relegating the affairs of the American hemisphere 
to a low l~vel of priority. The Latin American countries, which, like 
Brazil, had been hoping for American economic assistance after the war, 
resented this neglect and tried to draw the attention of the United States 
to their demands through the Pan-American Union and the Organisation 
of American States. Having failed to obtain satisfaction at the inter-
American conferences held in Mexico City in 1945 and in Rio de Janeiro 
in 1947, they mounted a determined campaign to ensure that the Ninth 
International Conference of American States, due to be held in Bogotd 
in April-May 1948, should discuss economic matters;'5 Their determination 
was strengthened by the operation of the Marshall Plan, which \vas 
intended to assist the recovery of the war-shattered economies of 
Europe. The Marshall Plan both provided an enticing example of \vhat 
the United States was capable and heightened their sense of grievance 
because of its potentially harmful effects on the Latin American econ-
omies. 
Simonsen was particularly active in the discussions on this topic 
vlhich went on in Brazil in 1947 and 1948. Indeed, Ferreira Lima 
thinks that he was offered a place in the Brazilian delegation to 
Bogota but did not go because of his insistence on being appointed head 
of the delegation.16 
Simonsen analysed the economic repercussions of the Marshall Plan 
on Latin America in a report to the Executive Commission of the Inter-
American Council on Trade and Production in October 1947~ 7 in \vhich he 
discussed the programme drawn up by the Committee of European Economic 
Co-operation, outlining Europe ' s future economic structure and the sup-
plies it needed from the United States, Canada and Latin America. He 
criticised the one-sidedness of the Marshall Plan and the Commission's 
programme, which aimed to re-establish Western Europe's standard of 
living and foreign purchasing power without considering their impact 
on the rest of the world. The Latin American countries were expected 
to be the main suppliers of food, fodder, fertilizers and timber, which 
meant a return to the conditions existing during the waro They vlOuld 
have to expand their extractive, agricultural and mining activities in 
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order to supply their quotas of raw materials and semi-colonial productso 
The production of these articles in abnormal quantities would force 
them to transfer their workers to primary activities with low returns 
and subject to economic instability. Furthermore, the plan did not 
foresee the maintenance of European imports of Latin American products 
at a stable level after 1951. Latin Americans knew from painful exper-
ience the serious harm which their economie s ",ould suffer ,.,i th this 
transfer of the factors of production to activities without guarantees 
of productivity and with low economic returns o They might also be 
affected, according to the committee's forecast, by a severe reduction 
in the supply of production goods from the United States because Europe 
would certainly demand priority for its needs o Finally, while wearing 
out their economic equipment, the Latin Americans would also be exposed 
to the problems of inflation, deriving from artificial price increases, 
excessive exports of essential consumer goods and difficulties in fin-
ancing their production and exports. 
Simonsen went on to emphasize the low average standard of living 
in Latin America as compared with Europe and the United States, a 
situation which few people understood in those areas, and added that 
any loss of economic substance would increase the population ' s povertyo 
He suggested, therefore, that the continent's international trade should 
be developed on a triangular basis: Latin America would sell more to 
Europe than it could buy from it and would buy more from the United 
States than it could sell to them, so that, in effect, the Americans 
would finance Latin America ' s exports t o Europe by allowing it to 
increase its purchases in their country. This would also prevent 
inflation. However, Latin America was in no condition to finance part 
of the reconstruction of Europe with its own resources o Only the 
regions where the average standard of living was equal to or above that 
of Europe could contribute to the re-equipment of Europe without an 
immediate counterbalance; even here the contribution should not be made 
on the same percentage basis as those of the United States and Canada 
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but needed a regressive correction, based on national income and per 
capita foreign trade. The other regions, where the average standard 
of living was below that of Europe, could not give up any part of the 
purchasing power created by their production. Nevertheless, despite 
this pessimistic appraisal, Simonsen thought that Latin America could 
supply certain materials which would represent a decisive factor in 
reconstruction, even if, monetarily, they did not seem significantG 
Simonsen ended by suggesting that the Latin American nations should 
try to organise a Commission on Economic Co-operation to study the 
means of creating effective co-operation between the American countries 
and of obtaining U.S o aid for their plans of economic development. In 
short, Latin America should try to have its legitimate aspirations 
included in the Marshall Plan so that the struggle for its development 
could be carried on simultaneously with European economic recovery. 
In subsequent speeches and reports, Simonsen elaborated on these 
conclusions, pointing out the need to renew and extend the equipment 
worn out during the war, obtain loans from the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development and the Export-Import Bank and attract 
private U.S. investment, fight domestic inflation by eliminating 
budgetary deficits, create an inter-American body to monitor the real 
effects of the Marshall Plan on Latin America and draw up an "Economic 
. 18 Charter of the Americas". 
"In this document, whose prime objective is to ensure 
suitable conditions for the development of Latin 
America, there should be provision for measures vlhich 
will encourage the transfer of capital, facilitate the 
obtaining of production goods and supply extensive 
technical assistance so as to raise productivity and 
the standard of living of the peoples of the continent".19 
In another study, Simonsen suggested that the Conference of Bogota 
20 
should consider a Pan-American policy for Latin American development o 
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He began by criticising the desire of the Committee of European 
Economic Co-operation to restore the pre-war international economy, 
pointing out that the Latin American countries had been forced by the 
war to transform their economies and could not now be expected to return 
to a 10\-19r level of activity. Then, playing on American Cold War fears 
of conununist subversion in Latin America,. he stated that "no plan of 
defence for the American Continent can be dissociated from a plan of 
21 
economic development". Furthermore, there could be no lasting e~uilib-
rium in international economic relations as long as there existed 
flagrant disparities between the levels of productivity in the different 
areas of the world, so "the development of the countries with incipient 
economies is a necessary counterpart to European reconstruction".22 
This plan of development had a two-fold aspect. On the one hand, 
it re~uired renovation and extension, trying to take up the thread of 
development again in order to attain the standards which would have 
been reached but for the disturbances caused by the \-lOrld conflict, 
and, on the other hand, there vlas development itself, in Hhich an attempt 
would be made to accelerate the rate of capital formation, so as to 
achieve standards of living comparable to the average standards in the 
European countries. Simonsen went on to discuss both aspects of devel-
opment in some detail. With regard to renovation and extension, the 
effect of the vTar on the Latin American economy had been to red is-
tribute the factors of production through the intensification of indus-
trial production, the expansion of strategic war products and the stag-
nation of agricultural production. It had also caused a deterioration 
of existing real capital. Thus the vlar had led both to an acceleration 
of change in the economic structure, Hhich was losing its old, predom-
inantly agricultural character, and a reduction in the rate of capital 
formation, because the existing installations had been over-utilised 
and the importation of production goods had been reduced& 
In the case of Brazil, real national income had increased over the 
period 1940-45 but per capita income had remained almost the same be-
cause of the growth of the population. Then, assuming an annual rate 
of capital formation of 5% and a 2% increase in population, Simonsen 
calculated the different rates of growth in real per capita income for 
the Brazilian economy over the period 1945-51, with and without a 
plan of renovation and expansion and yli th and without the aid to Europe 
which Latin America was expected to give under the Marshall Plan: r) 
natural development, without aid to Europe: 3.9%; 2) development with 
a plan of renovation and extension but without aid to Europe: 4.7%; 3) 
natural development, yTith aid to Europe: 2%; 4) development, with a 
plan of renovation and extension and with aid to Europe: 305%0 He 
concluded that, in any case, the effect of aid to Europe would be to 
diminish the rate of capital formation and the plan of renovation and 
extension, besides hot rehabilitating the domestic economy, would be 
insufficient to cover that aid. Even in the best of the above patterns 
(no.2), the rate of growth of real income ylould not be sufficient to 
alloy1 Brazilian standards of living to become comparable to average 
European standards, even in the space of 20 years. With the present 
rate of development of real per capita income, it would take 15-20 years 
to double the existing real income of 66 dollars, at 1940 prices, and 
even then, Brazil would only have reached the real per capita incomes 
of the poorest countries of Europe in 1940. 
Turning to the problem of development itself, he stressed once 
again the extremely low standards of living in Brazil and the other 
Latin American countries, which he blamed on their low economic prod-
uctivity. Then he emphasized the danger of these low levels to the 
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existing social order, since "the tactics of the communist parties [ ••• J 
consist in exploiting and rationalising the resentments and wretchedness 
23 
of the masses". Thus, in the event of an international conflict, it 
would be difficult to ensure a solid internal front. These internal 
dangers vlOuld be heightened if Latin America had to give aid to foreign 
countries at the expense of its already low standard of living. 
Simonsen next rejected the idea that Latin America vlOuld necessarily 
benefit from an increase in exports caused by its participation in the 
Marshall Plan. Unless there were an increase in real capital, such 
exports would entail a reduction in productivity, with a consequent 
reduction in the rate of capital formation. The reason for this was 
two-fold; on the one hand, there ... ,ould be a transfer of the factors 
of production from the sectors of greater productivity to the production 
of primary export articles and, on the other, a large part of these 
exports \'lOuld have no counterpart in imports, thus caus ing internal 
shortages and a renewal of inflation. Simonsen, however, thought that 
"Latin America's capacity to export should be subordinated to its internal 
development", since "internal development should not depend mainly on 
the expansion of trade but, on the contrary, the latter should depend 
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on the former". Hence, any increase in exports required a corresponding 
plan of development o Thus, in order to maintain the normal development 
of the Latin American economy on the basis of a 5~~ rate of capital 
formation, it would be necessary to compensate for the extra exports 
to Europe \vith equivalent imports of production goods and also some 
consumer goods, in order to prevent a drop in consumption. This would 
increase the productivity of the export sector and prevent inflationary 
pressures in the internal market. 
Simonsen, therefore, requested foreign aid for Latin America to 
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help it restore its economy to peacetime conditions, maintain its rate 
of economic development and export its quota of supplies to Europe. 
The total amount needed for this "TOuld be 10,500 million dollars, of 
which 2,002 million "lOuld be destined for Brazil. The aid would be 
distributed in the following fashion: 
Latin America Brazil 
(U.S. ~ millions) 
Total Plan 10,500 2,002 
a) Plan of Renovation 
and Extension 2,220 548 
it~ Deterioration ~ 732) ~182) Accummulated Demand 1,488) 366) 
b) Plan of Development 6p 580 1,154 
c) Plan for Increase of Exports 19700 300 
Thus, in this speech, Simonsen made Latin America's contribution to the 
Marshall Plan and European recovery contingent, for political and 
strategic reasons , on a plan and financial assistance to ensure its own 
continued development, and calculated the amounts which he thought ,vould 
be necessary to carry out the various aspects of the pIano 
Simonsen also ~uggested that the Bogot~ Conference should summon 
an Inter-American Conference on Economic Co-operation, to be held in 
New York or Washington. in May 1948 and proposed an agenda for discussion, 
'''hich included both emergency and long-term measures.25 The emergency meas-
ures centred on the discussion and approval of an agreement on inter-
American economic development during a period of 2 to 3 years, aiming 
to compensate for the retardment caused, directly or indirectly, by the 
war and the need to deliver supplies to Europe in support of the Marshall 
Plan. This agreement vlOuld help the defence of the continent by giving 
special emphasis to the development of sources of scarce strategic 
materials and their exportation. 
The specific measures to be taken "Tere: a) the programming of the 
efforts to be developed in each country; b) the mutual supply of food-
stuffs, raw materials, fuel and equipment; c) mutual guarantee of the 
means of transport necessary to provide these supplies; d) problems 
relating to inflation and a policy of controlling prices; ~) financing 
for the countries which needed it; f) the creation in each country of 
bodies to carry out this inter-American agreement; g) co-ordination 
by the Inter-American Economic and Social Council of the efforts to be 
developed in each country; h) economic and financial studies, partic-
ularly in relation to the standard of living, national income and ex-
change rates; i) co-operation in international bodies in order to 
carry out this agreement; j) mobilisation of the means of production, 
including signing inter-governmental contracts for the purchase of 
foodstuffs and ra'lol materials, aiming to stimulate their production by 
guaranteeing prices and markets for the producers; k) facilities for 
immigration. 
The long-term measures included inter-American agreements on 
economic development over a longer period, aiming to endow all the 
countries of the continent vli th a more stable economy, Hi th higher 
productivity and a better defence potential; facilities and guarantees 
for the investment of private capital; and the mutual concession of 
financial facilities by official financial institutions. Another 
measure proposed was the creation of an inter-American developmental 
organisation Hith financial resources composed of capital subscribed 
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by the American States in proportion to their national income. This 
organisation vlas to be empovlered to issue its bonds and those of third-
parties, make direct loans, guarantee loans and acquire shares in the 
capital of companies for its Ovffi portfolio or for resale. Finally, 
Simonsen proposed inter-American agreements on: the encouragement of 
immigration; the collection of data and economic and statistical studies; 
tax discrimination and double taxation; the exchange of exports, 
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teachers, study scholarships, scientific information; protection for 
industrial property; a guarantee of effective equality in commercial 
treaties, taking into account the differences in the economic, social 
and institutional structures of the contracting countries; discrimin-
ation in the field of insurance, banking and transport and on the rates 
charged for these se~~ices; standardisation of industrial and transport 
equipment; facilities for commercial transit and the establishment of 
free ports; and, lastly, tourismo 
In conclusion, Simonsen drew together all his ideas on Brazil's 
international economic relations in his last published work, a pamphlet 
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entitled Direito Internacional Social. He condemned international econ-
omic agreements betvreen highly developed and underdeveloped nations '''hich 
,'rere based on juridical equality, pointing out that the advantage in 
foreign trade accrued to the highly-industrialised countries with a high 
standard of living "Thich exported manufactured goods in return for 
primary products from the underdeveloped nations. The terms of trade 
were unfavourable to the latter because the fluctuations in price levels 
affected primary products more severely than manufactured products. 
Furthermore, the prices of primary products were, in general , not 
influenced by the producing countries but vrere dictated by the manu-
facturing countries. As an example of the way underdeveloped countries 
were placed at a disadvantage by the advanced nations' insistence on 
equal treatment for all, he cited the International Charter on Trade and 
Employment, '''hich had recently been drawn up in Havana; he demanded 
an effective equality for backvrard areas by giving them concrete oppor-
tunities to develop and to raise their standard of living, in compensation 
for the reduction of their tariff barriers. 
For in reality, continued Simonsen, the development of the new areas 
could only be achieved through two processes: either by adequate 
internal protection, '''hich ,,,as a slovrer and, at the same time, more 
difficult process, or else by international co-operation vThich was a 
more efficient method because it did not entail a reduction in the level 
of internal consumption, it did not affect export industries and it 
contributed to the expansion of world trade o Finally, citing the examples 
of Lend-Lease and the Marshall Plan, he appealed for special consideration 
to be given to the poor countries, "ri th the aim of achieving genuine 
international social justice and trying to diminish the ever-increasing 
inequality between the nations. A statute embodying this international 
social law would represent not only a policy of philanthropy but also 
good business as it vlOuld assure the economic equilib:r:i.um of the vTorld 
and the ,,,ell-being of the more powerful countries. 
Thus, in the last years of his life, Roberto Simonsen became an 
exponent of the special position of underdeveloped countries and of the 
need for their economic development, based on financial and technical 
assistance from the advanced countries. Indeed, these ideas formed the 
import of the speech of welcome to the former Prime Minister of Belgium 
which Simonsen was reading in the Academia Brasileira de Letras on 25 
May 1948 at the moment when he collapsed of a heart attack and died o 27 
Li ttle of vThat Simonsen had advocated was achieved at the Confer-
ence of Bogota. The Americans let it be known that they were not 
interested in giving inter-governmental aid to Latin America and pre-
ferred to encourage private investment. Although an Economic Agreement 
containing some of the provisions regarding foreign trade and the prices 
of primary products, which Simonsen and other Latin Americans had sought, 
28 
'vas signed, it contained many reservations and Has never ratified o The 
Truman administration eventually produced its Point IV programme for 
underdeveloped countries but thi s was regarded in Latin America as 
merely part of an aggressive drive to foster private U.S. capi tal 
. t t 29 ~nves men • 
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MeanvThile, the Brazilian government gradually overcame the aversion 
to planning which its association with the Estado Novo had inspired 
. 
30 
wi th the SALTE Plan of 1949 and Kubitschek' s Progra m.a de Metas. More-
over, in the late 1950s, the Cold War began to move to the Western 
Hemisphere. Kubitschek took advantage of the furore created by the 
drubbing which Eisenhower's ill-starred Vice-President, Richard Nixon, 
received in Caracas in 1958 to propose a "Pan-American Operation fl 
designed to revitalise the inter-American system through new measures 
of political and economic co-operation, and the Americans at last set 
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up an Inter-American Development Banko The r eal catalyst, however, was 
the Cuban Revolution and the fear that it would spread communist sub-
version to the rest of the continent. To combat the economic and 
social conditions which it was believed favoured the spread of communist 
infil tration, the Alliance for Progress \·1as established by the Charter 
of Punta del Este in August 1961.32 Roberto Simonsen' s "progressive 
conservative" ideas on the role of economic development found a brief 
echo in the liberal administration of John Kennedy. At the same time', 
events proved Simonsen to have been a shre\.,rd judge of the realities of 
power when he tried to link his economic ideas inextricably to social 
conditions and present economic development as a means of combating 
communist and collectivist ideologies. 
CONCLUSION. 
In the last ten years of his life, Simonsen's ideas had advanced 
rapidly: starting as a proponent of the industrialisation of Brazil, 
he ended by advocating a broad policy of economic development based 
. 
on massive American aid for the whole of Latin America. With his 
emphasis on economic problems and his expansionist outlook, he far 
outstripped Oliveira Viana, whose ideas were largely discredited with 
the demise of the Estado Novoo Nevertheless, the last word must go to 
Oliveira Viana, who outlived Simonsen by three years. A collection 
of his articles, published posthumously in 1952, may serve as a final 
comment both on his outlook and that of Simonsen. 
In one of the articles, written in March 1939, Oliveira Viana 
derided the belief held by some textile manufacturers that the instit-
ution of a minimum wage would help solve the crisis of overproduction 
1 
from which they were suffering. Instead, Viana said, they should have 
"set about coordinating, limiting and rationalising the productive 
capacity of each individual firm, so as to adjust the total mass of 
production to the consuming markets' capacity to absorb it". Thus, 
they should have formed a collective organisation - a cartel, a consorti~ 
or an entente, in which each individual would sacrifice himself for the 
general good of the category. 
Oliveira Viana blamed this failure of the industrialists on their 
lack of associability, which he attributed to their having developed 
in a climate of prosperity created by an absence of competition (thanks 
to protectionism), maximum production and unlimited marketso Now, how-
ever, Brazil was passing into an economy of limited markets and instead 
of initiative, efficiency and productivity, they needed limitation, 
control and coordination. Since the industrialists were unable to 
control and rationalise their activities themselves, the State \'Tould 
have to do it for them, compulsorily organising them so as to disci-
pline production and educate the industrial elites in the habits of 
corporative co-operation and solidarity. 
Such vie\oJs only serve to show how amazingly out-of -touch with 
"national realities" Oliveira Viana had become by 1940. Nevertheless, 
he did realise that Brazil was a vast country with plenty of room for 
expansion, yet he could only conceive of the corporative regime as 
2 
one of "control and limitation" . Thus it could only be applied to 
the sectors of production which were in a state of crisis, such as 
export products (coffee) and certain manufactures (textiles)o Else-
where, and particularly in expanding the area of settlement, "we 
3 
still need to cultivate the spirit of the bandeirantes". The March 
tm.,rards the West was only possible in a purely individualistic economy, 
beyond corporative control, and the only philosophy suitable for this 
was "the philosopliy of free enterprise, complete individualism and 
complete freedom on the one hand and on the other, of individual 
property, unlimited production and maximum profit". 4 
Thus,_ paradoxically, on the vital question of economic develop-
ment, Oliveira Viana ended his days as a laisser-faire economic 
liberal! Yet in the article with which he closed the book, he revealed 
his sense of political realities, ending with an acute prophesy. Writing 
towards the end of the war, he vrarned his readers not to expect a return 
to liberal individualism with the victory of the democracies: 
"There is nothing more mistaken than to suppose that [ ... J the State will lose its influence, returning 
to its former role as a mere policeman and to the 
limitations on its interventionism vrhich the old 
doctrinaires of the Liberal State fought for". 5 
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The State would continue to play an interventionist role, although 
",i thout the rigid methods of the totalitarian regimes and with greater 
participation by the masses and pressure groups. Conse~uently, despite 
their conflicting ideas on economic matters, Oliveira Viana and 
Roberto Simonsen were as one in their view of the new role \.,rhich the 
State \ofOuld play in the post-war world. 
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FOOTNOTES 
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BIBLIOGRAPHY. 
NOTE. 
I have used the modern Brazilian Portuguese ortho-
graphy except for the titles of publications and pers-
onal names. In the case of the latter, I have adopted 
the spellj_ng which seems to me to be the most frequently 
used. 
The English word 'state' is used in two senses in 
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pensamento brasileiro, Rio de Janeiro, 1942, pp. 
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